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1Introduction 
England’s higher education system has expanded greatly in the last half century, and its 
universities rank among the world’s best. But England also remains a country with persistent 
socio-economic disparities in access to higher education. Rectifying this remains an avowed 
priority of policymakers in all major political parties. In one sense, this challenge appears 
straightforward: the enrollment gap maps directly onto an achievement gap, as students from 
different socio-economic classes who perform similarly in high-school exit exams enroll in 
undergraduate degrees at similar rates. Consequently, policymakers have focused on reducing
disparities in attainment and high-school completion. However, implementing effective 
policy mechanisms has proven difficult to achieve.
This thesis consists of three stand-alone papers, each of which assesses a policy 
incentive that might alter the socio-economic gap in university enrollment; these incentives 
are encouragement, grade labels, and money, respectively. The rationale for examining these 
influences comes from a diverse range of theoretical backgrounds. In contrast, the analytical 
procedure used in each paper comes from the same empirical tradition, namely the Neyman-
Rubin causal model, which quantifies the impact of a given incentive by determining 
counterfactual scenarios to estimate the difference in outcomes stemming from either the 
absence or the presence of a given incentive. 
 The first chapter’s incentive of interest is teacher encouragement. Bourdieu’s 
theorization of habitus argues that students from socio-economically deprived backgrounds 
perceive formal education as a hostile environment in which they cannot succeed, thus 
deterring them from progressing to non-compulsory education and so exacerbating access 
disparities. However, more recent adaptions of this theoretical tradition suggest that teachers’ 
2interactions with such students may help to lessen these disparities. I use propensity-score 
matching to estimate the impact of teachers encouraging students to continue to the non-
compulsory years of high school on future enrollment behavior, both in those high school 
years and subsequently in university degree programs. To date, educational research on 
encouragement is generally qualitative in nature. To the best of my knowledge, there are not 
yet any quantitative inferential studies that assess its longer term effects, and this study helps 
to fill that gap in the literature. 
In the second chapter, I estimate the impact of grades in school assessments 
(independent of performance in the given assessment) on students’ progression to higher 
education. A variety of theoretical traditions suggest that information about assessment 
performance is likely to influence the subsequent behavior of school students, their parents, 
and their teenagers, and to lead to a bifurcation of higher and lower performers. In addition, 
Bourdieu’s sociological theories hypothesize that this information is especially influential on 
students from socio-economically deprived backgrounds, hence exacerbating disparities. To 
test these claims, I use a regression-discontinuity design to compare students who performed 
almost identically in national examinations at age 14 yet received different grades. Similar to 
the topic of encouragement, prior studies on this subject have used qualitative methods to 
explore students’ perceptions of summative grading and its potential pigeonholing effect on 
subsequent academic outcomes, but none have tested these theories with inferential statistical
techniques or linked the effect of grading to outcomes years after the examination.  
The third chapter’s incentive of interest is the Education Maintenance Allowance, a 
conditional cash transfer program for students from low-income households who remained in 
non-compulsory education at ages 16–19. Human capital theory identifies short term credit 
constraints as a barrier to students from deprived households being able to progress in non-
compulsory education. The Education Maintenance Allowance program, which pays students 
up to US$45 per week for remaining in education, was intended to lessen these constraints. I 
3assess the program’s impact on targeted students’ enrollment in education immediately after 
the end of compulsory schooling, i.e., the end of tenth grade. Continuation in education after 
tenth grade is relevant to higher education access because it is a prerequisite for entering 
university and a key point of socio-economic stratification in England’s education system. 
Unlike the first two studies, the theoretical rationale underpinning this incentive – human 
capital theory – has an established history in quantitative inferential studies. Yet, while strong
quasi-experimental research exists on the policy’s impact on enrollment levels at the pilot 
stage, there is a lack of studies that are of commensurate quality on the policy’s impact during
its national rollout.
This thesis advances research on education policy by spanning previously 
unconnected theoretical and empirical traditions (chapters 1 and 2) and providing a more 
accurate assessment of the impact of one of England’s largest access policies (chapter 3). 
Consequently, its component studies can improve our understanding of student motivations 
and some of the determinants of socio-economic disparities that it may be possible for 
education policies to ameliorate. Hopefully, these can enable researchers, policymakers, and 
practitioners to make more equitable what is currently a prestigious but stratified higher 
education system.
4Chapter 1: Does Teacher Encouragement Influence 
Studentsʼ Educational Persistence?
Summary
In this study, I investigate whether teacher encouragement to continue to the non-
compulsory years of high school influences the likelihood of students enrolling in (1) 
A-levels, (2) any university degree course, and (3) a degree course at a prestigious 
university. I do this by using propensity-score matching on data from the Longitudinal
Study of Young People in England. Further, I explore whether the impact of 
encouragement is greatest for those students in the middle third of academic 
achievement, as well as those with lower levels of parental education. Model 
estimates suggest that teacher encouragement increases the likelihood of both A-
level and university enrollment. These findings have important policy implications, 
especially since it appears that teacher encouragement has the greatest impact on 
those most likely to be on the margin for university attendance.
Introduction
England possesses one of the world’s elite university systems, with its prestigious institutions 
among the most widely recognized and highly ranked (Shanghai Ranking Consultancy, 2013; 
Times Higher Education, 2012; U.S. News and World Reports, 2012). But this should not 
mask the fact that participation in higher education, particularly at the most prestigious 
institutions, is highly stratified (Archer et al., 2003; Ball, 2008; Reay et al., 2005). Between 
5the 1960s and 1990s, the link between parental income and university enrollment grew 
(Blanden and Machin, 2004; Galindo-Rueda et al., 2004; Glennerster, 2001; Machin and 
Vignoles, 2004). Research indicates that this class gap has not eroded in more recent years: 
although it may be true that more students of low socio-economic status are staying in formal 
education beyond the tenth grade (the point at which school attendance in England ceases to 
be compulsory), this closing of the socio-economic enrollment gap has not carried over to the
high school/university nexus (Chowdry et al., 2008; Jackson, 2011).
Socio-economic disparities in enrollment map onto achievement disparities. Among 
students with similar high-school qualifications, socio-economic disparities in university 
attendance are small (Vignoles, 2013). Consequently, Britain’s incumbent government has 
focused on schoolteachers as key to redressing access inequalities (Reay, 2013), whereby 
teachers are judged primarily by their ability to teach students the core content necessary for 
them to pass national examinations (Stevenson and Wood, 2014). 
In this chapter, I analyze the role of teachers in influencing university access in a 
manner that is distinctive from the current norms of education policy in England. In addition 
to framing the role of teachers as teaching course material, I consider them as sources of 
support and advice for students. More specifically, I analyze the impact of teacher 
encouragement on students’ persistence in education beyond the compulsory years of high 
school. Encouragement has been discussed in past research on education, but most typically 
in relation to sociology and educational psychology rather than policy development (for 
example, McHarg et al. 2007; Moogan, 2011; Reay et al., 2001). 
Two dimensions of this study offer a better fit to the needs of policy research. First, I 
analyze a large-scale dataset that enables a quantitative methodological framework. Past 
studies of encouragement of school students often undertake constructivist analytical 
6approaches on small student samples, but, while important, these approaches tend to 
encounter concerns about the generalizability of their findings to the national scale. Second, I 
connect teacher encouragement to student outcomes that occur years later. Past studies of 
teacher encouragement commonly examine effects within the same academic year, but the 
longitudinal nature of the data used in this study enables inferential claims about sustained 
effects. 
Theory
The theory of habitus, as applied to educational access in England, provides this 
study’s conceptual underpinning. The utilization of habitus as a conceptual tool dates back to 
the Classical Mediterranean, with Aristotle using the term hexis to contrast the characteristic 
of a stable disposition with changing disposition (diathesis) and accident (pathos) (Nash, 
1999; Simeoni, 1998; Wacquant, 2005). While research fields vary with regards to whom 
they credit for recent applications of the concept – such as Claude Lévi-Strauss in 
anthropology or Jean Piaget in developmental psychology (Lizardo, 2004) – educational 
researchers in England focus on the work of Pierre Bourdieu.
For Bourdieu, it is crucial to recognize that humans operate within social structures 
(Reay, 2004); in his own words, he claims, “the cognitive structures which social agents 
implement in their practical knowledge of the social world are internalized, ‘embodied’ social
structures” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 468). However, he also eschewed the types of deterministic, 
structuralist approaches that deny any modicum of human agency (Ovenden, 2000), arguing 
that social science “must make room for a sociologically grounded phenomenology of the 
primary experience” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 127). 
Habitus serves to balance these factors in its depiction of human behavior. Bourdieu 
defines it as:
7a socialised body. A structured body, a body which has incorporated the immanent 
structures of a world or of a particular sector of that world – a field – and which 
structures the perception of that world as well as action in that world. (Bourdieu, 
1998a, p. 81)
Habitus is thus both the attitudes and tendencies that one develops as a result of interactions 
with others (Nash, 2005), as well as one’s ensuing actions (Reay, 2004). Cultivated over time,
an individual’s habitus forms a range of dispositions and behaviors indicating what she 
considers to be appropriate, desirable and possible. While an individual’s decision-making is 
not fixed across the lifespan, it is bounded at a given time according to prior opportunities 
and constraints.
Further, Bourdieu (1990) argued that individuals’ experiences and interactions occur 
within a hierarchical social structure imbued with the historical experiences of groups. While 
habitus occurs at the individual level as a result of the individual’s cognitive processes, these 
and social processes mediate one another throughout the lifespan (Archer, Hollingworth, and 
Halsall, 2007; Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). Hence, analyses of the social environment are 
paramount.  
While acknowledging that the aspects of identity that shape an individual’s habitus are
numerous, Bourdieu and co-authors’ (Bourdieu, 1998b, 2005; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977, 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) work on educational structures emphasized social class. 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) argue that upper- and middle- class students are more likely 
to encounter scenarios in which: “when habitus encounters a social world of which it is the 
product, it is like a ‘fish in water’: it does not feel the weight of the water and it takes the 
world about itself for granted” (p. 127). In contrast, students from the working classes face a 
greater onus to “engage in rational computation in order to reach the goals that best suit their 
8interests” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 108). These students are also vulnerable to stigmatization 
should they behave in line with their own habituses because “taste classifies, and it classifies 
the classifier” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 56), and, in formal education, working-class tastes are 
classified as vulgar (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979). 
Exponents of habitus in the English context echo Bourdieu’s claims about the 
importance of social class in formal education. Ball (2012) asserts that education policies 
“legitimate and initiate practices in the world, and they privilege certain visions and interests. 
They are power/knowledge configurations par excellence” (p. 22). Reay (2001) argues that 
the founders of England’s mass-education system in the nineteenth century sought to control 
working-class children. Both Reay (2001) and Ball (2012) claim that this approach was 
challenged by the growth in welfare spending post-World War II, but was then decisively 
consolidated in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. In a documentary analysis, Ball (2012) 
charts this consolidation in Cox and Dyson’s (1969) pamphlets, The Black Papers. In the 
wake of the previous year’s student protests in France, Germany, and Mexico, The Black 
Papers reiterated the importance of social order, hierarchy, and traditional values in 
education. Cox and Dyson also voiced concerns about slipping academic standards, a policy 
trope still common in the present day (Burke, 2012), as well as claiming that accommodating 
aspects of working-class culture and speech in school curricula might keep working-class 
children “literary primitive[s]” (Thornbury, 1978, pp. 136-7).
Among studies of current conditions, a common line of argument is that schools 
develop processes that reflect the socio-economic composition of their student bodies 
(Thrupp, 1999), forming institutional priorities wherein “certain sorts of choices or 
considerations take on an obviousness that is difficult to evade” (Ball, Davies, David, and 
Reay, 2002, p. 58). In other words, school staff instill in students a sense of which post-school
9options are feasible and desirable. In Ball et al.’s (2002) study, a student at one fee-paying 
school tells interviewers, 
I thought about would I go to Cambridge or not, because quite a lot of people, you 
know always think – am I going to Cambridge or not? I don’t know why, that just 
seems to be the question a lot of people ask themselves about higher education. (p. 58)
In contrast, one working-class respondent recalls from a visit to Cambridge, “it was like a 
proper castle, and I was thinking – where’s the moat, where’s the armor? Save me from this” 
(Ball et al., 2002, p. 68). This is corroborated by Archer and Hutchings (2000), who found 
that young working-class adults from ethnically diverse communities in London held clearly 
defined identities according to speech and dress that separated them from the tastes of young 
people who would go to university. Consequently, many working-class students do not aspire 
to university because they do not see it as a place for them (Archer et al., 2003; Reay, 2006); 
in contrast, middle- and upper-class students tend to come from families with a history of 
higher education participation, and so the decision to apply to and attend a university is 
relatively smooth (Ball, Reay, and David, 2002). 
This class-based disparity in whether to attend university also extends to choice of 
institution. Ball et al. (2002) argue that the choice process does not rest on prior cognitive 
performance alone because it is also the case that “university is a choice of lifestyle and a 
matter of ‘taste’, and, further, that social class is an important aspect of these subtexts of 
choice. In other words, this is choice as ʻclass-matchingʼ” (p. 53). Given the more automatic 
decision to attend, upper- and middle-class students are thus likely to have more time to 
select a university that better suits them, consolidating the advantages stemming from the 
guidance mechanisms already available to them (Brooks and Everett, 2008).  In contrast, 
working-class students who decide to attend university face differing constraints. For 
10
example, locality may be of greater importance to working-class students and institutional 
prestige to middle-class students (Ball et al., 2002; Pugsley, 1998). This adds another barrier 
to working-class students’ enrollment decisions: their likelihood of attending university has 
been undermined by their experiences with formal education, and this is exacerbated when 
they only consider a small range of universities as feasible for what “people like us do” (Reay
et al., 2005, p. 67), foregoing “tastes of luxury” for “tastes of necessity” (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 
177-178).
Scholars who have applied Bourdieu’s concepts to the UK education system have 
tended to theorize, much as Bourdieu did himself, that teachers are a complicit, rather than a 
resistant, component of an education system that perpetuates socio-economic disparities. This
engenders two primary concerns about the compatibility between (a) these concepts and their 
past empirical applications and (b) the hypothesis that teacher encouragement may be of 
particular benefit to socio-economically disadvantaged students. The first concern is whether 
Bourdieu’s theories are so deterministic as to deny the potential for such students to 
overcome the systemic barriers that they face. This concern is attributable both to theory and 
to empirical methods. By arguing that the entire education system is designed to reproduce 
inequality, exponents of habitus may neglect the potential for agency among working-class 
students that defies these macro-structures. As a consequence, this literature risks 
susceptibility to broader accusations of determinism made against Bourdieu’s theorization of 
habitus (see, for example, Archer, 2000; Jenkins, 1982, 1992; Mouzelis 1995). This is 
exacerbated by the predominant empirical approaches in this literature: researchers tend to 
explore students’ dispositions to higher education at the time of interview; because most 
studies are cross-sectional, this gives more limited scope for how much students’ dispositions 
may vary over time or in response to different stimuli. 
11
At the conceptual level, these accusations of determinism are somewhat ironic given 
that Bourdieu’s intention was to develop a critical theorization of behavior that would amend 
the determinism of past sociological theory by balancing agency and structuralism (Bourdieu,
1990, 1999; Reay, 2004). Critiques claiming that he fails to strike this balance have received 
spirited rejoinders in the sociological theory literature, namely on the basis that they fail to 
recognize Bourdieu’s assertion that structure is influenced in turn by counteracting instances 
of agency (see, for example, Crossley, 2001; Holdsworth, 2006) or that they conflate 
objectivism with structuralism (see, for example, Lau, 2004; Sweetman, 2003). Nonetheless, 
the structuralist nature of habitus compels researchers choosing to employ this theory to be 
aware of similar accusations of determinism in their own work.
Researchers of education in the UK have shown a keen awareness of the challenge of 
determinism. In their discussions of theory, responses to Bourdieu’s own rejoinders to his 
critics have varied. While the most common approach has been to revisit and accept these 
rejoinders (see, for example, Allen, 2013; Cochrane, 2011; Pimlott-Wilson, 2011; Reay, 1995,
2004), others have claimed that the coherence of Bourdieu’s writing fluctuated, while 
demonstrating a keen desire to steer clear of determinism in their own work (see, for 
example, Ball, 2003; Hernandez‐Martinez and Williams, 2013). Although discordant, these 
researchers demonstrate a willingness to engage with the challenge of determinism and to 
avoid it in their own research.
This care is reflected in analyses of empirical studies, which tend to treat habitus’s 
theorizations of structural inequality as powerful but not irresistible. In their studies of 
students navigating educational pathways, both Archer et al. (2012) and Pugsley (1998) draw 
attention to students who were exceptions to the principles of habitus, i.e., working-class 
students who were successful in school, in order to offer a counterbalance to the majority 
12
who corroborate these principles. Other research has been devoted to the experiences of such 
exceptional students as they progress towards the further and higher education opportunities 
from which they should be theoretically excluded (see, for example, Byrom and Lightfoot, 
2012; Reay et al., 2010; Redmond, 2006). For example, Baker and Brown (2008) attempt to 
identify factors, such as community cohesion and a shared sense of identity, that have enabled
successful working-class students to overcome the barriers that they face. Such evidence 
suggests that exponents of habitus have been careful to promote sources of inequality as 
constraining, but not defining, opportunities for working-class students (Vincent and Martin, 
2002).
The second concern is whether teacher encouragement to such students might help 
them to overcome the stigmatization that they encounter in formal education. Bourdieu and 
Passeron (1990) support Durkheim’s (1973) assertion that teachers hold a position of 
recognized authority; hence, teachers serve a “gatekeeper” role in education because their 
ability to distribute positive and negative feedback from a position of authority make them 
instrumental in students’ educational progress (Redmond, 2006). In Bourdieu’s writing 
though, efforts by teachers to rectify disparities receive little attention; instead, “as former 
model pupils who would like to have no pupils except future teachers, teachers are 
predisposed by their whole training and all their educational experience to play the game of 
the institution” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990, 132). Given the aforementioned tendency of 
schooling to celebrate cultural norms of the middle- and upper-classes, teachers are complicit 
in the stratifying role of education, as their judgments of students inevitably reflect and so 
consolidate social prior classifications (Bourdieu, 1990). Thus, in Bourdieu’s original 
conception of habitus, the role of teacher encouragement in challenging inequalities is 
minimal. 
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Much of the research to date on conditions in the UK corroborates the notion that 
teachers do more to perpetuate than to challenge patterns of inequality. In the latter years of 
school, teachers may give differential guidance to students according to social class (Preston, 
2003; Reay, 1998). Qualitative fieldwork indicates that teachers tend to under-appreciate the 
achievements of working-class students (Reay, 2005; Redmond, 2006), typically placing 
them in lower ability streams and less academically challenging subjects. Researchers in this 
field have attributed this tendency among teachers to conflate middle-class behaviors with 
cleverness and working-class behaviors with stupidity (Ball, 2003; Reay, 2005). Such 
designations are likely to have a lasting impact on students’ academic confidence and 
important repercussions for their university applications (Boaler, 1997; Steedman, 1988; 
Thomas et al., 2012).
Whether intentional or not, such discrimination by teachers is further exacerbated by 
households, as distinctive class strategies are apparent in families’ reactions to such 
judgments (Ball, 2003): since the formal school system reflects the norms of middle-class 
behavior, working-class families are more dependent on teachers’ opinions of their children’s 
achievement and behavior (Gunn, 2005; Lareau, 1997).  In part, this is because parents of 
higher social classes are often more comfortable engaging with schoolteachers, applying 
pressure to ensure favorable outcomes for their children (Cochrane, 2007, 2011; Giddens, 
1991; Reay, 1995). For example, at schools that stream by ability, such parents may be more 
willing to contest a teacher’s decision to put their child in a lower stream. Pugsley (1998) 
contrasts middle-class parents who are willing to demand that teachers provide advice on A-
level subject choices with working-class parents who are reluctant to initiate any contact, as 
exemplified by one interviewee who notes, “you don’t like to interfere really. You can’t, can 
you?” (p. 79).
14
However, there is also a competing body of research on conditions in the UK that 
works from Bourdieu’s theorizations but instead depicts teachers as “agents of transformation
rather than reproduction” (Mills, 2008, 80). Such work has moved beyond Bourdieu’s 
arguments against accusations that habitus is deterministic, not only accommodating 
exceptional acts of resistance to the prevailing forces of habitus, but arguing that individuals 
frequently choose to consciously resist such forces (Crossley, 2001), making these resistant 
behaviors intrinsic to the formation of a given student’s habitus (Sayer, 2005). Oliver and 
Kettley (2010) argue that teachers’ promotion of university applications is key to whether 
students from underrepresented backgrounds apply, and, across the range of government 
schools that they surveyed, they find contrasting instances of proactive encouragement and 
reticence that were not defined by students’ socio-economic status.
Student-teacher relationships are key to forming a student’s attitude towards formal 
education (Hollingworth and Archer, 2009), and Reay et al. (2009) emphasize the importance 
to student plans of relations with individual teachers rather than institutional culture. While 
also working from Bourdieu’s conceptual foundations, this literature provides competing 
qualitative evidence of the potential for teachers’ social interactions to widen access for 
underrepresented groups. Thus, unlike Bourdieu’s conceptualization of habitus in its original 
form, subsequent theoretical reinterpretations and empirical applications of habitus make it an
approach amenable to the notion that teacher encouragement might play a role in reducing 
socio-economic disparities in students’ educational progress.
Aims of the current study. Within the literature to date, most studies of teacher 
encouragement (for example, McHarg et al. 2007; Moogan, 2011; Reay et al., 2001) are 
based on convenience samples at either a single or small set of education institutions. 
Consequently, the extent to which their circumstances are representative of students more 
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broadly is ambiguous. Without more extended discussions of why a given site or sample 
group is of particular research interest, many of these studies forego the type of theoretical 
generalization that Eisenhart (2009) argues is so important to qualitative educational research 
methods. As a consequence, while habitus-based empirical studies frequently provide 
illuminating perspectives, the absence, to date, of inferential quantitative studies to 
corroborate their assertions weakens this literature’s capacity to make claims about students’ 
experiences at the national scale, which is an important consideration for policymakers. 
In this study, I provide a constructive application of the principles of habitus by 
testing whether teacher encouragement has a positive impact on students’ enrollment 
decisions and whether any effects vary by students’ socio-economic status and achievement 
levels. My use of quantitative methodology extends the current literature because it facilitates
the construction of a credible counterfactual, and the use of longitudinal data makes it 
possible to assess the impact of social interactions on observed enrollment behaviors years 
later. The study’s aims are articulated by the following research questions:
1. If a teacher encourages a student to progress to the non-compulsory years of high 
school, does this increase the likelihood of that student enrolling in A-levels?
2. Does any impact extend to future enrollment in a) any university and b) a high-
prestige university?
3. For all outcomes, does the impact of teacher encouragement vary by parental 
education or students’ prior academic achievement?
Although I use Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to theorize class disparities in access 
and choice, my empirical strategy is markedly different from the norms of the habitus 
16
literature in England. More specifically, I use a quantitative estimation approach rather than 
the more common qualitative approaches of interviews, focus groups, and ethnographic 
observation, and, as a consequence, I relinquish affordances of those approaches. For 
example, with qualitative methods, researchers have been able to provide phenomenological 
studies that represent students’ decision-making in a nuanced, heterogeneous manner. 
In contrast, I use a straightforward measure of students’ perceived encouragement 
from teachers, and link the impact of this encouragement to observed enrollment behavior in 
subsequent years. The measure is a closed survey question: did they [the teacher] tell you 
[the student] that they thought you should stay on in full-time education? Thus, it can only 
examine a single dimension of teacher interactions with students, and in a narrow manner. 
In the research literature though, no standard approach has yet been accepted for 
operationalizing either teacher encouragement or support. Past studies have varied in how 
they operationalize encouragement, although most if not all focus on students’ perceptions. 
Reay et al. (2001) define teacher encouragement as persuading students that there are benefits
to staying in higher education. Moogan (2011) discusses teacher encouragement in terms of 
teachers sharing information about their own experiences in higher education, as well as 
information about the type of school attainment necessary in order to make feasible a 
particular choice of subject major at university. McHarg et al. (2007) treat support as a 
teacher telling students they should continue to post-compulsory education and provides 
information about whether they are likely to get the requisite grades. Among quantitative 
studies, Berzin (2010) uses a scale based on 11 questions asked of students about teacher 
support, but does not specify what these questions are. In their study of student aspirations, 
Anders and Micklewright (2013) use the same question from the Longitudinal Study of 
Young People in England (LSYPE) survey to measure teacher encouragement as I do in this 
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study. 
Students answered this survey question during the same school year to which the 
question relates (i.e., tenth grade). Still, it is worth noting that this measure of encouragement 
is vulnerable to potential sources of bias. One challenge is that students’ interpretation of the 
question might vary systematically according to prior characteristics. For example, students 
who feel more positively than others about school prior to tenth grade may be more likely to 
interpret the same interaction with a teacher as encouragement. A similar but distinct 
challenge is response bias: students may be consistent in how they interpret an interaction but
differ in their reporting of it. Again, this might differ according to background characteristics 
such as self-worth, aspirations, and prior attainment. Both challenges increase the risk of 
spurious estimations of teacher encouragement when systematic differences occur according 
to past characteristics likely to correlate with enrollment in post-compulsory education.
The Empirical Model
I work from the assumption that it is implausible that teachers are randomly choosing 
which students to encourage to continue to the final years of schooling. Such non-random 
provision of support is likely to create a selection bias in the ‘treatment’ of interest. Further, 
this selection bias is likely to be apparent in treatment status across a range of covariates that 
the research literature indicates are predictors of educational attainment. For example, on 
average teachers are more likely to provide encouragement to students with higher prior 
attainment (Franklin, 1995; McHarg et al., 2007). Nonetheless, my hypothesis is that, even 
after accounting for selection bias, students receiving encouragement from teachers are more 
likely to progress to university than those who do not. 
I attempt to account for selection bias in the receipt of encouragement by establishing 
the counterfactual. The counterfactual compares two outcomes for any individual: first, 
18
receiving the ʻtreatment’ (in this paper, teacher encouragement), and second, not receiving the
treatment (Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986). Either outcome can potentially occur for any 
individual in the analysis (Holland, 1986), but only one actually does occur, providing the 
observed outcome, while the other, the unobserved outcome, does not. 
Assessing the difference between the observed and unobserved outcomes can ideally 
be achieved using random assignment of ʻtreatment’ and ʻnon-treatment’ across a sufficiently 
large group, since all other characteristics that might influence the outcome of interest will be
indistinguishable, on average, between the groups. However, random assignment is rarely 
feasible for many ʻtreatments’ of interest to social science researchers. This has led to the 
development of quasi-experimental methods that seek to statistically emulate features of 
random assignment. Among these, the most common are various forms of regression. These 
parametric methods control, or hold constant, other characteristics that influence the outcome 
of interest and would be equally distributed across treated and untreated groups under random
assignment. Yet, although popular, the assumptions underlying regression analyses are 
stringent and will not hold in many cases (Reynolds and DesJardins, 2009). For instance, it is 
important to control for all potential confounding factors. Further, these controls must either 
have a linear relationship with the outcome of interest or the researcher must successfully 
predict the characteristics of the non-linear relationship.
Matching provides a non-parametric alternative to regression analyses. Matching 
individuals in treatment and control groups according to identical values for confounding 
characteristics would allow for treatment and control groups to be identical (at least across 
observed characteristics) except for receipt of the treatment, thus providing a strong 
approximation of a randomized trial. However, matching across numerous characteristics 
increases the likelihood of encountering the “curse of dimensionality”: as the number of 
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characteristics increases for which a match is needed, the probability of finding individuals in
both groups with matching characteristics goes to zero (Reynolds and DesJardins, 2009).
Propensity-score matching offers a solution to this challenge. Instead of comparing 
individuals across multiple characteristics, the approach matches on a single dimension: the 
probability of receiving the treatment of interest (Rubin, 1997). The propensity score is 
created for each individual by estimating a logistic regression on observed characteristics to 
calculate the probability of receiving the treatment. As Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have 
demonstrated, matching on the probability of covariate occurrence is equivalent to directly 
matching on covariate existence. The impact of the treatment is then estimated by calculating 
the average difference in the outcome of interest between pairs with matching propensity 
scores across the treatment and control groups. 
My goal is to identify the average treatment on the treated (ATT). In other words, I 
aim to assess the average impact of encouragement on the subset of students who received 
encouragement. This is a different goal from the average treatment effect (ATE), for which I 
would calculate the average impact of the treatment on both treated and untreated individuals.
The reason for targeting the ATT over the ATE is that teacher encouragement is not randomly 
assigned, and so an estimation of the impact of encouragement on all students may be less 
plausible and so have fewer practical implications.  In addition, it may not be feasible or 
desirable for teachers to encourage all students to continue to the non-compulsory years of 
high school. 
The ATT is formally identified as:
ATT = E(Y
1
 | T = 1) – E(Y
0
 | T = 1), (1)
where E(Y
1
 | T = 1) represents the conditional expectation of Y1 given T equals 1. This is 
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readily observable in the data by finding the enrollment rate among students who received 
encouragement. The second part of the right-hand side, E(Y
0
 | T = 1), represents the 
conditional expectation of Y0 given T equals 1. This is the counterfactual, i.e., the unobserved
outcome.
I attempt to provide a reliable estimate of this counterfactual through the use of 
propensity score matching. Using a set of predictors, I estimate a logistic regression model to 
determine each student’s propensity score, i.e., the probability of receiving the treatment:
log
P s
1−P s
= α + β1 X 1 s + β2 X 2s + ... + βk X ks + ϵs
(2)
where Ps is the estimated propensity score for student s, α and β1 through βk are estimated 
coefficients, and ɛs represents a random error term that is logistically distributed. X1 to Xk are 
all of the observed background characteristics that I discuss subsequently. This model is 
estimated with the LSYPE’s survey weights, and standard errors are clustered at the level of 
schools. Each student’s propensity score is estimated once and then used in all subsequent 
matching models.
After estimating each student’s propensity score, I derive the ATT through kernel-
based matching as developed by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998). Evidence suggests 
that the kernel approach to matching is more precise than the most common alternatives, 
radius and one-to-one matching (Frolich, 2004). Kernel matching is a non-parametric 
estimation approach that uses multiple untreated participants to generate the counterfactual 
for any treated individual. This offers a trade-off in comparison to one-to-one matching, as 
matching on additional observations with more dissimilar propensities reduces variance, but 
at the risk of increased bias (i.e., non-comparability between a treatment unit and its matched 
observations) (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In comparison to radius matching, another 
21
approach that uses multiple observations, kernel-based matching reduces the risk of bias 
because it uses a weighting function that weights more heavily those observations with 
propensity scores closest to that of the given treated individual. 
As Reynolds and Desjardins (2009) note, the ATT for matching methods is 
represented by
ATT =
1
n1
∑
i∈(T =1) (Y i 1 − ∑j∈(T =0) w (i , j )Y 0 j)
(3)
where n1 is the number of treated units, j is the untreated unit, and w(i, j) is the weight placed 
on each untreated unit j for a treated unit i. I define this weight according to a kernel function,
K (ϕ ) , ϕ =
( Pi(X )1− P i(X ))− (
P j(X )
1− P j(X ) )
h
(4)
in which φ represents the quality of the match. This quality of match is calculated by taking 
the difference between the odds ratio of the propensity score for the treated observation (Si), 
and the odds ratio of the propensity score for the untreated observation (Sj), as a proportion of
a bandwidth h. I match on the odds ratio of the propensity scores rather than the propensity 
scores themselves because this provides more robust estimates when some respondents are 
oversampled in relation to their proportion in the overall population (Smith and Todd, 2005a),
as is the case with LSYPE. This is particularly important when using kernel matching 
approaches, because in these approaches multiple observations are used to provide each 
counterfactual and are weighted on the basis of their absolute difference from the treated 
observation (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
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Using this kernel function then, the weight for a given untreated observation is 
w (i , j)=
K (ϕ )
∑
j
K (ϕ )
(5)
That is, each kernel weight for the given observation j must be divided by the sum of the 
kernel weights in order for the matching weights w(i, j) to sum to one. Consequently, the 
kernel-based matching approach requires choices with regards to the type of kernel function 
(K) and bandwidth size (h), with the former typically proving less important than the latter 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). I use the Epanechnikov kernel function. In comparison to the
other most common kernel functions – the triangle and Gaussian kernels – the Epanechnikov 
kernel function strikes a balance between prioritizing non-treated individuals with similar 
propensities while still incorporating the results for a range of the non-treated (Reynolds and 
DesJardins, 2009). However, models are also estimated with the alternate kernel types in 
order to test their sensitivity to this choice. Results, which are compiled in Appendix 1.C, 
indicate that ATT results estimated with the Epanechnikov kernel are typically more 
conservative than those with the other kernel types. 
Choice of bandwidth size is essentially a tradeoff between limiting variance, which 
increases as bandwidth increases, and limiting bias, which increases as bandwidth decreases. 
I estimate models with bandwidths between 0.1–0.11, meaning that for a given treated 
individual the comparison match is derived from untreated individuals whose propensity 
score fell within 0.05 and 0.055 on either side of the treated individual’s score. I tried a range 
of bandwidths and this choice of bandwidth had the best covariate balance between the 
treatment and matched comparison group, which is an important prerequisite for the 
matching procedure to maintain validity (Guo and Fraser, 2010). Analyses were conducted 
using the PSMATCH2 program (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) for the Stata statistical package.  
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Data
I use data from the British Department of Education’s Longitudinal Study of Young 
People in England (Department for Education and National Centre for Social Research, 
2012). The Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) used a two stage 
probability proportional to size sampling procedure. The primary sampling units were 
schools, of which 647 were surveyed during the first wave. Respondents were born between 
September 1, 1989 and August 31, 1990, and were interviewed annually between 2003, at 
which point they were in eighth grade, and 2010. The average number of respondents per 
school was 24 in the first wave, although with attrition this average had fallen to 13.2 by the 
seventh wave. Respondents’ parents were interviewed for the first four years. Religious, 
ethnic and linguistic minorities were ‘oversampled’ in proportion to the English population. I 
use the survey’s population weights in order to account for this ‘oversampling,’ differential 
response rates across waves, and the use of clustered sampling within schools.
However, as with most longitudinal surveys, the LSYPE is prone not only to sample 
attrition but also to missing components – in particular, non-participation from parents – and 
item non-response (Piesse and Kalton, 2009). The challenge of missing parent-interview data 
is mitigated somewhat by only using items from the interviews with the primary parent or 
caregiver, rather than also using corroborative items from interviews with the secondary 
parent or caregiver, thus avoiding the chance of losing an additional nine percent of 
respondents. 
For the outcomes of interest, item non-response was lower than 1% for both the 
questions relating to A-level study (0.91 percent) and university attendance (0.21 percent), 
indicating that missing data for this variable almost entirely reflects attrition (Anders, 2012). 
Appendix 1.A provides information about non-response rates on other variables that have 
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missing values, first for when A-level study is observed, and then for when university study is
observed. For all variables, missing values were not fully nested within missing values for 
any other variable, with the exception of the geographic variables (region, neighborhood 
wealth, and urbanicity), all of which are generated from the same base variable (postal code). 
As Table 1.A1 indicates, non-response is especially high for the family-income and National 
Statistics Socio-economics Classification (NSSEC) variables, two characteristics that are 
highly correlated both with academic progression and to one another (Piesse and Kalton, 
2009). Analyses indicated that missingness for either variable was strongly associated with 
progression to higher education and was therefore not occurring at random. 
Since item non-response was particularly high for only two covariates, it might be 
tempting to create dummy variables to identify non-response for these respective covariates 
in order to hold the cases with missing data. However, while this approach would help to 
maintain sample size, any subsequent estimated models are likely to produce biased 
coefficients (Jones, 1996), and even original proponents of dummy non-response now reject 
this approach (Cohen and Cohen, 2003). Instead, I use listwise deletion, which yields 
approximately unbiased coefficient estimates even when data is not missing at random (Little,
1992). The main weakness of listwise deletion is the loss of sample. Yet, while the resulting 
loss of observations leads to larger standard errors, the estimated standard errors produced by 
models after using listwise deletion tend to provide accurate estimates of true standard errors,
making listwise deletion an “honest” approach to managing item non-response (Allison, 
2002).
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Table 1.1. Descriptive statistics for sample
% or
Mean(SD)
% or
Mean(SD)
Enroll in university 0.45
Predict child continues past 10th 
grade 0.83
Enroll in prestigious university 0.09 Parent Saving for university 0.27
Teacher encouragement 0.48 Home Internet 0.91
Region 
 Northwest 0.14
Religion 
  Christian 0.58
  York Humber 0.11   Muslim 0.03
  East Midlands 0.09   Hindu 0.01
  West Midlands 0.12   Sikh 0.01
  East 0.11   Other 0.01
  London 0.10   None 0.37
  Southeast 0.16 Religiosity (1=high, 4=low) 3.1(1.0)
  Southwest 0.11
Academic aptitude 
 5th grade English 27.4 (4.0)
Rural area 0.22   5th grade math 27.4 (4.6)
IDACI score 0.18 (0.16)   5th grade science 28.9 (3.4)
Household income
34,234
(29,738)   8th grade English 34.7 (5.7)
Parent education   8th grade math 37.4 (7.3)
  No educational qualifications 0.07   8th grade science 34.8 (6.2)
  Sub-10th grade qualification 0.05 Female 0.51
  10th grade qualification 0.25
Racial/ethnic identity
  Afro-Caribbean 0.04
  12th grade qualification 0.20   South Asian 0.06
  Post-high school, not degree 0.18   Other minority 0.01
  University degree 0.19 English foreign language 0.03
Parent occupational status (NSSEC)
  High 0.47 British-born 0.96
  Medium 0.28 Aware of EMA policy 0.64
  Low 0.14 Free school meals 0.09
  Parent long-term unemployed 0.11 Special educational needs 0.18
N 4,300
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Figure 1.1. Defining the sample size
Consequently, this analysis uses a partial sample of respondents from the LSYPE dataset. 
Figure 1.1 presents the stages in which this sample was restricted. The first wave of 
interviews sampled 15,770 respondents in 2003, when they were in eighth grade; by the 
seventh and final wave in 2010, the number of participants had fallen to 8,682. However, I 
only consider those respondents still participating by the seventh wave and who, with the  
exceptions mentioned, responded to all variables used in the analyses. This left a restricted 
sample of 4,300 respondents. Table 1.1 presents a full range of descriptive statistics for the 
restricted sample of 4,300 observations, after the requisite adjustment for population weights.
Given that I restrict my sample on the basis of missing responses, it is not possible to 
check the comparability of the restricted and full samples across a broad range of respondent 
characteristics. However, because the LSYPE is linked to the government’s National Pupil 
Database, it is possible to compare attainment in national examinations between my restricted
sample and the full LSYPE sample, as presented in Table 1.2. The restricted sample 
performed significantly better than the full sample in examinations at all three time points, 
indicating that the restricted sample is not directly representative of the full sample. 
Consequently, subsequent model estimates of the impact of encouragement should not be 
taken as accurate point estimates for the full LSYPE cohort, but rather as indicative of trends.
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Table 1.2. Comparison of restricted and full samples
Restricted sample Full sample
Mean (SD) n Mean (SD) n Difference in
means
National examinations at:
   Fifth grade (Key Stage 2 average) 27.9(3.6) 4,300 27.1(4.1) 14,559 0.8*
   Eighth grade (Key Stage 3 average) 35.7(6.0) 4,300 33.8(6.8) 14,828 1.9***
   Tenth grade (GCSE capped points) 326.5(83.8) 4,300 295.6(111) 15,329 30.9***
Notes: Asterisks indicate significant difference in means between samples: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Model variables
Outcomes of interest
This analysis focuses on three outcomes, which are presented in relation to respondent
ages in Figure 1.2. Each outcome measure is self-reported and operationalized by its own 
dichotomous dummy variable. The first is a given student’s enrollment in A-levels, generally 
considered the more academic pathway in the final years of high school, within two years of 
completing compulsory education (i.e., tenth grade). The second is enrollment in a university-
degree course at ages 18–20 (it is not possible to measure enrollment at a later age because 
respondents were 19 to 20 years old when the most recent survey wave was conducted). The 
third is enrollment in a university-degree course at a high-prestige institution, again at ages 
18–20. I operationalize high prestige as Russell Group membership. The Russell Group 
consists of 24 of the United Kingdom’s 119 universities. It is a self-selecting membership 
group, which arguably heightens its elitist identity. Although Russell Group membership is 
not an objective signifier of university quality, 22 of the 24 Russell group universities were 
ranked among the top 30 of the United Kingdom’s 162 universities in the most recent Times’ 
28
(2015) league tables, and its member institutions tend to set higher academic undergraduate 
entry standards than other British universities. 
Figure 1.2. Outcomes of interest
Key explanatory variable
The key explanatory variable of interest is whether a given student reported receiving 
encouragement from schoolteachers to continue to A-levels, the more academic pathway 
offered for the non-compulsory final two years of schooling in England. This measure is 
operationalized as a student’s self-report during tenth grade (the final compulsory year of 
schooling) of whether they recall any teacher encouraging them to continue to A-levels. The 
variable is dichotomous, with students either reporting encouragement from one or more 
teachers, or not at all.
Model controls
Because my aim is not simply to establish an association but a potential cause and 
effect, it is important to account for other factors that are linked both to schoolteacher 
encouragement and progression to postsecondary education. In propensity-score matching, 
this is done through the explanatory variables used to generate each individual’s propensity 
score, as per equation 2. Informed by the research literature on university participation in 
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England, the variables that I select can be grouped into four main categories: (1) finances, (2) 
academic achievement, (3) social class, and (4) elements of ethnic, religious, and gender 
identity. These groupings are not meant to define the role of each variable in teacher 
encouragement and university access, but simply to support their inclusion in the estimation 
of the propensity score. All of the variables that I list here were used in the estimation of 
students’ propensity scores. All variables are measured during LSYPE’s first two survey 
waves, which ensures that the explanatory variables are not dependent on teacher 
encouragement in tenth grade.
Finances. Multiple researchers have attributed participation gaps to wealth inequality.
Typically, these researchers do not explicitly ground this attribution within a theoretical 
framework. Still, they tend to be consistent in how they characterize the mechanism by which
wealth influences university access: poorer households perceive university to be 
unaffordable; even though government loans mean that this is not strictly the case, this 
perception hampers poorer students’ intentions to apply to university. Students from poorer 
households are especially likely to be intimidated by the costs of attending university 
(Pennell and West, 2005); while they tend to be knowledge about fees, they are far less likely 
to know about the range of scholarships and bursaries available to offset these (Chowdry et 
al. 2012; Christie and Munro, 2003). This challenge is further demonstrated by Davies et al.’s
(2008) survey data, in which two thirds of respondents not attending university said debt 
affected their decision “much” or “very much”, twice the rate of those who did attend. 
Moreover, the majority of these respondents reported that they chose whether to attend prior 
to any knowledge of bursary options. 
Financial controls consist of five items: household income, university saving, region, 
urbanicity, and neighborhood wealth. Family household income is measured as a continuous 
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variable, and its impact is estimated with a logarithmic function. Parental saving is a 
dichotomous variable, noting whether any parent or caregiver in the given student’s 
household reported having started saving for the student’s costs of higher education by the 
time the student was in ninth grade. Region and urbanicity are included because the cost of 
living varies in England according to both factors. For region, dummy variables are used to 
represent the nine Government Office Regions. Urbanicity is a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether the student lived in a rural or an urban area. Neighborhood wealth is 
measured according to the percentage of children below age 16 in the local area who live in 
low income households, as provided by the government’s Income Deprivation Affecting 
Children Index (IDACI). In addition, I account for internet access, on the basis that 
insufficient knowledge of financial support among poorer students is exacerbated by their 
relatively poor access to home internet (Gorard & Selwyn, 1999; Lee, 2008). Internet access 
is specified by a dichotomous variable indicating whether the student had access to the 
internet in their home at all while they were in ninth grade.
Academic achievement. An alternative body of research emphasizes disparities in 
educational attainment in accounting for the class gap in higher education participation. The 
theoretical justification for this emphasis can be traced back to Carneiro and Heckman’s 
(2002, 2003) extension of human capital theory, in which they argue that childhood 
disparities in cognitive development, rather than financial resources, between poorer and 
wealthier students are the principal causes of divergences in future education and 
employment. When controlling for achievement, at age eighteen the gap in continuation to 
further and higher education by socio-economic class may be as low as one percent 
(Chowdry et al., 2008). Since the introduction of university fees in 1998, social class effects 
become insignificant with finer controlling of educational achievement (Galindo-Rueda et al.,
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2004). As a result, policies aimed at improving attainment and attendance among school 
students may have the greatest impact (Anders, 2012a).
Academic achievement controls consist of students’ test scores in six national 
examinations. Students sat tests in English, science, and mathematics during the fifth grade 
and again during the eighth grade; each score is measured as a continuous variable. For 
models that try to distinguish whether the impact of encouragement may vary according to 
prior achievement, students are divided into tertiles according to their average score in these 
examinations. The number of attainment levels chosen is three because the high–mid–lower 
grouping is a recurrent theme in British education policy, both for how schools set by ability 
and how government policy briefings have tended to conceptualize student ability (Gillard, 
2008; Ireson and Hallam, 1999).
Social class. Researchers who focus on the role of social class in causing educational 
disparities tend to derive their conceptual frameworks from Bourdieu’s (1998b) theorization 
of habitus. As elaborated upon earlier, this theorization claims that working class students’ 
experiences of stigmatization in formal education deter them from progressing to higher 
education. Jackson and Jonsson (2013) argue that too much emphasis is now put on academic
performance, claiming that they “are able to point to differences in the choices made by 
members of different social groups, conditional on performance, as the crucial explanandum”
(pp. 332-333). The class gap in attainment varies by educational stage: while it may be 
lessening in recent years at the transition between tenth-grade GCSE examinations and 
twelfth-grade A-level examinations, it has persisted between A-levels and higher education 
(Jackson, 2011). For university choice, student conceptions of the type of universities that 
they feel would provide a good ‘fit’, as well as those that they think worthy of even 
considering, is guided in large part by social class (Ball et al., 2002). 
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Social class variables consist of the main parent or caregiver’s occupational class, 
education, educational expectations for the student, and home internet access. Occupational 
class is grouped as low, medium, high, and long-term unemployed; these are derived 
according to the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NSSEC) system. Parental
education is operationalized as a categorical variable, taking the highest qualification among 
parents and/or caregivers in the student’s household. Parent/caregiver expectation is 
measured by a dichotomous variable stating whether the adult expected the student to 
continue to non-compulsory education (asked when the student was in ninth grade).
Racial and ethnic identity controls. Many researchers have expanded Bourdieu’s 
(1998b) theorization of habitus to examine the role of racial, ethnic, and religious identity in 
forming students’ beliefs about higher education (see, for example, Archer et al., 2001; 
Archer and Leathwood, 2003; Burke, 2010). It is worth noting though that access disparities 
in England differ from those in the United States with respect to ethnic minorities. In 
England, students from non-White backgrounds are proportionally ‘over-represented’ in 
universities, in the sense that a greater proportion of university students are non-White than 
the proportion of English citizens of the traditional university-going ages. However, this 
varies by minority group, and is particularly pronounced among students from Indian, 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, and mixed backgrounds, whereas rates are lower for Afro-
Caribbean students (Chowdry et al., 2008). Further, minorities are twice as likely as White 
students to feel poorly informed about forms of financial relief to offset the costs of study 
(Adnett and Tlupova, 2007), and, on average, minority students do not fare as well as White 
students in achievement at university or subsequently in the labor market (Conor et al., 2004).
In addition, analyses of higher education access should not focus solely on aggregate 
attendance rates at the expense of analyses of which universities students are attending. 
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Minority students are more likely to attend ʻpost-1992’ institutions, which have higher 
dropout rates and are typically regarded as inferior to older universities (Ball, 2008). Despite 
the fact that tuition costs have been uniform for decades and now vary only slightly, distance 
from home plays a particularly important role in choice of institution for low-income 
students, and Pakistani and Bangladeshi girls (Gibbons and Vignoles, 2012).
Ethnic identity is first operationalized as students’ self-designation into racial groups, 
which is categorized into four dummy variables: White, South Asian, Afro-Caribbean, and all
other designations. In addition, a dummy is included for whether the student speaks a 
language other than English in their household. Religion is operationalized as a categorical 
variable, grouped as Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, other, and none. Each student’s main 
parent/caregiver was also asked to state the importance of religion to his or her life on a four-
point scale. In addition, sex is specified by a dichotomous variable for whether the student is 
female.
Findings
Descriptive statistics
In Table 1.3, rates of reported teacher encouragement, enrollment in A-levels, 
enrollment in university, and enrollment in a prestigious university are presented, first for all 
students and then according to parental education and prior academic achievement. These 
figures suggest that the likelihood of receiving encouragement varies considerably across this
range of observable characteristics: students with higher levels of parental education are far 
more likely than other students to receive teacher encouragement, and this is also true for 
those with higher test scores. These differences confirm the need for an analytic strategy that 
can account for confounding effects, as teacher encouragement is not occurring 
independently of these other characteristics. Omitted variable bias is highly probable, that is, 
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factors existing prior to encouragement are likely to be driving both the occurrence of 
encouragement and university enrollment. 
Table 1.3. Reported encouragement and enrollment by key characteristics
 Reports teacher
encouragement
(percent)
Enrolls in A-
levels (percent)
Enrolls in any
university
(percent)
Enrolls in
prestigious
university 
(percent)
All 48 60 45 9
Academic achievement    
  Lower 34 19 10 <1
  Middle 44 49 32 1
  Higher 57 87 71 19
Parental education    
  No qualifications 40 40 26 3
  10th grade qualification 46 50 33 3
  12th grade qualification 46 56 41 7
  University degree 53 77 63 16
Model Fit
Propensity score matching may help to account for confounding effects, but it is 
important to check the appropriateness of the matching model prior to reporting ATT 
estimates. In order to provide a robust estimation of the counterfactual, propensity-score 
matching analyses must adhere to three assumptions: conditional independence, common 
support, and covariate balance (Reynolds and DesJardins, 2009).
Conditional independence. While previous research comparing propensity-score 
matching to randomized allocation argues that the former may adequately emulate the latter 
(e.g. Dehejia, 2005; Dehejia and Wahba 1999, 2002), Smith and Todd (2005a; 2005b) have 
argued that the approach has considerable pitfalls. Among these is the assumption that, 
conditional on the observed covariates used in the model, the outcome of interest is 
independent of treatment assignment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Therefore, model 
estimates are sensitive to accurate selection of the characteristics that lead to the calculation 
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of the propensity scores. I aim to overcome this challenge by using past theory and literature 
to inform the variables that are used to generate the propensity scores. Fortunately, the 
LSYPE dataset has detailed information about respondents, and so the key themes in past 
literature on university access in England are represented. The fact that so many of the 
variables used in the propensity score estimation are significantly different between treatment
and control groups also suggests that there is good reason to include them. 
The greater challenge though is ascertaining which variables that are not included in 
the model would have further improved the propensity score estimations. Appendix 1.B of 
this paper provides information about Mantel-Haenszel tests (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959) for
each model, which assess sensitivity to omitted confounding variables by calculating how 
large an independent impact that variable would need to have on the odds ratio for the 
outcome in a given model to become insignificantly different from zero. 
Regarding what such potentially confounding omitted variables might actually be, 
perhaps the most compelling are data on school attended, teachers, and prior student effort. 
When estimating students’ propensity scores (equation 2), I was not able to run a school fixed
effects model due to the large number of schools in the dataset with very few sampled 
students. This is mitigated, albeit probably only moderately, by the inclusion of IDACI 
scores. Besides providing direct measure of neighborhood deprivation, the IDACI is highly 
correlated to school attended: 55% of the variation in IDACI is explained by which school 
each student attends. This is beneficial since the IDACI score can serve somewhat as a proxy 
for part of the variation in school attended. 
Unfortunately, the LSYPE contains no information on which teacher provided a given
student with encouragement, nor on any characteristics that might inform the likelihood of 
them doing so, such as experience, subject specialty, or attitude. While student effort is likely 
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to correlate with a number of the variables used in this study’s models, such as attainment or 
aspirations, some more direct proxy of effort would further improve the study’s validity. The 
research literature in psychology has developed a number of constructs for measuring effort 
(see, for example, Marsh et al. 2003; Midgley et al., 2000; Pintrich et al., 1993); 
unfortunately, none of these were collected in the LSYPE surveys. Again though, the model’s
associated Mantel-Haenszel tests indicate that any such measure would need to have a strong 
impact, independent of the existing variables, on the prediction of teacher encouragement in 
order to render spurious this study’s model estimates.
Figure 1.3. Common support between treated and matched untreated groups
Common support. The common support assumption requires that there are a 
sufficient number of treated and untreated observations with comparable propensity scores. 
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When treated individuals have propensity scores far higher than those of the untreated, the 
propensity score-matching approach is an inappropriate analytical procedure because the 
comparability of the groups is highly questionable (Blundell et al., 2005). 
Figure 1.3 provides a visual representation of the extent to which treated and non-
treated students have comparable observed likelihoods of receiving teacher encouragement. 
This suggests that most if not all treated students had a calculated propensity that was 
equivalent to that of some students in the matched control group. This was confirmed during 
the propensity matching estimation, which dropped just 1 of the 2,181 untreated students due 
to a lack of common support. This represents less than 0.1 percent of the sample, indicating 
that the paper’s matching analysis meets this model assumption.  
Covariate balance. The third core assumption is that observed characteristics are 
balanced between the treatment and comparison groups after matching. In other words, the 
matching process can only be successful when group means and standard deviations for each 
of the covariates do not differ significantly between the matched treatment and control 
groups. However, within the research literature no clear standard has been reached that would
provide the criteria for what does and does not constitute significant differences between 
covariates (Reynolds and DesJardins, 2009). Multiple methods exist for testing covariate 
balance between treatment and control groups, the most common of which is likely to be 
standardized differences and associated percentage bias (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Smith
and Todd, 2005a). However, the standard of a 20% bias limit, as established by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1985), seems somewhat arbitrary (Reynolds and DesJardins, 2009). For ease of 
analysis, I opt for a two-sample t-test of the difference in means across the groups for each of 
the covariates. Balance is achieved for any given covariate when it is not possible to reject 
the null hypothesis of no difference between the groups at the five percent significance level. 
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Table 1.4. Comparison of treated, all untreated and matched untreated groups
Treated
All
untreated
Matched
untreated
Treated
All
untreated
Matched
untreated
Variable Mean Difference Difference Variable Mean Difference Difference
Region Religion
  Northwest        .12 +.02 +.01   Christian .57 +.01 +.01
  York Humber .10 +.03* <.01   Muslim .04 -.01 <.01
  East Midlands .10 -.02 <.01   Hindu .01 <.01 +.01
  West Midlands .13 -.02 <.01   Sikh .01 <.01 <.01
  East .11 .01 <.01   Other .01 -.01** -.01**
  London .10 -.01 <.01   None .35 +.01 <.01
  Southeast .17 -.02 -.01 Religiosity (1=high, 4=low) 3.1 <.01 <.01
  Southwest .11 +0.1 <.01 Test scores
Rural area .23 -.01 <.01   5th grade English 28.0 -1.3** -.01
IDACI score .18 .01 <.01   5th grade math 28.1 -1.5** -.01
Household income 35,480 -2,460 -472   5th grade science 29.5 -1.0** <.01
Parent education   8th grade English 35.7 -1.9** -.03
  No educational qualifications .06 +.02** <.01   8th grade math 38.8 -2.6** -.02
  Sub-10th grade qualification .04 +.02** <.01   8th grade science 35.9 -2.3** -.03
  10th grade qualification .24 +.02 <.01 Female .52 -.01 +.01
  12th grade qualification .19 +.02 +.01 Racial/ethnic identity
  Post-high school, not degree .20 -.04* +.01   White .89 +.01 <.01
  University degree .22 -.07** -.02   Afro-Caribbean .04 +.01 +.01
Parent occupational status (NSSEC)   South Asian .06 -.01 <.01
  High .51 -.09** -.02   Other minority .01 <.01 <.01
  Medium .29 +.02 +.01 English foreign language .03 -.01 .01
  Low .11 +.05** +.01 British-born .96 <.01 +.01
  Parent long-term unemployed .09 +.03** +.01 Free school meals .08 +.02* +.01
Predict child continues past 11th grade .88 -.10** -.01 Special educational needs .15 +.07** +.01
Parent Saving for university .31 -.10** -.01
Home Internet .93 -.04** -.01 N = 2,119 2,181 2,180
Notes: Asterisks indicate significant difference from treatment group: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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In Table 1.4, model covariates are presented for the treated, all untreated, and matched
untreated samples. When comparing treated students to all untreated students, 20 of the 46 
covariates are significantly different at the five percent level. In contrast, just one of the 
covariates was significantly different between the treatment and matched sample groups, 
indicating that the analytical model meets the covariate balance assumption.
Model estimates
My first research question asks whether perceived teacher encouragement influences 
enrollment in A-levels. Results for this outcome are presented in Table 1.5. For all students 
who report encouragement, the ATT estimate is 7.7 percentage points, representing an 
increase in enrollment rates of 12%. While this is markedly smaller than the raw gap between
all treated and untreated students (18 percentage points), it is still large enough to suggest that
the ATT of teacher encouragement is significant at any conventional level.
Table 1.5. Average treatment effect on treated (ATT): A-level study
 
 
Treated
(percent)
Matched
untreated
(percent)
ATT 
(pp increase)
ATT 
(% increase)
All 73.9 66.2      7.7(1.5)**     12**
Parental education     
  No qualifications 63.5 52.0      11.5(3.9)**     22**
  10th grade qualification 66.7 53.9      12.8(3.1)**     24**
  12th grade qualification 67.4 63.2      4.2(3.6) 7
  University degree 85.6 80.1      5.5(2.1)*    7*
Academic achievement     
  Lower 35.0  26.6      8.4(3.3)*      32*
  Middle 64.0 52.3      11.7(2.6)**      22**
  Upper 91.2 87.9      3.4(1.5)*      4*
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
       
Further, the impact of teacher encouragement appears to be greater for students with 
lower levels of parental education. For those from the two lower groups (no qualifications 
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and tenth-grade qualifications), A-level enrollment rates increase by 11.5 and 12.8 percentage
points, respectively, both of which are significant at the .01 level. The effect of 
encouragement is relatively small for the other two groups (twelfth-grade qualifications and 
university degree holders), by 4.2 and 5.5 percentage points, respectively, only the latter of 
which is significant at the .05 level. The impact of encouragement is significant for all three 
of the achievement groupings, although the size of the impact is far greater for students in the
lower and middle thirds.
Table 1.6. Average treatment effect on treated (ATT): enrollment in any university
 
Treated
(percent)
Matched
untreated
(percent)
ATT 
(pp increase)
ATT 
(% increase)
All 57.4 53.3      4.1(1.6)**    8**
Parental education     
  No qualifications 49.4 39.1      10.3(3.9)** 26**
  10th grade qualification 45.9 38.6      7.3(3.1)*   19*
  12th grade qualification 50.9 47.8      3.1(3.7) 8
  University degree 70.3 70.1      0.1(2.5)           0
Academic achievement     
  Lower 21.7 17.1      4.6(2.8)          27
  Middle 46.0 35.6    10.4(2.6)**       29**
  Upper 74.9 76.5    –1.6(2.0)           -2
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
Table 1.6 presents ATT estimates for the impact of encouragement on enrollment in 
any university. Across all students, the difference between treated and matched students 
provides an ATT of 4.1 percentage points, which is significant at the .01 level. Once again, 
the impact of teacher encouragement varies by parental education, proving significant only at 
the lower levels (no qualifications or tenth grade qualifications). For these groups, there are 
significant increases in the likelihood of university enrollment, of 10.3 and 7.3 percentage 
points, respectively, representing an increase of about a fifth over the matched comparison 
group. When grouped by academic achievement, aggregate enrollment among the middle 
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third of students increases significantly, by 10.4 percentage points, equivalent to an increase 
of around a quarter in the probability of university enrollment. However, no change is 
observable for the upper and lower thirds, indicating that teacher encouragement appears only
to have an observable impact on those in the middle third.
Table 1.7. Average treatment effect on treated (ATT): enrollment in prestigious university
 
Treated
(percent)
Matched
untreated
(percent)
ATT 
(pp increase)
ATT 
(% increase)
All          12.9 10.1      2.8(0.9)**       28**
Parental education     
  No qualifications           5.4 5.2      0.2(1.7)       4
  10th grade qualification           5.6 3.2      2.4(1.2)*       75*
  12th grade qualification          11.5 7.5      4.0(2.1)       41
  University degree          20.7         17.0      3.7(1.9)       25
Academic achievement     
  Lower            1.2 0.3      0.9(0.7)       300
  Middle            3.0 1.6      1.4(0.8)       88
  Upper          22.4         19.0      3.4(1.8)       18
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Standard errors for ATT estimates are shown in parentheses.
Table 1.7 presents the results of all matching models for which the outcome of interest
is enrollment in a prestigious university. The impact of teacher encouragement on the 
aggregate of treated students is statistically significant, with an ATT estimate of 2.8 
percentage points. Although this is smaller than the percentage point difference for attendance
at all universities, it represents a larger percentage increase (28%) in the likelihood of the 
outcome than the aggregate ATT for enrollment at any university (8%).
Whereas encouragement led to an increase in likelihood of enrollment in a high-
prestige university for all parent education groups, only the tenth grade qualification groups 
was significant at the .05 level, although it is worth noting that estimates for the two higher 
levels (twelfth grade and degree qualifications) are also close to this level of significance. 
Regarding academic achievement, almost all students who enrolled in a prestigious university
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were already in the highest third prior to tenth grade, although the impact teacher 
encouragement on the likelihood of these students attending a prestigious university was not 
quite significant at the .05 level. There was an increase for the middle achievement group, 
from 1.6% among the matched comparison group to 3.0% among those who received 
encouragement, but, as with the upper third of students, the impact of encouragement was 
close to but not significant at the .05 level. Almost no students in the bottom third went on to 
enroll in a prestigious university, regardless of whether they received encouragement.
Discussion
Limitations
One key limitation of the propensity-score matching approach is its reliance on 
observed variables. However perfect the match between treatment and control groups on 
these variables, there will always be some degree of uncertainty on the quality of matching on
unobserved variables. I have sought to moderate this shortcoming, both through guiding my 
selection of variables via the past literature and testing for sensitivity to omitted variables 
with the Mantel-Haenszel test (see Appendix 1.B).
Another methodological limitation relates to measurement of the ‘treatment’ – a 
teacher encouraging a tenth grade student to stay on for the non-compulsory years of high 
school – since it relies entirely on student reports. There is no means of corroborating student 
assessments of encouragement with the perspective of their teachers. However, while this 
reliance on student self-reports may encourage readers to be cautious in accepting the 
findings presented here, it is useful in itself to learn from students’ perceptions of receiving 
encouragement.
Although the LSYPE cohort completed compulsory high school in 2006, it is not 
possible to make a straightforward extrapolation of these findings onto school students in the 
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present day. Since 2013, England’s government has made it compulsory for youth to remain 
some form of education or training until age 17, and in 2015 the government extended this 
requirement until age 18. There is not yet empirical evidence of the policy’s impact on youth 
enrollment behavior. It is important to note though that the government’s definition of 
education or training is broad: apprenticeships, part-time education, or training while 
employed suffice. The fact that I operationalize post-compulsory enrollment as studying for 
A-levels, the most academically rigorous option for most students, leads me to think that it is 
unlikely my findings would now be rendered redundant by a policy change that enforces only
limited levels of education or training.
Another contextual difference is that students now face higher financial barriers to 
continuing in education after tenth grade. LSYPE respondents had access to the Education 
Maintenance Allowance, which made weekly payments to low-income students who stayed 
in the non-compulsory years of high school. In 2011, the government replaced the Education 
Maintenance Allowance with the 16-19 Bursary Fund, which offers support to a far smaller 
proportion of students. In addition, the LSYPE cohort finished high school at a point where 
annual tuition fees for all English universities were set at approximately US$4,500. In 
contrast, this year’s cohort of school leavers face varying fee levels, with an average around 
US$12,000. Given these financial disincentives, both for completing A-levels and attending 
university, recent policy changes in England lessen the extent to which these findings can 
represent conditions in the present day.
Contributions
In spite of these limitations, this study makes an important contribution to the research
literature on this subject. My findings support Bourdieu’s theorization of habitus, but also 
diverge from it in an important respect. By indicating that teacher encouragement is 
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influential in students’ progress to higher education, my findings support the notion that 
students’ participation in formal education is at least partially dependent on the social cues 
they receive that legitimize their progress. In addition, my findings support the notion that 
students respond differently to such cues according to social class. 
However, they differ from Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1990) claim that teachers are a 
complicit, rather than a resistant, component of an education system that perpetuates socio-
economic disparities. This is because my model estimates suggest that teacher encouragement
has a positive impact on future enrollment, and that this impact is greatest for students with 
lower socio-economic status. As discussed earlier, research on the British education system is
divided, with some emphasizing the role of teachers in perpetuating inequality (for example, 
Ball, 2003; Preston, 2003; Reay, 1998) and others the role of teachers in resisting inequality 
(for example, Hollingworth and Archer, 2009; Mills, 2008; Oliver and Kettley, 2010). My 
findings corroborate the latter group. Perhaps this should encourage greater optimism about 
the role that formal education is able to play in tackling inequality 
To my knowledge, this research is the first to provide inferential analysis on the role 
of student-teacher interactions in university access. Since its methodology is unique among 
empirical applications of Bourdieu’s theorization of habitus, my findings broaden the 
evidentiary base for proponents of this theoretical tradition. The propensity-score model 
estimates suggest a sustained benefit to students when they receive teacher encouragement to 
commit to further education. The outcome is separated from the reported encouragement by 
around three to four years, yet significant benefits can be observed for recipients of 
encouragement. These findings add to the research literature by providing more robust 
evidence that near-immediate effects of teacher encouragement may also enjoy a degree of 
longevity.
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For policy researchers whose focus is university access, it should be informative to 
receive inferential evidence that relations between students and their high school teachers 
play a role in the decision to continue in postsecondary education. University access research 
ought not to conceptualize teachers solely as deliverers of course material and thus academic 
preparedness, envisaging family and counselors as the significant adults in influencing 
students’ career planning and aspirations. Instead, future access research stands to benefit 
from accounting for the relational aspects of teacher-student interactions. From the 
perspective of many students, teachers are likely to represent the most immediate 
embodiment of the educational system through which they are navigating. Even in the early 
years of high school, encouragement and support from this source appears to influence the 
likelihood of students making the transition into the non-compulsory stages of the K-16 
‘pipeline’.
Policy researchers may also take interest in the evidence of heterogeneous effects not 
only according to socio-economic status but also to prior attainment. This evidence helps to 
identify which students are most likely to be influenced. I find that the impact of teacher 
encouragement on enrollment in A-levels and university degrees are greatest for students in 
the middle tercile of attainment; this suggests that teacher encouragement has the most 
impact on enrollment behavior among those on the margin of continuing to non-compulsory 
education. This finding corroborates past research emphasizing the importance of prior 
attainment to university access (for example, Anders, 2012a; Chowdry et al., 2013; 
Marcenaro-Gutierrez et al., 2007). It appears that students with middling attainment are often 
on the verge of continuing in education; they are more uncertain than those with higher 
attainment (who are sure they should continue) or those with lower attainment (who are sure 
they should not continue). Teacher encouragement seems to offer an effective means to 
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improve enrollment rates among these marginal students.
There is not commensurate evidence though of a subset of marginal students for 
whom the impact encouragement on attending a prestigious university is especially high. 
Estimates from models with alternative kernel specifications tend to be significant at the .05 
significance level (Appendix 1.C), but I prefer to rely upon the more conservative estimates 
when using the Epanechnikov kernel. Still, given that these conservative estimates are close 
to the .05 significance level, they are too ambiguous to definitively reject the presence of 
heterogeneous effects for attendance at a prestigious university. Heterogeneous effects for this
outcome may not exist, but it is also plausible that they do but my current estimates are not 
able to detect them. This could be due to insufficient sample size, or my categorization of 
students into ability terciles may fail to identify effects among a more specific ability band, 
be it within or across the middle and upper terciles. 
This study’s findings should also be of interest to schoolteachers and policymakers. 
Its most straightforward, but arguably most important, implication is for teachers: if their 
encouragement is having an observable impact on future educational outcomes for students, 
this information should be shared with them. Many teachers are taking the initiative to 
encourage students to progress with education beyond the stages in which they will work 
directly with them, but it is unclear whether they know that this is having an impact. Still, it is
worth reiterating that I focus on the average treatment effect on the treated, which only 
estimates the average impact of encouragement on those who received it, not on those who 
did not. Hence, it would be unreasonable to extrapolate this study’s model estimates to all 
children or to conclude that teachers should start providing encouragement as widely as 
possible. Nonetheless, if this paper’s findings confirm to teachers the importance of their 
encouragement to students, this may induce positive feedback loops in their behavior. 
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I began by discussing the importance of recognizing the dominance of some trends in 
policymaking, and the relative diminution of others. It is in this respect that this study might 
inform the work of policymakers. Britain’s current coalition government has emphasized 
schooling as its main policy focus for improving educational opportunity and access to higher
education. This is logical: as mentioned earlier, university access disparities by socio-
economic group are high, but close to non-existent when only considering those who 
complete A-levels. However, within the broad topic of schooling policy, academic 
achievement has received almost the entirety of the government’s attention. Further, 
policymakers predominantly discuss teachers’ ability to raise academic achievement by 
improving pedagogy and discipline.
The mechanisms by which teachers can improve university access are thus bounded at
two levels: what they can contribute (improving academic achievement), and how they can 
do this (pedagogy and discipline). While policy necessitates prioritization, this conception of 
teachers is reductionist. Course delivery and classroom management offer important but not 
definitive sources of focus; teachers also have the opportunity to develop a more relational 
role, providing a personal intermediary between student and educational system. My findings 
suggest that students are responsive to non-formal cues and legitimation; as the primary 
figureheads of formal education, teachers may have more forms of influencing inequality 
than we currently acknowledge.
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Appendix 1.A: Missing data
For each row variable, Table 1.A1 presents the percentage of respondents with 
missing information for a given variable when model-outcome variables were observed. 
Table 1.A2 presents the correlation of missingness between variables when enrollment in A-
levels was observed. Table 1.A3 presents the correlation of missingness between variables for
when enrollment in any university degree and a university degree at a prestigious institution 
were observed.
Table 1.A1. Percentage of observations missing each variable, by outcome.
Variable A Levels University
n=11,823 n=8,664
Encouragement 4.1 2.8
Government Office Region 3.2 2.3
IDACI score 3.2 2.3
Urbaninicity 3.2 2.3
Family income 25.7 24.6
Parental education 5.2 4.7
Parental NSSEC 18.9 9.6
Parental aspirations 4.1 3.3
Saving for HE 3.6 2.5
Internet access 2.1 1.1
Religion 4.1 3.0
KS2 English 6.4 5.5
KS2 Math 6.2 5.4
KS2 Science 6.4 5.6
KS3 English 7.1 6.7
KS3 Math 5.3 5.0
KS3 Science 6.3 6.0
Gender 0.1 0.0
Race/ethnicity 4.2 3.1
Gender 4.8 4.9
Special educational needs 4.3 3.4
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Table 1.A2. Correlation of missing variables for A-level models.
Table 1.A3. Correlation of missing variables for university models.
SEN Encouragement Region IDACI Urbanicity Income Parental NSSEC Parent Parent Internet Religion KS2 Eng. KS2 Math KS2 Sci. KS3 Eng. KS3 Math KS3 Sci. Gender Ethnicity FSM
education aspirations saving
SEN 1
Encouragement 0.00 1
Region -0.01 -0.05 1
IDACI 0.07 0.04 -0.12 1
Urbanicity -0.03 0.01 0.09 -0.24 1
Income -0.02 -0.04 0.07 -0.40 0.10 1
Parental education 0.04 0.05 -0.08 0.40 -0.12 -0.43 1
NSSEC 0.09 0.04 -0.05 0.43 -0.10 -0.47 0.55 1
Parent aspirations 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.00 1
Parent saving 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.12 -0.20 -0.13 -0.13 1
Internet 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.22 -0.04 -0.24 0.24 0.25 0.02 -0.14 1
Religion 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.18 -0.09 -0.13 0.19 0.19 -0.06 0.14 0.04 1
KS2 English -0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.24 0.04 0.25 -0.35 -0.32 -0.09 0.37 -0.22 -0.07 1
KS2 Math -0.08 -0.06 0.03 -0.23 0.04 0.24 -0.32 -0.29 -0.07 0.35 -0.21 -0.07 0.75 1
KS2 Science -0.07 -0.05 0.03 -0.24 0.06 0.25 -0.33 -0.30 -0.06 0.31 -0.20 -0.13 0.76 0.79 1
KS3 English -0.07 -0.02 0.09 -0.30 0.06 0.26 -0.38 -0.34 -0.08 0.42 -0.24 -0.07 0.81 0.68 0.67 1
KS3 Math -0.08 -0.06 0.07 -0.30 0.08 0.29 -0.37 -0.34 -0.07 0.40 -0.25 -0.06 0.75 0.89 0.75 0.77 1
KS3 Science -0.09 -0.05 0.07 -0.32 0.09 0.29 -0.40 -0.36 -0.07 0.40 -0.25 -0.10 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.88 1
Gender 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.13 -0.07 -0.03 0.14 -0.05 -0.03 1
Ethnicity 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.39 -0.18 -0.24 0.23 0.28 -0.07 0.24 0.08 0.38 -0.11 -0.12 -0.18 -0.12 -0.14 -0.19 0.04 1
Free school meals 0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.40 -0.09 -0.42 0.36 0.51 0.00 -0.02 0.21 0.16 -0.22 -0.20 -0.20 -0.25 -0.25 -0.26 0.03 0.28 1
SEN Encouragement Region IDACI Urbanicity Income Parental NSSEC Parent Parent Internet Religion KS2 Eng. KS2 Math KS2 Sci. KS3 Eng. KS3 Math KS3 Sci. Gender Ethnicity FSM
education aspirations saving
SEN 1
Encouragement 0.00 1
Region -0.01 -0.04 1
IDACI 0.06 0.03 -0.14 1
Urbanicity -0.02 0.00 0.09 -0.24 1
Income -0.02 -0.03 0.08 -0.40 0.11 1
Parental education 0.04 0.04 -0.08 0.40 -0.12 -0.43 1
NSSEC 0.08 0.04 -0.06 0.44 -0.11 -0.47 0.54 1
Parent aspirations 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.01 1
Parent saving 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.07 -0.01 0.13 -0.20 -0.13 -0.15 1
Internet 0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.24 -0.05 -0.25 0.24 0.25 0.01 -0.16 1
Religion 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.17 -0.09 -0.12 0.18 0.19 -0.05 0.16 0.03 1
KS2 English -0.06 -0.02 0.06 -0.25 0.05 0.26 -0.35 -0.31 -0.05 0.37 -0.23 -0.06 1
KS2 Math -0.08 -0.04 0.03 -0.23 0.05 0.25 -0.32 -0.28 -0.04 0.35 -0.22 -0.06 0.75 1
KS2 Science -0.08 -0.03 0.04 -0.25 0.07 0.26 -0.34 -0.29 -0.03 0.30 -0.20 -0.12 0.75 0.79 1
KS3 English -0.07 -0.01 0.10 -0.30 0.07 0.28 -0.38 -0.34 -0.10 0.43 -0.25 -0.05 0.81 0.68 0.66 1
KS3 Math -0.10 -0.04 0.08 -0.31 0.08 0.29 -0.37 -0.34 -0.06 0.40 -0.26 -0.06 0.75 0.88 0.74 0.77 1
KS3 Science -0.11 -0.03 0.08 -0.33 0.10 0.30 -0.40 -0.35 -0.05 0.40 -0.26 -0.09 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.88 1
Gender 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.15 -0.05 -0.01 0.17 -0.02 0.00 1
Ethnicity 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.38 -0.17 -0.22 0.21 0.26 -0.05 0.27 0.06 0.39 -0.10 -0.11 -0.17 -0.10 -0.13 -0.17 0.02
Free school meals 0.12 0.01 -0.04 0.40 -0.10 -0.42 0.36 0.51 0.00 -0.02 0.21 0.16 -0.22 -0.20 -0.21 -0.25 -0.25 -0.27 0.02 0.26 1
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Appendix 1.B: Sensitivity to omitted variables 
This appendix provides information about the bandwidth and sensitivity tests used in each 
matching model. All matching models were produced using kernel matching with the 
Epanechnikov kernel, and Table 1.B1 presents information about the bandwidth used for each
matching model (for a more detailed discussion of kernel and bandwidth choice, see 
DesJardins and Reynolds, 2009). 
Stata’s mhbounds program (Becker and Caliendo, 2007) was used to calculate the 
Mantel-Haenszel test statistic (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959) for each model. This statistic tests
a model’s sensitivity to confounding factors, i.e., unobserved variables that might influence 
both assignment to encouragement and the likelihood of attending university. The Mantel-
Haenszel test determines how strongly the influence of an unobserved dichotomous variable 
would need to be in order to undermine the given model. In the following table, each model’s
sensitivity is reported in terms of the critical value at which the Mantel-Haenszel test statistic 
significance level exceeds the 0.05 level. For example, the first model’s critical test statistic 
value is 1.6. This indicates that, in order for the 95% confidence interval of the model’s ATT 
to include zero, an unobserved dichotomous variable would need to cause the odds ratio of 
treatment assignment to differ between the treatment and comparison groups by a factor of 
1.6 (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). To provide a reference point, in the logistic regression 
model used to generate the propensity scores, the greatest odds ratio for any dichotomous 
variable was 1.5, for the variable asking whether the student’s parent expected them to 
continue beyond GCSEs.
[Table begins on following page]
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Table 1.B1. Mantel-Haenszel test results for each model.
Outcome Subsample Bandwidth Sensitivity
A-level study All 0.11 1.6
Parent/caregiver holds
A-level study   No qualifications 0.11 1.55
A-level study  10th grade qualification 0.11 1.4
A-level study  12th grade qualification 0.11 1.35
A-level study   University degree 0.11 1.25
Academic achievement
A-level study   Lower 0.11 1.3
A-level study   Middle 0.11 1.6
A-level study   Upper 0.11 1
 
Attends any university All 0.1 1.6
 Parent/caregiver holds   
Attends any university   No qualifications 0.1 1.55
Attends any university  10th grade qualification 0.1 1.55
Attends any university  12th grade qualification 0.1 1.35
Attends any university   University degree 0.1 1.25
 Academic achievement   
Attends any university   Lower 0.1 1.1
Attends any university   Middle 0.1 1.6
Attends any university   Upper 0.1 1
    
Attends prestigious university All 0.11 1.65
Parent/caregiver holds
Attends prestigious university   No qualifications 0.11 1
Attends prestigious university  10th grade qualification 0.11 1.4
Attends prestigious university  12th grade qualification 0.11 1.35
Attends prestigious university   University degree 0.11 1.35
 Academic achievement   
Attends prestigious university   Lower 0.1 1
Attends prestigious university   Middle 0.1 1.2
Attends prestigious university   Upper 0.1 1.1
Notes: All models use kernel matching with the Epanechnikov kernel. The “Sensitivity” 
column presents the critical value at which the Mantel-Haenszel (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959)
test statistic’s significance level exceeds the 0.05 level.
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Appendix 1.C: Alternative model specifications
Table 1.C1. ATT results for models when re-run with alternate kernel specifications.
Kernel type
Outcome Subsample Epan. Uniform Normal Biweight
A-levels All .077 (.015) .084 (.014) .106 (.014) .074 (.014)
Parent/caregiver holds
A-levels   No qualifications .115 (.039) .110 (.037) .130 (.037) .101 (.037)
A-levels  10th grade qualification .128 (.031) .133 (.030) .158 (.030) .119 (.030)
A-levels  12th grade qualification .042 (.036) .060 (.034) .082 (.034) .050 (.034)
A-levels   University degree .055 (.021) .056 (.021) .073 (.021) .051 (.021)
Academic achievement
A-levels   Lower .084 (.033) .075 (.030) .084 (.030) .070 (.030)
A-levels   Middle .117 (.026) .132 (.025) .145 (.025) .125 (.025)
A-levels   Upper .034 (.015) .036 (.015) .041 (.015) .033 (.015)
 
University All .041 (.016) .048 (.015) .072 (.015) .036 (.015)
 Parent/caregiver holds     
University   No qualifications .103 (.039) .093 (.036) .116 (.036) .082 (.036)
University  10th grade qualification .073 (.031) .086 (.029) .108 (.029) .071 (.029)
University  12th grade qualification .031 (.037) .043 (.035) .065 (.034) .033 (.034)
University   University degree .001(.025) .007 (.024) .025 (.024) -.002(.024)
 Academic achievement     
University   Lower .046 (.028) .034 (.026) .043 (.026) .027 (.026)
University   Middle .104 (.026) .121 (.024) .132 (.024) .114 (.024)
University   Upper -.016(.020) -.015(.020) -.009(.020) -.019(.020)
   
Prestigious university All .028 (.009) .032 (.009) .041 (.009) .027 (.009)
Parent/caregiver holds
Prestigious university   No qualifications .002 (.017) .008 (.015) .013 (.015) .006 (.015)
Prestigious university  10th grade qualification .024 (.012) .026 (.011) .029 (.011) .023 (.011)
Prestigious university  12th grade qualification .040 (.021) .034 (.019) .039 (.019) .032 (.020)
Prestigious university   University degree .037 (.019) .046 (.018) .057 (.018) .039 (.018)
 Academic achievement     
Prestigious university   Lower .009 (.007) .010 (.007) .010 (.007) .009 (.007)
Prestigious university   Middle .014 (.008) .014 (.007) .015 (.007) .013 (.007)
Prestigious university   Upper .034 (.018) .038 (.018) .042 (.018) .035 (.018)
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Chapter 2: Do Discrete Grade Boundaries Shape Students’ 
Future Outcomes? 
Summary
The research literature in England has highlighted the importance of educational 
achievement throughout school in predicting subsequent progression to higher 
education. However, in contrast to existing theorizations of this relationship, exam 
results may not only demonstrate students’ prior academic achievement but also 
influence their future achievement. I examine the impact of discrete exam grades, 
independent of attainment, on studentsʼ progress to post-compulsory education. 
Employing a regression discontinuity design, I compare students who have received 
different grades on national examinations in eighth grade despite performing almost 
identically. Further, I investigate whether the impact of grades differs according to 
socio-economic status. Results indicate that both the English and mathematics 
assessments influence performance in school-leaving exams and enrollment in post-
compulsory schooling. For lower socio-economic students, this impact is higher than 
for other students and extends to university enrollment.
Introduction
Like many other countries, England’s recent governments have promoted higher education as
a means to national economic growth. Enrollment rates have increased accordingly: by 2012, 
student enrollment in the United Kingdom stood at over 2.3 million, representing a six-fold 
increase since the 1960s (Greenaway and Haynes, 2003; Bermingham, 2014). The proportion 
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of citizens aged 18–22 who were enrolled in a degree course rose from 5% in 1960 to 40% in 
2013 (Callender, 2006; Vignoles, 2013).
However, this expansion has disproportionately served students from the higher socio-
economic classes (Blanden and Machin, 2004; Galindo-Rueda, Marcenaro-Gutierrez, and 
Vignoles, 2008; Glennerster, 2002; Machin and Vignoles, 2004), and so undergraduate 
enrollment remains highly stratified (Anders, 2012a; Archer, Hutchings, and Ross, 2003; 
Chowdry et al., 2013). By 2009, students from the most advantaged quintile of households 
were six times more likely to attend university than those from the least advantaged quintile 
(Vignoles and Powdthavee, 2009). Thus, although England’s three major political parties all 
support increasing undergraduate enrollment among poorer students (Conservatives, 2013; 
Labour, 2010; Liberal Democrats, 2013), concerns about access persist. 
While researchers have offered a range of theorizations for this disparity, the strongest
inferential studies to date indicate that achievement in the early and middle years of schooling
is crucial. Such research demonstrates that achievement measures in national examinations 
explain a great deal of the gap in undergraduate enrollment across socio-economic classes 
(see, for example, Anders, 2012a; Chowdry et al., 2013; Marcenaro-Gutierrez et al., 2007; 
Vignoles and Powdthavee, 2009). However, the mechanisms by which earlier achievement 
drives future enrollment behavior have not been fully clarified.
In this study, I contribute to the research literature on educational access in England 
by further developing our understanding of these mechanisms. I do this by testing a key 
assumption in the education policy literature, namely that national summative assessments 
reflect students’ academic ability in a transparent manner.  I test an alternative hypothesis: 
that the exam results that students receive shape their subsequent educational outcomes, and, 
furthermore, that this impact may differ according to students’ socio-economic class. I do this
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by separating the effect of information that students receive about their academic 
achievement from the underlying achievement itself. 
More specifically, I aim to distinguish the impact upon a studentʼs educational 
progress of receiving a lower or higher grade, independent of achievement. For example, do 
students who receive a higher grade in mathematics attain at a higher level in the future than 
those who performed indistinguishably but received a lower grade? Through a regression 
discontinuity design, I compare the impact of receiving the average grade, versus receiving 
the grade below, on the transition to post-compulsory education. In addition, I test whether 
impacts differ according to students’ socio-economic status, thus exploring whether this 
factor may help to explain disparities in university enrollment.
The exams used are the Key Stage 3 national assessments in English and mathematics
that, until 2009, students took at the end of eighth grade.1 The key grade boundary of interest 
lies between the average grade and the grade just below. Grades are defined according to cut-
points in the underlying, continuous test score; students, parents, and teachers receive 
information on the grades but not on the continuous test scores. Examining authorities do not 
decide the cut-points until after students have sat the exams, and these cut-points change 
every year. The outcomes of interest are three of the criteria by which academic progress is 
often judged in English policy debates: (1) achievement in tenth-grade national examinations,
(2), enrollment in the non-compulsory grades of high school, and (3) enrollment in a 
university degree course.  
Background and literature
One key feature of England’s national curriculum is that students begin to specialize in 
subjects from an early age. At age 14, students select about 10 subjects – from approximately 
1 These assessments are now commonly replaced by an alternative, Cognitive Assessment Tests, the 
implications of which I discuss later in this chapter.
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40 options – on which they will be tested at age 16 in national General Certificates of 
Secondary Education (GCSE) examinations. Schooling ceases to be compulsory after these 
exams; those who do not pass five or more GCSEs – around 40% of students (House of 
Commons Education Committee, 2013) – tend to leave the standard high school system in 
favor of more vocational courses or employment.
Those that do pass at least five GCSEs are able to continue to the final two years of 
high school to take A-levels. Students tend to choose three or four A-level subjects, can only 
study those for which they took GCSEs, and must select specific subjects in order to study a 
particular subject for university. For example, students hoping to study medicine at university
are advised to take advanced science options at GCSEs and have to take chemistry at A-level.
In their university applications, students must specify which subject they plan to study. 
During their undergraduate degree programs, students do not take introductory classes across 
a range of subjects; instead, they only study courses in either a single- or dual-subject 
program from the outset.
All undergraduate applications are managed by a single organization: the Universities 
& Colleges Admissions Service (henceforth UCAS). The application process is largely 
uniform across institutions: universities have access to candidates’ personal statements, 
anticipated A-level results (as predicted by schoolteachers), and GCSE results. Only a 
minority of institutions use interviews to further screen applicants.
Students hoping to progress beyond the compulsory stages of education are thus 
required to choose appropriate GCSE subjects at age 13–14 and perform well in these 
subjects at age 15–16. GCSEs provide a strong predictor of future university attendance 
(Chowdry et al., 2013), operating as a “symbolic and material currency in terms of future 
educational progression” (Davey and Fuller 2013, 3.1). UCAS has been in place for 20 years,
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GCSE exams for 28 years, and A-levels for over 60 years. For two decades then, the national 
school curriculum and undergraduate admissions process for English universities have 
followed a consistent pattern with uniform processes. However, this system also puts pressure
on students to envisage coherent academic trajectories and perform well in examinations 
from mid-adolescence.
Although GCSE results are the first examinations to formally influence students’ 
subsequent opportunities, national assessments begin earlier in the lifespan. In fifth grade, 
students complete Key Stage 2 assessments in English, science, and mathematics. Until 2009,
students would repeat these subjects in Key Stage 3 assessments during eighth grade. In 
2009, the UK government abolished testing in Key Stage 3 exams. A standardized 
alternative, Cognitive Abilities Tests (CATs), have become increasingly widespread in recent 
years; the producer of these tests claims that they are now used by two thirds of schools (GL 
assessment, 2015). While the UK government has not mandated CATs, it promotes their use 
(Department for Education, 2014). In the discussion section of this chapter I will return to the
implications of the use of these CATs instead in place of the Key Stage 3 assessments; for all 
empirical analysis, though, I focus on conditions in which students took the Key Stage 3 
assessments. 
For the Key Stage 3 assessment in each subject, a given student, their parent(s), and 
teachers received level scores, equivalent to discrete letter-grade boundaries. Consequently, 
this grading system allowed for direct comparisons among students. In theory, all national 
examinations prior to Year 11 are low stakes for students in the sense that their primary role is
to assess the performance of schools (Daugherty, 1995), rather than to provide students with 
qualifications that influence their subsequent study and employment opportunities. Yet, 
Conner (1999) argued that Key Stage 3 exams had attained a de facto high-stakes status, and 
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the motivational impact on students of knowing how one has been ranked in such 
assessments should not be overlooked (Broadfoot, 1999). 
As noted, the strongest inferential studies to date have established that strong 
predictors of postsecondary enrollment occur from childhood and early adolescence. Among 
these predictors, prior attainment in national examinations is the most powerful (Vignoles, 
2013). However, while such studies have established the predictive power of attainment 
measures, the mechanisms by which attainment measures might influence enrollment have 
not yet been confirmed through quantitative analyses. One starting point is to divide 
explanations between those for which pre-existing attributes define and are reflected in 
attainment measures  – such as academic aptitude, self-discipline, and confidence – and those
for which assessment feedback has some impact in itself, independent of underlying causes of
a given level of attainment. In this study, I focus on the latter. 
Among policymakers, a common rationale for summative testing is that it raises 
academic standards (Harlen and Deakin Crick, 2003; Kellaghan and Greaney, 2001), but this 
perspective may take too little account of the complexity of factors relating to motivation 
(Kellaghan et al., 1996). There is countervailing evidence suggesting that summative testing 
is detrimental to students who achieve lower grades, i.e., instead of general uplift, testing 
leads to greater polarization (Bourdieu, 1998; Paris et al., 1991; Pollard et al., 2000).  
Correlational studies between studentsʼ self-esteem and achievement find an increase in this 
relationship for cohorts who have taken more national examinations (Davies and Brember, 
1998, 1999). Ethnographic studies find that classroom interactions changed in the wake of 
students receiving exam results, with the self-esteem of lower performers dropping (Leonard 
and Davey, 2001; Reay and William, 1999). 
Prior research across the social sciences offers a range of potential theorizations for 
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why the Key Stage 3 assessments might have a detrimental influence on those receiving 
lower grades. Among these, perhaps the most pervasive in educational research is attribution 
theory. Coming from psychology, attribution theory is a phenomenological system that 
focuses on an individualʼs judgment of the cause underlying a negative experience. The three 
key dimensions of an individual’s reasoning are whether an event was due to factors that the 
individual believed to be 1) internal to themselves, 2) controllable, and 3) stable (Weiner, 
2010).  For example, if a student attributes a disappointing exam result to insufficient effort, 
this cause is internal, unstable, and controllable, so they will experience guilt and regret, 
which are positive motivators. In contrast, a student who receives identical negative feedback
but attributes this to insufficient aptitude, a cause that is internal, uncontrollable, and stable, 
will experience hopelessness, shame, and humiliation, and so will see little point in studying 
for future assessments. In this theorization, summative examinations such as those at Key 
Stage 3 are detrimental to motivation and achievement (Graham, 1990).This is because they 
can consolidate what Dweck (2006) labels a “fixed mindset”: in response to this form of 
feedback, children are likely to frame exam results as evidence of permanent ability traits, 
lessening their belief that ability can be developed through work and so deterring future effort
(Dweck 1986; 2000).
Human capital theory, the most prevalent theory among education economists, 
proposes similar student reactions to exam feedback to those of attribution theory, albeit with 
an emphasis on different motivating forces. Stemming from the work of Becker (1967, 1980) 
and Schultz (1961), human capital theory frames education as an investment that individuals 
choose to undertake primarily in order to increase their future earnings. Different students 
will encounter different rates of return from education, and exam grades are likely to 
influence a given student’s judgment of the rate of return to undertaking further education. 
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For example, students receiving the highest grades should, on average, be those most 
disposed to anticipate that future effort is likely to lead to greater attainment and associated 
career benefits. 
Students who perform poorly on examinations relative to others can still benefit from 
further investment in education. In their decision-making, however, such students can lack 
sufficient information to accurately predict returns, or they may face psychic costs, i.e., 
stressors, that offset the benefit of investing in further education (Becker, 1976). While 
Becker did not expound greatly on the nature of psychic costs, claiming that “quantitative 
estimates of psychic gains are never directly available” (Becker, 1980, p. 198), attribution 
theory is just one conceptual approach that specifies why receiving low grades can stress 
students and deter future effort. These psychic costs may be exacerbated by discount rates: 
for many students, short-term costs may weigh more heavily in their reasoning than benefits 
that will only bear fruition in the longer term.
From the field of sociology, Beanʼs (1980, 1981, 1983) adaption of Priceʼs (1977) 
worker turnover theory treats exam grades as an extrinsic reward. Price theorized that pay 
was a key determinant of an employeeʼs decision to leave an employer, with increased pay 
serving to improve job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and limit search behavior, 
thus reducing the likelihood of an employee leaving. In Beanʼs adaption to undergraduate 
behavior, grades serve as a proxy for payment, providing students with an extrinsic reward 
for their effort that then incentivizes greater future effort. Those who receive higher grades 
are thus more likely to remain in education, as this reward increases their positive attitudes 
towards their educational experience and provides a resource that enables greater future 
opportunity. 
Whereas attribution, human capital, and worker turnover theory all operate primarily 
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with the student interpreting their exam results independently of others, intellectual 
competence is in part a function of social interactions (Aronson and Steele, 2005). For 
example, research from developmental psychology indicates that early adolescence is a 
period in which peer comparisons are particularly important to self-esteem. At this age, 
students typically form stronger assessments of their psychological capacities, whereas at 
earlier ages physical and behavioral attributes are more important; these self-assessments are 
based largely on comparisons with peers (Wigfield and Karpathian, 1991). This shifting focus
is accompanied by a growing belief that academic ability is a stable trait that is less related to 
effort (Dweck and Leggett,1988; Nicholls, 1989), serving as a deterrent to put more effort 
into studying because students who fail under such circumstances are stigmatized more than 
those who fail without putting in so much effort (Covington, 1992). Consequently, students 
who receive below-average exam grades may focus on present failure at the expense of future
possibilities, with the result that they avoid challenging tasks, revise their academic ambitions
downwards, and do not pursue post-compulsory education (Anderman and Maehr, 1994; 
Black and William, 1998).
It is also feasible that grades influence the behavior not only of students but also, for 
example, of parents, teachers, and school leaders. Within economics, signaling theory and 
bounded rationality have both supplemented human capital theory by relaxing the strict 
assumptions in Beckerʼs (1980) treatise that it is straightforward for individuals to make 
judgments about ability since they can both access and interpret all relevant information with 
ease. In contrast to human capital theory, the key conceptual underpinning of bounded 
rationality is that the cognitive cost of processing makes access to too much information 
counterproductive (Conlisk, 1996). As a consequence, students, parents, and teachers may 
respond to the cruder measure of ability that discrete grades represents rather than try to make
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more fine-grained analyses of the causes of the attainment that underlies these groupings 
(Papay et al., 2010).
Labor economists have theorized that grades provide an important source of 
information by which employers sort potential candidates in the absence of the opportunity to
observe their competency in the specific job. Here, sorting comprises both signaling, wherein 
students use exam grades as a means to send positive signals about themselves to others, and 
screening, in which grades provide a sorting function by which employers use them as a 
proxy to assess ability (Bills, 2003). Signaling theory is most commonly attributed to Spence 
(1973, 1981), who developed this approach to explain employersʼ assessments of job 
candidates under conditions of uncertainty. In the case of Key Stage 3 exams, employer 
behavior serves as an analogy: future employers do not have access to a studentʼs results in 
these exams. Nonetheless, it is tenable that key adults in a studentʼs educational development 
could use signals as a tool to help them assess the studentʼs educational development long 
before employers in the studentʼs adulthood. Beckerʼs (1980) original treatise on human 
capital acknowledges that parents are likely to play some advisory role in helping adolescents
to reach an optimal equilibrium position in how much more education they should commit to,
and, presuming that they do not hold perfect knowledge of ability, grades provide an 
important means to signal ability (Rosenbaum, 1986).
In sum, there are numerous theorizations of how grade labels might have important 
repercussions for students as they progress into post-compulsory education and early 
adulthood. Some of these theorizations may be more pertinent than others; for example, some
focus on adult behavior and so might not translate so well to adolescents. Focusing first on 
the individual-level theorizations, this concern is pertinent to weighing the respective merits 
of attribution theory, worker-turnover theory, and human-capital theory. Of the three, 
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attribution theory has the largest literary base indicating its applicability to the thought 
processes of 13–14 year-olds, especially given the body of developmental psychology 
focusing on the development of childrenʼs thought processes in relation to assessments at this
specific age. Furthermore, Key Stage exams exhibit key characteristics of the type of 
assessments on which attribution theory focuses: as a result of their official and formal 
nature, students tend to perceive them as valid, reliable measures of ability, reducing the 
likelihood of students attributing lower grades to chance, preparation, or other causes that 
would provide hope of future improvement (Black and William, 2006; Pollard et al., 2000; 
Vispoel and Austin 1995).
In contrast, while Bean adapts worker turnover theory to a group typically of the same
age as younger working adults, transferring Beanʼs theories to behavior during early 
adolescence is more tenuous: we currently lack research on whether children at ages 13–14 
explicitly relate exams to an educational system for which they have an avowed commitment,
or lack thereof. However, if one were to delimit the borrowing from worker turnover theory 
focus solely on the claim that exam grades serve as extrinsic rewards, this theory then 
becomes very similar to attribution theory: both focus on the studentʼs response to the 
assessment at the individual level and its impact on effort towards future academic 
assessments. The two theories differ though in that attribution theory emphasizes the role of 
negative experiences in demotivating lower achievers, while worker turnover theory instead 
emphasizes the role of positive experiences in motivating higher achievers. Observational 
studies from the UK suggest that the former holds greater sway: researchers noted that the 
frequency and magnitude of negative, stressful experiences that students reported in relation 
to Key Stage exams far outweigh more positive experiences (Leonard and Davey, 2001; 
Pollard et al., 2000; Reay and William, 1999).
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Human capital theory requires a further stage in the reasoning of students. Whereas 
attribution and the adapted worker-turnover theory both relate student experiences with 
exams to their subsequent judgment of similar experiences within the education system, 
human capital theory requires that students anticipate future employment opportunities and 
link their experiences and decision-making in school to these opportunities. There is evidence
that students in the UK link school exams to adult life, and that students interpret low 
attainment in exams as a harbinger of failure in adult life. For example, on the basis of their 
observations in a London school, Reay and William (1999) depict a classroom climate where 
Key Stage examinations serve as a criterion by which students judge themselves and one 
another. When asked what a high Key Stage grade would say about a classmate, one student 
responds “that heʼs heading for a good job and a good life and it shows heʼs not gonna be 
living on the streets,” whereas her own expectation of a low grade would say that “I might 
not have a good life in front of me and I might grow up and do something naughty” (pp. 346–
347). 
Yet, although students may link exam performance in school to employment in 
adulthood, there is not yet commensurate evidence that students are altering their behavior in 
response to summative assessments. While developmental psychology indicates that students 
can interpret their development in relation to others by the age (either 13 or 14) at which they 
sat the Key Stage 3 exams, there is not yet compelling qualitative evidence that they link 
these judgments to career opportunities at this stage and adjust their behavior according to 
anticipated future career opportunities. When challenged on the extent to which school 
children in the United States truly altered their behavior in education so as to align their 
attainment with feasible goals, Becker (1980) argued that parental input may influence 
students’ confidence, aspirations, and knowledge about academic requirements. This 
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consideration is all the more important in the UK where, as discussed earlier, the school 
system requires students to specialize by subject from early adolescence, meaning that 
students have to make potentially crucial decisions at ages when they are all the more likely 
to rely upon family and school teachers.
This contextual factor adds credibility to the theorizations – signaling theory and 
bounded rationality – that expand their focus beyond student decision-making occurring at 
the individual level, independently of others. This is particularly true with regards to teachers,
as policy demands for accountability may pressure teachers into allocating more resources to 
some students than others. In recent years, for example, policymakers have treated the 
number of students achieving five GCSEs (including English and mathematics) at grade C as 
a key criterion in judging school performance (Vignoles, 2013), and this metric figures 
prominently in governmental school inspections (see, for example Taylor, 2012; Wilshaw, 
2013). Teachers and school leaders may allocate resources accordingly, with less focus placed
on those students projected to perform well above or below this cutoff (Ball, Maguire, and 
Braun, 2012; Gilborn and Youdell, 2000). 
As mentioned, Englandʼs school system is characterized by early subject 
specialization. Within schools, ability streams may influence student achievement (Ireson, 
Hallam, and Hurley, 2005), and only some students may be able to take higher-tier GCSE 
examinations, in which they can attain the higher grades, or more advanced GCSE subjects, 
such as triple science. Given the high correlation between studentsʼ earlier and later 
performance in national assessments (McCall and Alcott, 2013), Key Stage 3 grade levels are 
likely to present an important tool for teacher and school leaders to help make such decisions.
Teachers receive the exam results in terms of discrete grades rather than the continuous 
underlying scores, and may prefer this heuristic over some form of assessment marked on a 
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continuous scale that they would have to generate in addition to the national examinations.
While these theories differ with regards to how they theorize the primary link between
exam results and subsequent student behavior, they lead to similar hypotheses about the 
effects of grade labels. Attribution theory, human capital theory, and Beanʼs (1980, 1981) 
modified worker turnover theory argue, respectively, that results mediate studentsʼ affective 
sense of self, assessments of future earning potential, and sense of satisfaction with 
education. However, while differing in this respect, each draws the same conclusion about the
effect of exam grades on studentsʼ future study behavior. While attribution theory focuses on 
the deterrent effect of lower grades, human capital theory and worker turnover theory focus 
on higher grades acting as an incentive. Signaling theory and bounded rationality both 
suggest that teachers and parents would use exam grades as a sorting mechanism to 
differentiate between students. Implicitly then, the hypothesis that would follow from each 
theory is that increasing polarization is likely to occur between those who attain higher grades
and those who attain lower grades on earlier examinations. 
In addition, none of these theorizations of grade label effects would lead, in and of 
themselves, to the anticipation of heterogeneous effects according to the subject of 
assessment or the outcome of interest. For example, none of the theories emphasize the 
relative importance of one subject matter over the others, no matter the mechanism by which 
they conceptualize a labeling effect occurring. Given that GCSEs, A-levels, and university 
enrollment serve as sequential points in the education system, there is no clear reason to think
that the effect of grade labels may be more noticeable in relation to one of these outcomes 
than another, especially given that none of the theories anticipate either a dissipation or 
compounding of effects over time.
The theories discussed thus far provide a basis for understanding how grade labels 
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during schooling may influence studentsʼ trajectories towards future markers of progress 
through the education system. What these theories do not offer, though, is a means to theorize
why these labels may serve to exacerbate socio-economic disparities in education. For this, it 
is worth turning to one of the most prevalent theorizations of the formal school system in the 
UK research literature: Bourdieuʼs reconceptualization of habitus.
Bourdieu (1973; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977) theorizes that behavior is socially 
situated, with the key influences in decision-making being the anticipated acceptance and 
stigmatization of others. For Bourdieu, it is crucial to recognize both that humans operate 
within social structures (Bourdieu 1986) and that human agency makes it possible for 
individuals to resist such structures (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Ovenden 2000). 
Bourdieu maintained this individual-collective balance by embedding habitus within a troika 
of analytical concepts, of which the other two components were field and doxa (Davey and 
Fuller, 2013). 
Within this theorization, habitus is both the attitudes and tendencies that one develops 
as a result of interactions with others (Nash, 2005) as well as one’s ensuing actions (Reay, 
2004). Cultivated over time, an individual’s habitus forms a range of dispositions and 
behaviors indicating what she considers to be appropriate, desirable and possible. An 
individual’s decision-making is not fixed across the lifespan, but it is bounded at a given time
according to prior opportunities and constraints. Field denotes the social space in which 
individuals interact, and it represents a more objective interpretation of a given situation than 
does habitus (Grenfell and James, 1998): “social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things 
and in minds, in fields and in habitus” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 127). Doxa refers to
the beliefs that are taken for granted by individuals within any one field. This embeds the 
individual within the collective, as multiple habituses and their component notions of what is 
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and is not desirable and feasible are entwined, shifting an individual’s self-restricting 
response from ‘not for the likes of me’ to ‘not for the likes of us’ (Archer et al., 2007; Davey 
and Fuller, 2013). 
The existence of hierarchy – and conformity to it – provides a crucial point of contrast
from more individualistic theorizations such as human capital, since variation across 
individuals’ habituses suggest variation in their beliefs about the benefits and drawbacks of 
higher education. Two students can approach the same enrollment decision with ex-ante 
similar propensities to benefit from choosing to enroll, but they may react differently to this 
decision according to their differing beliefs about what constitutes a desirable and/or feasible 
outcome. In addition, two students of differing habituses who undertake the same educational
experience are also likely to benefit to differing extents since “the rate of return on 
educational capital is a function of the social and economic capital that can be used to exploit 
it” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979, p. 79). Bourdieu’s body of work thus represents a critical 
analysis of the extent to which social mobility exists in contemporary Western societies. 
Education was of primary interest to him, but he was skeptical of its capacity to drive 
mobility, instead viewing it as an assertion of cultural power (Bourdieu, 1973). In one of their
seminal works on education, Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) argue that “all pedagogic action 
is, objectively, symbolic violence insofar as it is the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an 
arbitrary power” (p. 5).
While acknowledging that the aspects of identity that shape an individual’s habitus are
numerous, Bourdieu and co-authors’ (Bourdieu, 1998, 2005; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977, 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) work on educational structures emphasized social class. 
Considering elite universities in France, Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) depict university as a
field, wherein undergraduates attempting to access and navigate this space are taking part in a
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competitive game for which there are rules (doxa). Students’ knowledge of these rules is 
unequal, as are their dispositions (habituses) to take on study, with the more disadvantaged 
belonging to lower social classes. 
Disadvantage occurs, according to this line of argument, because the educational 
system legitimizes the cultural practices and preferences more typical of the upper and 
middle classes over those more typical of the lower classes. In contrast to these students, 
those from the working classes face a greater onus to “engage in rational computation in 
order to reach the goals that best suit their interests” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 108). These students’
study experiences are also vulnerable to stigmatization should they behave in line with their 
own habituses because “taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 
56), and in this field the prevailing doxa holds working-class tastes to be vulgar (Bourdieu, 
1986; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979).
Studies of pre-elementary and elementary education in England note that both 
mechanisms are in operation even by these stages (see, for example, Reay, 1995, 1998; 
Vincent, Braun, and Ball, 2008; Walker and Clark, 2010). From the earliest years of 
schooling, teachers label students as intelligent, average, or slow, and stream them 
accordingly; these designations are often predicted by social class and have a lasting impact 
on students’ academic confidence (Steedman, 1988; Thomas, Bland, and Duckworth, 2012). 
In interviews, Reay (1995) found that middle-class parents were quick to raise concerns about
group-reading activities for fear that these were aiding other children’s progress at the 
expense of their own. 
Such class disparities widen further when differential parental knowledge and 
confidence lead to asymmetrical competition to gain entry for their children to specific 
middle schools and, by extension, GCSE courses (Ball, Bowe, and Gewirtz, 1996). As noted 
78
already, England’s school system makes the consequences of subject choice and performance 
in middle school for later opportunities considerable. As a result, early manifestations of the 
constraining factors identified within habitus are compounded by the time students reach the 
later years of schooling, well before their course choices and exam performance have easily 
visible implications for university applications (Vincent, 2001). Hence, while many studies 
focus on students around the final years of the compulsory school system, this associated 
research indicates that the institutionalized constraints that students face are established from 
the earliest years of schooling. 
Within this theorization of formal education, exams serve a key factor, as across 
schooling they serve to consecrate the advantages of more privileged students, serving as 
both cause and effect of greater separation (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 104). Researchers of education
in England have used Bourdieuʼs theories to argue not only that better aggregate performance
on exams serves to separate social classes, but that differences in parental behavior according 
to social class further exacerbate disparities. This is because parents from lower social classes
have less confidence in contesting practices within a school, such as placing their child in a 
lower ability stream or demanding more extensive feedback on classwork (Cochrane, 2007, 
2011; Giddens, 1991; Pugsley, 1998).
Consequently, working-class families may be especially prone to accepting 
summative judgments about their childrenʼs progress and ability levels. National exams are a 
key case in point, as parents from lower social classes are less likely to challenge their 
validity or encourage their children to accept them as incontestable judgments of ability.  
Following from attribution theory, learners who attribute success to effort, and who perceive 
ability to be changeable and controllable, are likely to deal with failure constructively and so 
persevere with future learning tasks (Schunk, 1991). Hence, differential responses to exam 
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results by class are important because it is plausible that this may serve to exacerbate pre-
existing attainment gaps.
A major strength of the habitus-based research literature is that it provides clear 
empirical evidence for its theorizations of working-class students’ perceptions. These are 
given a central role in most research papers through sustained, uninterrupted quotations that 
make clear that students vary considerably in the role they perceive education to play in their 
own lives, as well as the factors that impinge on their decisions to pursue non-compulsory 
education. Typically, the analyses that accompany interview and focus group data are cogent 
and nuanced, synthesizing students’ views in a manner that establishes themes but is also 
careful to recognize discordant viewpoints. Such research approaches strengthen this 
literature’s ability to “make sense of the world from the perspective of participants” 
(Eisenhart, 1988, p. 103). 
Researchers employing habitus have also presented persuasive evidence to support 
their claim that English schools and universities are rooted in a normative education system 
that values upper- and middle-class traits. Although they only represent a small portion of the 
habitus-based literature, Ball’s (2012) and Reay’s (2001) documentary analyses provide 
compelling evidence that policymakers have pathologized working-class students’ language 
and behavior throughout the history of compulsory education in England. Further, research 
focusing on parental interventions with schooling belies Becker’s (1980) assumption from 
human capital that parents might compensate for shortcomings in students’ capacities to 
navigate the education system, suggesting instead that the enthusiasm and capacity to make 
favorable interventions is typically concentrated among those parents whose children face the
fewest structural barriers. 
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Aims of the present work
While I am not able to test the respective merits of these theorizations, I make an 
important contribution to the research literature. This is because my empirical approach 
enables an inferential verification of the presence, or lack thereof, of a labeling effect from 
Key Stage 3 exams, and so can initiate the type of generalizable analyses on this phenomena 
that are currently lacking for the English context. To date, those studies that are more critical 
of summative assessment in England have relied predominantly on qualitative research 
methods to discern the impact of examinations on student behavior (see, for example, 
Leonard and Davey, 2001; Reay and William, 1999). The major exceptions, by Davies and 
Brember (1998, 1999), provide quantitative representations of the impact of Key Stage 1 and 
Key Stage 2 assessments on self-esteem, but without providing the type of valid 
counterfactual scenarios necessary to make inferential claims. 
Quasi-experimental methods have not yet been applied to estimate the impact, if any, 
of grades received during these assessments on studentsʼ progress to post-compulsory 
education. Such methods have already identified effects of performance feedback in different 
educational settings. In Swedish elementary schools, Sjögren (2010) found mixed impacts of 
the use of grading according to gender and parental education levels. Positive effects of 
feedback on subsequent performance have been found for high school students in Spain 
(Azmat and Iriberri, 2010) and the United States (Papay, Murnane, and Willet, 2010). In the 
UK, Sartarelli (2011) has explored the impact of Key Stage scores on student behavior, 
finding no impact on most outcomes with the exception of bullying.
I aim to transfer such quasi-experimental methods to the study of the impact of 
summative assessments in England on students’ subsequent educational outcomes. 
Specifically, I attempt to identify the impact of receiving a low or high exam grade, 
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independent of achievement. In addition, I investigate whether effects differ for students of 
different socio-economic strata. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare the 
impact of receiving the average exam level (versus below average) on the following 
outcomes:
1. GCSE performance at age 16.
2. Enrollment in A-levels by age 19.
3. Enrollment in a university degree course by age 20.
Data and summary statistics
I use data from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE). The 
Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) used a two stage probability 
proportional to size sampling procedure, with the primary sampling units being schools. 
LSYPE respondents were born between September 1, 1989 and August 31, 1990. Interviews 
were conducted annually between the spring of 2004, when the youths were in eighth grade, 
and 2010, providing seven waves of data. The survey’s first wave sampled 15,770 youths, but
attrition in later waves means that the sample sizes are reduced to 14,947, 11,186, and 8,233 
according to whether the outcome of interest related to GCSEs, A-levels, or university 
enrollment, respectively. 
This attrition is likely to have lessened the extent to which LSYPE is representative of
the national cohort that it was intended to represent. Whereas the proportion of English 
domiciled young people aged 17–19 enrolled in university was 33% in 2008/09 and 34% in 
2009/2010 (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2012), enrollment among the 
LSYPE cohort averaged 43% across these years, even when using survey weights, suggesting
attrition according to characteristics for which LSYPE’s sample weights cannot control 
(Anders, 2012b). Consequently, although my findings are likely to be indicative of national 
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trends, subsequent model estimates should not be presumed to be nationally representative. 
Another consequence of survey attrition is that the samples that I use for my three 
outcomes of interest differ slightly from one another. As presented in Table 2.1, it appears that
respondents from higher socio-economic backgrounds and higher Key-Stage-3 attainment 
were more likely to continue participating in the later LSYPE waves, during which the 
questions on A-levels and university enrollment were asked. This adds a further complicating 
factor because apparent changes in the impact of encouragement over the educational stages 
(for example, evidence of a dissipating impact or a compounding impact) may be partially 
attributable to differences between the sub-samples analyzed at each stage. 
Table 2.1: Description of the data
When the following outcome is observed:
GCSE A-levels University
Observations 14,947 11,186 8,233
NSSEC Level (%)
  Lower 27 27 25
  Intermediate 30 28 28
  Higher 43 45 47
Mean Key Stage 3 Score 
(Standard Deviation)
  English 33.1(6.3) 33.7 (6.1) 34.4 (6.0)
  Mathematics 35.5 (8.1) 36.3 (8.0) 37.2 (7.8)
Source: Longitudinal Study of Young People in England.
The key predictor variables in my analyses are respondents’ Key Stage 3 test results in
English and mathematics. I do not analyze respondents’ Key Stage 3 test results in science for
two reasons. First, unlike English and mathematics, it is not possible to assess students’ 
subsequent progress in science because students do not follow a core curriculum with a 
common exam in this subject. Second, the predominance of English and math performance in
school league tables could mean that science results factor less into teachersʼ planning for 
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student interventions and ability streaming. Consequently, any impact of test results in 
science on the more general outcomes of enrollment in A-levels and university study may 
differ from the respective impacts of mathematics and English. Hence, in subsequent analyses
I focus on the English and mathematics exams. 
LSYPE is linked to the UK Government’s National Pupil Database, which holds 
administrative data on the test scores that students obtained in their Key Stage 3 subject tests. 
In each subject test, students could receive a grade of 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 (as well as 8 for 
mathematics only) depending on the marks that they obtained, from within a range 0–100 for 
English and 0–150 for mathematics. Figure 2.1 provides an example of how continuous score
mapped onto grade levels in one of these assessments.
Figure 2.1: An example of how test score maps to key stage level
Note: Example comes from 2003 English assessment, which LSYPE respondents took. Fewer
than one percent of respondents score below Level 3.
Data on the first outcome, passing GCSE examinations, is obtained through the 
LSYPE’s link to the National Pupil Database. This outcome is defined in two respects: 
subject-specific and general performance. Subject-specific performance compares studentsʼ 
Key Stage math grades to whether they receive a grade of C or higher in GCSE math, and the
equivalent for Key Stage English to GCSE English. General performance is assessed through 
the capped GCSE score, which comprises a continuous point score based on the eight best 
exam results for a given student. The capped GCSE score is a common measure in education 
policy in England (Vignoles, 2013); it is based on students’ performance in just eight, rather 
84
than all, exams to account for the tendency for students at fee-paying schools to take more 
GCSE examinations than do students in the state-provided system. The second and third 
outcomes, enrollment in A-levels and enrollment in university, rely on students’ self-reports 
during the survey’s fourth and subsequent waves. 
To analyze heterogeneous effects according to socio-economic status, I use the three-
class grouping – higher, intermediate, and lower – of the National Statistics Socio-economic 
Classification (henceforth NSSEC) offered by the UK governmentʼs Office for National 
Statistics (2014), with the caveat that the long-term unemployed are also included in the 
“lower” grouping due to insufficient sample sizes. Students for whom NSSEC data is missing
are included in models of general effects but are not included in models of differential 
impacts according to socio-economic status. 
Table 2.2: Test scores and outcomes for full sample and according to NSSEC level
By NSSEC level:
All Lower Intermediate Higher
  English Level 6 or above 0.34 0.26 0.35 0.55
  Maths Level 6 or above 0.53 0.44 0.59 0.74
 Mean capped GCSE point score 303 287 317 353
Attain C or higher in GCSE 
English
0.59 0.51 0.65 0.81
Attain C or higher in GCSE 
mathematics
0.54 0.46 0.60 0.76
Enroll in A-levels 0.56 0.51 0.47 0.73
Enroll in University degree 0.49 0.41 0.46 0.62
Note: Results for the full sample (“All”) include students with missing NSSEC data. Source: 
Longitudinal Study of Young People in England.
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics on the label thresholds and outcome measures,
first for all students and then according to socio-economic status. There is a clear socio-
economic disparity for each of the label thresholds and outcome measures, with higher 
NSSEC students outperforming intermediate NSSEC students, who in turn outperform lower 
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NSSEC students. Table 2.3 presents average outcomes for all sampled students according to 
whether they scored above or below the Level 6 threshold in each subject. For each subject, 
those scoring above the threshold realize each of the outcomes at higher rates than those who 
scored below the threshold, and always by at least a factor of two. All differences are 
statistically significant at any conventional level. 
Table 2.3: Sample averages for outcomes by Level 6 threshold
Below Level 6 Level 6 and above p-Value
English
 Capped GCSE point score 265 376 <0.001
 Attain C or higher in GCSE 
English
0.41 0.96 <0.001
Enroll in A-levels 0.40 0.84 <0.001
Enroll in university degree 0.32 0.73 <0.001
Mathematics
 Capped GCSE point score 239 359 <0.001
 Attain C or higher in GCSE 
mathematics
0.15 0.89 <0.001
Enroll in A-levels 0.32 0.75 <0.001
Enroll in university degree 0.25 0.64 <0.001
Source: Longitudinal Study of Young People in England.
The empirical strategy
The use of regression-discontinuity designs (RDD) in social science research dates 
back half a century (see Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960; Campbell and Stanley, 1963). 
Although the approach received limited attention in subsequent decades (Cook, 2008), it has 
become increasingly popular in recent years (Lee and Lemieux, 2010; McCall and Bielby, 
2012). In the field of education, studies have used the RDD approach to investigate a range of
influences such as financial aid (Van der Klaauw, 2002), scholarships (DesJardins and 
McCall, 2014), remedial education programs (Jacob and Lefgren, 2004), and pre-school 
interventions (Ludwig and Miller, 2007). 
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RDD’s popularity is likely due to its intuitive appeal as the most valid estimation 
strategy under specific allocation mechanisms, absent random allocation (Cook, 2008; Lee 
and Lemieux, 2010). The specific mechanisms are those in which treatment is assigned via a 
cutoff point on an observed continuous variable. So long as individuals are unable to 
manipulate whether they fall on one side of the cutoff point or the other, the variation in 
treatment around this point is essentially random (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The present study
is well suited to an RDD approach because the assessment feedback device – discrete exam 
grades – varies at distinct cutoff points on the underlying continuous scores that students 
achieve in each test. Students are unable to manipulate which side of the grade cutoff their 
scores fall because grade boundaries are not defined until after each year’s test. In addition, 
students, parents, and teachers are provided with discrete grades after the test but not the 
exact value on the underlying continuous mark scale. This is important because knowledge of
the continuous mark might mitigate the response of any of these groups in relation to the 
grade; for example, teachers might see students who scored just below the threshold as more 
comparable to those scoring just above it than to those scoring many points below the 
threshold.
In order to get a higher grade on the Key Stage test, students must meet or exceed a 
given test score. Thus, a given student’s receipt of a higher grade (G) depends on her test 
score (S). More specifically, the grade depends on their score in relation to a grade cutoff (C),
whereby those students for whom S ≥ C receive grade G. Taking receipt of a higher grade as a
treatment, for student i its relation to a future outcome (Y) can be denoted as
Y i={Yi
1
if Gi=1
Yi
0
if Gi=0
(1)
or
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Y i=Y i
0+Gi (Y i
1
−Yi
0) (2)
However, the inferential challenge is that it is not possible to observe both Yi
1 and Yi
0 
because student i cannot both receive and not receive the treatment G. Random allocation 
overcomes this challenge since, taking α as a vector of all variables that could influence Yi 
prior to receipt of the treatment, in the equation
Y i=α+τGi+ε i (4)
Gi  and the error term εi are independent. Thus, the estimate of the treatment effect τ is 
obtained by subtracting the average of Y for all untreated students from the average of Y for 
all treated students.
The properties of the Key Stage grade boundaries make it possible to partially 
emulate this ideal randomized scenario through a “sharp” RDD design. In a “sharp” design, 
the cutoff variable perfectly predicts allocation of the treatment (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008),
so that 
Gi=1 {Si ≥c}
Gi=0 {Si<c }
(5)
The “sharp” design is possible because all students whose scores fall below the boundary 
receive the lower discrete grade, while all those whose scores fall at or above the boundary 
receive the higher grade. 
Returning to equation 4, accepting that the expected value of the error term εi varies 
with Si, but assuming that it does so as a continuous function of S, Hahn et al. (2001) have 
shown that
τ=lim
x↓c
E [Y i∣Si=s ]− lim
x ↑ c
E [Y i∣Si=s ] (6)
provides the treatment effect of G. Note though that this only uses observations from the 
arbitrarily selected range [c – x, c + x] around the cutoff point (McCall and Bielby, 2012), 
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whereas all observations may be used under randomized allocation. Thus, the RDD provides 
an estimate of the local average treatment effect, but it does not allow for extrapolations to 
observations further from the threshold (DiNardo and Lee, 2011; Shadish et al., 2002). 
In order to limit bias, kernel-based polynomials provide a popular means to predict τ 
under the RDD design (Hahn et al., 2001; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Consequently, 
researchers face choices regarding three factors that have implications for a given model’s 
validity: the kernel, the bandwidth, and the use of polynomial terms in the regression model 
(Mealli and Rampichini, 2012). Among these, the choice of kernel is of lesser importance 
because model estimates are not so sensitive to different kernels as they are to different 
bandwidths and polynomial terms (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; McCall and Bielby, 2012). I 
follow McCall and Bielby (2012), who use a Gaussian kernel, although all models were re-
estimated with alternative kernels in order to check whether estimates are highly sensit ive to 
this choice. Estimates using these alternative kernels were not substantively different to those 
using the Gaussian kernel.
As Mealli and Rampichini (2012) note, choice of bandwidth offers a tradeoff between 
precision and bias. In order to allow for bandwidths larger than those most commonly used in
prior research (Calonico et al., 2013a), I use the formulation offered by Calonico et al. 
(2013b) to select data-driven bandwidths for each model in order to minimize the mean 
square error. In their formulation, Calonico et al. (2013b) base their confidence intervals on a 
bias-corrected discontinuity estimator to account for the impact of large bandwidth choices, 
but depart from the prior literature by using an alternative formulation of standard errors in 
order to account for the greater variability in the calculation of a given t-statistic caused by 
estimated bias-correction.  
In addition, it is important that students cannot manipulate their positioning around 
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the threshold. In recent years, McCraryʼs (2008) formal test of the distribution of the running 
variable has become perhaps the most common means for examining potential manipulations 
around the cutoff. As Figure 2.2 indicates, the running variables – i.e., the test score in each 
Key Stage 3 subject assessment – would not pass McCraryʼs test. 
However, this can be explained by contextual factors. First, the examining authority 
does not define grade boundaries until after the test, and the central examination body already
holds examination scores by the time that these boundaries are announced. Second, one key 
practice that examiners use for the Key Stage 3 assessments is “borderlining,” which is the 
practice of re-marking those papers that fall three marks below the discrete Level boundaries 
(QCA, 2004; Quinlan and Scharaschkin, 1999). Since this is done for those papers falling just
below the boundary but not for those just above, and given the variation in examinersʼ scores 
(House of Commons Children, Schools and Families Committee, 2008), it is natural that the 
frequency of scores will drop just before the boundary and rise just after. While 
“borderlining” proved controversial and was eventually stopped (House of Commons 
Children, Schools and Families Committee, 2008; National Audit Office, 2008), it was still in
use in 2004, the year in which LSYPE respondents sat these assessments. 
Figure 2.2: Histograms of test scores by subject
Source: Longitudinal Study of Young People in England. On the x axis, scores are standardized 
so that –6, 0, and 6 represent the minimum scores for Levels 5, 6, and 7, respectively.
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In addition, I conduct an alternative sensitivity check for potential manipulation, 
presented in Appendix 2.A, in which I regress whether students fall just above or just below 
each threshold on the key background characteristics of NSSEC grouping and Key Stage 2 
performance. Of the 18 models that I estimate in this sensitivity check, just one has a 
significant regressor, providing limited evidence of any systematic manipulation of 
positioning around the Level 6 threshold in any of the exams.
Model estimates
For all students
Table 2.4: Estimated impact of Level 6 label
Subject
Outcome
(1)
English
(2)
Mathematics
Capped GCSE point score  3.741* 4.788
(2.738) (3.852)
Attain C or higher in GCSE subject 0.028 0.017
(0.025) (0.039)
Enroll in A-levels 0.094** 0.037
(0.041) (0.026)
Enroll in university degree 0.039 0.061
(0.033) (0.038)
Note: Coefficients for the first row represent the expected change in GCSE points score 
associated with the Level 6 label. Coefficients for the second, third, and fourth rows 
represent the percentage-point change in probability, associated with the Level 6 label, of a 
student achieving the given outcome. Results include students with missing NSSEC data. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *  p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Source: 
Longitudinal Study of Young People in England.
Model estimates for the impact of the Level 6 label are presented in Table 2.4. An 
accompanying visual depiction is presented in Figure 2.3, where scores are standardized so 
that the Level 6 threshold is represented by zero. As noted in Section 2, estimates are based 
on non-parametric models that use Calonico et al.ʼs (2013b) estimation procedure in order to 
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Figure 2.3: Regression discontinuity estimates: all students
Source: Longitudinal Study of Young People in England. On the x axis, scores are standardized so that –6, 0, 
and 6 represent the minimum scores for Levels 5, 6, and 7, respectively.
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minimize standard errors. Consequently, bandwidth size varies across models; information 
about the bandwidth and sample size used for each model is presented in Appendix 2.B. 
These findings provide moderate evidence of a labeling effect from the English 
examination, but essentially no evidence of the mathematics label having an impact. The 
Level 6 label in the English assessment is associated with a 3.7 point increase in capped 
GCSE point score. It is worth noting though that this is only significant at the 0.1 level, and 
that this coefficient equates to less than a one-grade increase (e.g., from a C to a B) on a 
single GCSE exam, which would be represented by a six-point increase. In addition, the 
Level 6 label in English is associated with a 9.4 percentage-point increase in enrollment in A-
levels. This may seem a large increase given that 67% of the full sample enroll in A-Levels, 
although it is worth noting that the lower bound for this 9.4 percentage-point increase is just 
1.4 percentage points. The Level 6 label in English does not appear to have a statistically 
significant impact on a given studentʼs likelihood of attaining a C or higher in GCSE English.
In the mathematics examination, the Level 6 label is not significant in relation to any of the 
outcomes. For university enrollment, although the label from mathematics is close, neither it 
nor the English label is significant at the 10% level. 
By socio-economic status
Estimates of the Level 6 label according to socio-economic status are presented in 
Table 2.5. These indicate that labeling effects differ according to socio-economic status: 
while there is limited evidence of an impact for students from the higher and mid-NSSEC 
groupings, substantial labeling effects are visible for the lower NSSEC group.
For high-NSSEC students, three of the 11 models provide significant non-zero estimates,
albeit each of these is at the 10% level. The English label is linked to improved performance 
in GCSE English, with a 4.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of attaining a C or  
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Table 2.5: Estimated impact of Level 6 label,  by NSSEC level
Subject
(1)
English
(2)
Mathematics
NSSEC: lower
Capped GCSE point score 20.11** 28.21***
(8.40) (7.57)
Attain C or higher in GCSE subject 0.207*** 0.057 
(0.062) (0.066)
Enroll in A-levels 0.110** 0.082
(0.054) (0.056)
Enroll in university degree 0.205** 0.008
(0.092) (0.066)
NSSEC: intermediate
Capped GCSE point score -1.189 5.438
(8.47) (5.862)
Attain C or higher in GCSE subject -0.020 0.055
(0.035) (0.071)
Enroll in A-levels 0.111 0.061
(0.075) (0.065)
Enroll in university degree 0.015 0.144**
(0.083) (0.071)
NSSEC: higher
Capped GCSE point score -1.062 9.494
(4.200) (5.160)
Attain C or higher in GCSE subject 0.046* 0.108**
(0.037) (0.054)
Enroll in A-levels -0.068 0.094*
(0.045) (0.055)
Enroll in university degree  -0.030 0.039
(0.052) (0.048)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *  p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Source: Longitudinal Study of Young People in England.
higher at GCSE. The Level 6 label in mathematics is linked to a 10.8 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of getting a C or above in GCSE mathematics and a 9.4 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of enrollment in A-levels. For mid-NSSEC students, there is 
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evidence of a labeling effect for just a single outcome: the mathematics exam is positively 
associated with an increase of 14 percentage points in the likelihood of university enrollment 
by age 20, which is significant at the five percent level.
In contrast to the other two groupings, there is considerable evidence of a labeling 
impact on lower-NSSEC students. The English examination appears to have a positive impact
on all four outcomes, with coefficients of 20 points for capped GCSE point score (equivalent 
to a boost of more than three grade levels), 21 percentage points for attaining at least a C in 
GCSE English, 11 percentage points for A-level enrollment, and 21 percentage points for 
university enrollment. The mathematics exam has a positive impact on capped GCSE point 
score of 22 percentage points, but no discernible impact on pass rates in GCSE mathematics 
or enrollment in either A-levels or a university degree. 
Discussion and future directions for research
At Key Stage 3, it appears that the Level 6 grade label had a polarizing effect on 
otherwise similar students at the aggregate level. This finding supports the notion, as 
hypothesized by a range of theoretical backgrounds, that feedback from summative testing 
influences student behavior. It corroborates analyses conducted in non-English contexts (e.g., 
Papay et al., 2010) or on non-academic outcomes (e.g., Sartarelli, 2011), and substantiates the
claims made by a body of literature (e.g., Black and William, 1998, 2006; Harlen and Deakin 
Crick, 2003; Reay and William, 1999) on the English context that has provided compelling 
phenomenological evidence but lacks the inferential studies necessary to establish a plausible 
counterfactual.
Moreover, my findings add weight to the claim that students’ pathways through 
formal education depend, at least partially, on social class, thus expanding the evidentiary 
base for researchers using Bourdieu’s theorization of habitus. Specifically, labeling effects 
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appear to be have been greatest for students from lower socio-economic classes. However, 
my analytical approach does not make it possible to evaluate the respective merits of the 
mechanisms that these researchers have offered, such as whether such tests serve to confirm 
teacher prejudice or working-class families are especially prone to accepting summative 
judgments about their childrenʼs progress and ability levels. 
It is worth noting though that my estimates of the size of Key Stage 3 labeling effects,
especially when considering the lower bounds of their associated confidence intervals, cannot
explain the majority of the link between school achievement and university enrollment that 
has been identified in the literature (e.g., Chowdry et al., 2013; Anders, 2012). Nonetheless, it
seems that grade labels play some part both in the achievement-enrollment relationship and 
socio-economic disparities in enrollment. Since the purpose of testing at Key Stage 3 was not 
even to award qualifications to students for their performance (and neither, implicitly, to 
punish those with relatively poor performance), these findings indicate that it may be worth at
least reassessing current feedback procedures. 
Potential adjustments could lie on a spectrum at which the more extreme end would 
be dropping assessments entirely, should they provide little information about school quality. 
A less extreme change would be to not share results with students, or, should it be the case 
that teachers or school leaders are the source of labeling effects from the assessments, these 
tests might be anonymized. A more moderate approach would be to provide feedback scores 
on a continuous scale. Even if this were to complicate the interpretation of scores for children
or parents, this would likely be compensated for by the benefits of moving away from the 
present mode of over-simplification. Perhaps most moderate of all, greater care should be 
taken over studentsʼ and parentsʼ interpretation of the grades so that lower performers do not 
see their grade levels as definitive judgments of academic ability, but rather as something that
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is malleable with greater effort in future.
Currently, Key Stage 2 assessments in English and mathematics follow a similar 
format to the assessments taken by the LSYPE cohort. CATs, the common replacement for 
Key Stage 3 assessments, differ from their predecessor more drastically. As noted, even 
though the government does not require schools to use CATs, a majority of schools do so. 
Given this absence of central enforcement, the implementation of CATs varies substantially 
across schools, and our knowledge of this variation is limited. For instance, CATs provide 
schools with each student’s underlying continuous score and band groupings, and schools are 
also able to define their own band groupings. Some schools use these tests to group children 
into ability bands, set achievement targets for both students and teachers in the subsequent 
tenth-grade exams, and share results with students’ parents, either in the format of the 
continuous score, achievement bands, or a mixture of the two. 
This uneven implementation of CATs constrains future inferential statistical research. 
Even if data were to become more widely available, endogeneity would present a problem: 
there are likely to be unobservable factors influencing why certain schools implement CATs 
in a particular way that will also be linked to future educational outcomes. However, 
applications of the regression discontinuity design could still be used for Key Stage 2 
assessments to identify whether whether labeling effects are visible from this earlier age too, 
and if so, whether their impact may be greater or lesser than those occurring in adolescence. 
In addition, the UK government has more secure datasets than the LSYPE that would 
enable more detailed analyses of any relationship between Key Stage 2 assessments and 
student outcomes in A-levels and higher education. For example, it would be possible to 
examine performance in A-levels and the type of subjects studied. Similarly, for higher 
education, it would be informative to analyze differences in institutional quality and subject 
97
major. Among other benefits, such research would enable more nuanced analyses of the 
relationship between Key-Stage grade labels in a particular subject, e.g. mathematics, and 
subject-specific outcomes, such as performance in GCSE mathematics, or the study of STEM
subjects at university. 
Qualitative research could evaluate the competing and interacting nature of the 
mechanisms underlying summative testing in a manner that is not possible with the type of 
inferential analysis I have used. Important work has already been produced on the impact of 
Key Stage assessments on student esteem (Leonard and Davey, 2001; Reay and William, 
1999). Alterations in behavior may also occur for students, peers, parents, teachers, or some 
other interested party. Further studies that use qualitative methods, such as ethnographic 
observations or interviews, could shed greater light on who else besides students is 
responding to grade labels, and the mechanisms by which their responses have an impact. 
In contrast to the more uniform practices of the Key Stage 2 exams, the uneven 
implementation of CATs could be a boon for such research. The variety in conditions could 
enable researchers to tease out the impact of small differences in how schools choose to share
and act upon test results. For example, more phenomenological analyses could investigate 
whether students respond differently to grade labels when they have direct consequences, 
such as defining ability streams, or the more general form of judgment that stems from being 
placed on an ability scale. Similarly, it would be useful to know how parents might interpret 
CATs scores, and whether they are reliant on discrete boundaries when presented alongside 
the underlying continuous scores. Thus, the very source of difficulty that CATs present for 
inferential research could prove fruitful for qualitative research, providing us with more 
nuanced insights into the role of summative assessment in education.
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Appendix 2.A: Sensitivity tests around the grade thresholds
This appendix tests the suitability of the Key Stage 3 data for the RDD approach by testing 
for discontinuities in prior student characteristics around the Level 6 cut-off point in each 
assessment. Tables 2.A1–2.A3 test for discontinuities in NSSEC status, and Tables 2.A4–
2.A6 test for discontinuities in performance at Key Stage 2, as measured by continuous test 
scores in those assessments. 
Judging the models as a group, there is little evidence that students were able to 
systematically manipulate their position around the cut-off points. Of the 18 models, just one 
provides an estimate that is significantly different from zero. The significant estimate comes 
from the model that regresses students’ positions around the Level 6 threshold of the Key 
Stage 3 mathematics assessment on their test scores in Key Stage 2 mathematics for students 
(column (1) of Table 2.A5). This finding seems to be counterintuitive, as it indicates that 
students scoring just above the Level 6 threshold did significantly worse in Key Stage 2 
mathematics than those who scored just below this threshold.
All models are created using Calonico et al.’s (2012a) bandwidth selection approach 
and construction of standard errors. Each model uses a uniform kernel and local-polynomial 
of order one, i.e., linear. For all tables, standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
Significance levels are denoted as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.A1: Test for discontinuity in rate of low-NSSEC children, by assessment.
(1) (2) (3)
English Mathematics Science
RD Estimate -0.00808 -0.0163 -0.0110
(0.0172) (0.0135) (0.0158)
Observations 4,261 6,070 3,994
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Table 2.A2: Test for discontinuity in rate of mid-NSSEC children, by assessment.
(1) (2) (3)
English Mathematics Science
RD Estimate -0.0268 0.0103 -0.00504
(0.0273) (0.0181) (0.0227)
Observations 3,405 6,033 4,260
Table 2.A3: Test for discontinuity in rate of high-NSSEC children, by assessment.
(1) (2) (3)
English Mathematics Science
RD Estimate 0.0502 -0.0244 0.0138
(0.0381) (0.0254) (0.0273)
Observations 2,212 4,051 3,653
Table 2.A4: Test for discontinuity in Key Stage 2 English score, by assessment.
(1) (2) (3)
English Mathematics Science
RD Estimate -0.156 0.248 -0.0547
(0.144) (0.165) (0.188)
Observations 4,147 2,744 3,698
Table 2.A5: Test for discontinuity in Key Stage 2 math score, by assessment.
(1) (2) (3)
English Mathematics Science
RD Estimate -0.780*** -0.153 -0.193
(0.227) (0.170) (0.156)
Observations 2,395 5,481 3,278
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Table 2.A6: Test for discontinuity in Key Stage 2 science score, by assessment.
(1) (2) (3)
English Mathematics Science
RD Estimate -0.138 0.108 0.0143
(0.152) (0.156) (0.110)
Observations 2,498 3,312 5,540
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Appendix 2.B: Specications for discontinuity models
In this appendix, the following tables provide more detailed information about the RDD 
models used in Section 6. 
Table 2.B1: Specification for models presented in Table 2.4, column (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capped GCSE
point score
Attain C or
higher in GCSE
English
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate 3.741 0.0280 0.0938 0.0389
Observations 5342 3405 2235 3276
Conventional S.E. 2.738 0.0250 0.0405 0.0328
Conventional p value 0.172 0.262 0.0207 0.236
Robust 95% CI [-.79 ; 11.96] [-.01 ; .1] [.02 ; .2] [-.03 ; .13]
Robust p-value 0.0858 0.137 0.0128 0.197
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 3.078 1.868 1.715 3.173
BW Bias 5.832 3.607 3.654 5.530
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform
Table 2.B2: Specification for models presented in Table 2.4, column (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capped GCSE
point score
Attain C or
higher in GCSE
math
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate 4.788 0.0170 0.0369 0.0610
Observations 3803 2751 4707 2368
Conventional S.E. 3.852 0.0388 0.0261 0.0375
Conventional p value 0.214 0.661 0.158 0.104
Robust 95% CI [-5.21 ; 12.44] [-.08 ; .08] [-.01 ; .11] [-.03 ; .14]
Robust p-value 0.422 0.968 0.134 0.208
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 2.511 1.698 4.611 2.904
BW Bias 4.825 4.089 8.610 5.588
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform
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Table 2.B3: Specification for models presented in Table 2.4, column (3)
(1) (2) (3)
Capped GCSE
point score
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate -2.149 -0.00974 -0.0147
Observations 3643 3364 2601
Conventional S.E. 2.976 0.0295 0.0358
Conventional p value 0.470 0.741 0.680
Robust 95% CI [-8.39 ; 5.54] [-.09 ; .04] [-.11 ; .06]
Robust p-value 0.688 0.505 0.558
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 2.315 2.780 2.788
BW Bias 4.302 5.923 5.068
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform
Table 2.B4: Specification for models presented in Table 2.5, column (1) for low-NSSEC 
students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capped GCSE
point score
Attain C or
higher in GCSE
English
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate 20.11 0.207 0.110 0.205
Observations 711 681 949 462
Conventional S.E. 8.405 0.0619 0.0538 0.0925
Conventional p value 0.0167 0.000842 0.0414 0.0267
Robust 95% CI [3.03 ; 42] [.11 ; .38] [.01 ; .26] [.02 ; .47]
Robust p-value 0.0235 0.000405 0.0411 0.0311
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 2.387 2.257 3.120 1.831
BW Bias 3.917 4.813 5.661 3.243
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform
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Table 2.B5: Specification for models presented in Table 2.5, column (2) for low-NSSEC 
students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capped GCSE
point score
Attain C or
higher in GCSE
math
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate 28.21 0.0569 0.0819 0.00816
Observations 965 831 1073 786
Conventional S.E. 7.570 0.0657 0.0556 0.0656
Conventional p value 0.000195 0.387 0.141 0.901
Robust 95% CI [13.31 ; 48.06] [-.11 ; .18] [-.03 ; .23] [-.16 ; .14]
Robust p-value 0.000536 0.655 0.144 0.857
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 3.450 2.872 3.923 3.609
BW Bias 6.947 6.311 7.162 6.951
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform
Table 2.B6: Specification for models presented in Table 2.5, column (3) for low-NSSEC 
students
(1) (2) (3)
Capped GCSE
point score
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate -0.424 -0.0169 0.0154
Observations 650 917 595
Conventional S.E. 6.854 0.0508 0.0719
Conventional p value 0.951 0.739 0.831
Robust 95% CI [-16.32 ; 15.81] [-.16 ; .07] [-.17 ; .14]
Robust p-value 0.975 0.463 0.839
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 2.437 3.398 2.790
BW Bias 4.410 6.611 5.893
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform
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Table 2.B7: Specification for models presented in Table 2.5, column (1) for mid-NSSEC 
students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capped GCSE
point score
Attain C or
higher in GCSE
English
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate -1.189 -0.0202 0.111 0.0152
Observations 454 1059 632 579
Conventional S.E. 8.467 0.0347 0.0752 0.0832
Conventional p value 0.888 0.561 0.141 0.855
Robust 95% CI [-24.81 ; 14.87] [-.09 ; .07] [-.05 ; .31] [-.2 ; .2]
Robust p-value 0.624 0.892 0.154 0.974
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 1.437 3.069 1.850 2.007
BW Bias 2.637 6.282 3.422 3.369
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform
Table 2.B8: Specification for models presented in Table 2.5, column (2) for mid-NSSEC 
students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capped GCSE
point score
Attain C or
higher in GCSE
math
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate 5.438 0.0553 0.0605 0.144
Observations 910 729 842 600
Conventional S.E. 5.873 0.0706 0.0652 0.0707
Conventional p value 0.354 0.434 0.354 0.0420
Robust 95% CI [-8.07 ; 19.35] [-.12 ; .19] [-.1 ; .2] [.01 ; .33]
Robust p-value 0.420 0.680 0.530 0.0427
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 3.425 2.625 3.054 2.611
BW Bias 6.034 5.327 5.833 4.888
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform
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Table 2.B9: Specification for models presented in Table 2.5, column (3) for mid-NSSEC 
students
(1) (2) (3)
Capped GCSE
point score
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate -7.654 -0.0447 -0.0390
Observations 767 582 640
Conventional S.E. 4.686 0.0718 0.0714
Conventional p value 0.102 0.534 0.585
Robust 95% CI [-18.49 ; 3.04] [-.21 ; .12] [-.23 ; .09]
Robust p-value 0.160 0.613 0.404
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 2.405 1.761 2.321
BW Bias 4.537 3.514 4.565
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform
Table 2.B10: Specification for models presented in Table 2.5, column (1) for high-NSSEC 
students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capped GCSE
point score
Attain C or
higher in GCSE
English
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate -1.062 0.0459 -0.0680 -0.0301
Observations 1667 1121 1356 1311
Conventional S.E. 4.200 0.0370 0.0448 0.0519
Conventional p value 0.800 0.215 0.129 0.562
Robust 95% CI [-11.86 ; 8.14] [-.01 ; .15] [-.16 ; .05] [-.14 ; .1]
Robust p-value 0.716 0.101 0.306 0.747
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 3.375 2.400 2.869 3.147
BW Bias 6.153 5.651 4.972 5.426
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform
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Table 2.B11: Specification for models presented in Table 2.5, column (2) for high-NSSEC 
students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capped GCSE
point score
Attain C or
higher in GCSE
math
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate 9.494 0.108 0.0935 0.0394
Observations 1140 1142 1150 1342
Conventional S.E. 5.163 0.0539 0.0554 0.0477
Conventional p value 0.0659 0.0453 0.0914 0.409
Robust 95% CI [-.47 ; 22.52] [-.03 ; .21] [-.01 ; .24] [-.08 ; .14]
Robust p-value 0.0602 0.131 0.0833 0.585
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 3.396 3.463 3.485 5.225
BW Bias 7.046 6.500 6.673 9.630
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform Uniform
Table 2.B12: Specification for models presented in Table 2.5, column (3) for high-NSSEC 
students
(1) (2) (3)
Capped GCSE
point score
Enrollment in
A-levels
Enrollment in
university
degree
RD Estimate 3.997 0.0504 0.0120
Observations 1221 1223 1313
Conventional S.E. 4.452 0.0494 0.0506
Conventional p value 0.369 0.307 0.813
Robust 95% CI [-6.76 ; 14.39] [-.08 ; .15] [-.1 ; .14]
Robust p-value 0.480 0.513 0.739
Order Loc. Poly. 1 1 1
Order Bias 2 2 2
BW Loc. Poly. 2.812 2.876 3.659
BW Bias 5.111 5.378 6.321
Kernel Type Uniform Uniform Uniform
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Chapter 3: Did the Education Maintenance Allowance 
Increase Enrollment in Post-16 Education? 
Co-authored with Brian McCall
Summary
From 2004 to 2011, England’s government provided a conditional cash transfer – the
Education Maintenance Allowance – for students below a household-income 
threshold who remained in post-compulsory education. While studies of the policy’s 
pilot program demonstrated an impact on student retention and progression to higher
education, comparable research on the program after its national rollout is lacking. 
We attempt to rectify this gap in the research literature. Using data from the Family 
Resources Survey, we use regression discontinuity analyses to ascertain the 
program’s impact over the seven years that it was in operation. Further, we 
investigates whether the program’s impact differed according to student gender and 
age. Results indicate that the policy did increase enrollment in post-compulsory 
education, although there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the policy had 
differential effects according to the aforementioned student characteristics.
Introduction
In the United Kingdom, as in the United States, there has been mounting pressure to 
increase education levels among citizens. Typically, this is predicated on evidence that 
additional education generates greater financial returns (Blundell et al., 2005; Walker and 
Zhu, 2011), leading to the claim that policymakers should promote post-secondary education 
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in order for the British economy to remain globally competitive. Further, such policies should
focus on socio-economically underprivileged students, given that the recent growth in further 
and higher education enrollment has occurred at a disproportionately high rate among the 
more privileged (Blanden and Machin, 2004; Vignoles and Powdthavee, 2009). In fact, there 
are concerns that some existing policy initiatives aimed at increasing the number of 
university graduates may widen the already significant educational gap between high and low
income youth, as the former tend to be more responsive than the latter to policies aimed at 
increasing attendance rates (Archer et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2002). 
One means of mitigating this problem is to implement policies aimed directly at youth
from low income groups. The Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) program is one of 
the key initiatives by UK governments to do this. Initiated in 2004, the EMA is a conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) offering youths from low-income households up to £30 (approximately 
US$45) per week if they remain in education between ages 16–19. Payments are made 
directly to youths, and they are free to use the money as they choose. In 2011, 45% of 16 to 
18 year-olds in full-time education received the EMA (Department for Education, 2011). 
Research suggests that recipients were more likely to use EMA payments for costs relating to 
transport, school equipment, and their households than for social expenses (Ashworth et al., 
2001; Legard et al., 2001).
However, while the governments of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have 
maintained their EMA programs, England’s incumbent coalition government abolished its 
EMA program. This is in keeping with the English government’s broader divergence in 
policymaking from the other UK governments, whereby the English government has 
increasingly sought to deregulate and reduce its expenditure. For the K-12 system, such 
policies include the introduction of free schools (which, much like charter schools, receive 
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government funds but are independent of school districts), a reduction in funding for teacher 
training, and the removal of the requirement for teachers to hold a teaching qualification. For 
the financing of higher education, students have increasingly had to directly bear the costs of 
study. In 2010, England’s government trebled tuition fee caps for undergraduate courses to 
£9,000 (approximately $13,000). 
For the years between compulsory schooling and higher education, i.e., student ages 
16–18, two major policy changes have occurred. In the first, the coalition government has 
implemented the preceding Labour government’s plan to increase the school-leaving age to 
18; until 2013, students could leave education at the end of the school year in which they 
turned 16. However, this policy does not require students to remain in full-time education 
after the age of 16: apprenticeships and part-time study, or training alongside employment or 
volunteering, suffice. Consequently, students must now remain in some form of education or 
training until age 18, but the range of permissible activities is broad. There is not yet 
empirical research on the impact of this policy change. 
In the second change, the government went against Labour’s plan to maintain the 
EMA as a means of supporting students from poorer households aged 16–19. In 2011, the 
government replaced the EMA, on which the government spent £560 million in its final year, 
with the 16–19 bursary fund, on which the government currently spends £180 million per 
year. Whereas the EMA was paid directly to students under a set criteria, bursary funds are 
allocated to schools, who then decide how to distribute the funds among their student bodies. 
Thus, the EMA’s replacement is of lower total value, and its conditions are likely to be more 
opaque to many students. Again, there is not yet empirical research on the impact of this 
policy change.
The English government’s rationale for abolishing the EMA has been contentious, 
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arguing that the costs – £560 million in 2010  – were not reflected by sufficient policy impact
(Department for Education, 2011). Citing research from the National Foundation for 
Educational Research (2011), the government claimed that 90% of 16 to 18 year-olds who 
were in education would still have been so in the absence of EMA payments. The key 
research, by Spielhofer et al. (2010), used survey data from 838 EMA recipients, of whom 
12% agreed with the statement “they would not have participated in the courses they are 
doing if they had not received an EMA” (National Foundation for Educational Research, 
2011, 2).
However, competing evidence exists of the EMA having a positive effect on 
enrollment and attainment. The most methodologically robust research is based on data 
collected during the EMA’s pilot stage. This pilot stage began in 1999, when the EMA was 
implemented in 15 of England’s 150 school districts. Four variants of EMA payments were 
trialled; these variants differed with regards to their maximum payment (£30 or £40), 
retention payments, and achievement bonuses. In addition, one made payments to students’ 
parents rather than directly to students. During the pilot stage of the EMA, researchers 
identified a matched control group of school districts according to measures of neighborhood 
deprivation, school performance, and enrollment rates in post-compulsory education. In both 
pilot and control districts, data was collected on students’ backgrounds in order to enable 
analysis with matching methods.
Research using this pilot stage data indicates that the EMA increased enrollment in 
post-compulsory education. Using kernel based matching models, Dearden et al. (2009) 
estimate that the EMA increased enrollment by approximately 4.5 percentage points in the 
first year after compulsory education and 6.7 percentage points in the second year, suggesting
that the EMA increased not only enrollment but retention. The authors estimate that 
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approximately two thirds of these students were drawn from unemployment rather than paid 
work. The authors also found that the EMA had a greater impact on enrollment among 
children whose families rented their housing than children whose family owned their 
housing, although this difference was not significant at the .10 level.
The EMA’s impact on achievement is not quite as clear. In their analysis of the pilot 
stage data with propensity-score matching methods, Middleton et al.’s (2003) estimates of the
EMA’s impact on achievement were largely positive but not statistically significant, leading 
the authors to speculate that a larger sample would probably yield significant positive 
estimates. Subsequently, Chowdry et al. (2007) estimated linear matching models of the 
EMA’s impact on achievement, but increased their sample size by using all of England’s 
remaining school districts in their control sample. The authors found the EMA to have no 
positive impact on achievement among female students, but that average performance in A-
level exams (taken at age 18) increased by 8.9% among male students.
However, no research exists to date on the policy’s national rollout that uses the type 
of quasi-experimental methods necessary for robust causal inferences of the study’s impact. 
There is reason to believe that conditions may be different since the national rollout; for 
example, the pilot policy was introduced after targeted students completed national tenth 
grade examinations (GCSEs). Since subsequent study opportunities depend upon GCSE 
performance, it is plausible that the impact of the EMA differs when students know of its 
existence prior to these exams. In addition, the value of EMA payments was fixed in absolute 
terms during the program’s duration, so the inflation adjusted value of these payments 
decreased. To provide a point of reference, the Retail Price Index increased by 12.9% 
between the pilot study in 1999 and the EMA’s national rollout in 2004 (Chowdry et al. 
2007). Conversely, the household income threshold for the maximum EMA payment was 
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£13,000 during the pilot and £20,817 during the national rollout, meaning that a greater 
proportion were able to receive this maximum payment.
The present study resolves this gap in the research literature. Using nationally 
representative governmental datasets for each of the years of the EMA’s implementation, we 
provide robust estimates of the policy’s impact on enrollment levels among the target 
population. We do this by using a regression discontinuity design because, as discussed in 
later sections, this approach is appropriate for the EMA’s eligibility criteria. Our primary 
research question in this study is as follows: what impact did the EMA program have among 
eligible 16- to 18 year-olds on the probability of enrollment in full-time education? In 
addition, we also test for heterogeneous effects of the EMA on enrollment according to 
region, youth, gender and age. 
Theoretical Framework
Human capital theory postulates that anticipated financial returns are the primary 
motivating factor in students’ enrollment decisions. The core argument underlying this claim 
is that skill development can lead to greater wealth accumulation in the future; hence, 
education is a financial investment. Prior to human capital, conventional economic theory 
held that tertiary education offered a form of consumption: students choose to take part for 
recreation and status (Machin, 2008). Gary Becker and Theodore Schultz, to whom the 
development of human capital theory is most commonly attributed (Dearden et al., 2011), 
claimed instead that individuals choose to undertake education so long as they think that the 
income premium resulting from their education will offset the costs they bear – primarily 
foregone income and study fees – in order to study.
Becker (1980) and Schultz (1961) acknowledge Adam Smith, an eighteenth-century 
economist, for initiating the notion of human capital. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith 
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(1776/2007) accounted for the skills of citizens when assessing the wealth of a given country.
Further, he claimed that differences among people “arise not so much from nature, as from 
habit, custom, and education” (p. 15). Smith thus theorized that humans’ skills influence their
ability to generate wealth, and that these skills are fashioned, at least in part, by education. 
Becker and Schultz then sought to build on Smith’s arguments by quantifying the economic 
returns to education. Focusing on white males in the United States in the first half of the 
twentieth century, both declared higher education to be a profitable investment. In this 
context, Becker (1980) argued that the average monetary return to college graduates was 
between 11–13%. Schultz (1961) posited that education had outpaced other forms of 
investments, claiming that its rate of return on a dollar invested had doubled in relation to 
alternatives.
Researchers argue that such investments in education are similarly beneficial in the 
United Kingdom, even when accounting for heterogeneous returns (Blanden and Machin, 
2004; Blundell et al., 2005; Dearden, 1999; Dearden et al., 2002; Dolton and Vignoles, 2000).
Further, more recent research claims that the degree premium will endure despite the fee 
increases. Barr (2011) argues that the incoming fee system is actually unnecessarily favorable
to students and the government could charge graduates greater repayments in their early 
careers without threatening the economic value of a degree. Walker and Zhu’s (2011) 
analyses, which allowed for, and found, greater variation in returns to degree completion than
previously acknowledged in the English research literature, still led them to claim that the 
new tuition fees are “dwarfed by the scale of lifecycle earnings differentials” (p. 1184).
Human capital theory treats students’ motivations and behaviors as though they 
consistently reflect its own description of the role of education. As a consequence, students 
are presumed to decide whether to enroll in education on the basis of anticipated future 
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earnings. In addition, students are expected to be adept at making this judgment. Becker 
claimed that students operate on the basis of the “well-known equilibrium condition” (1976, 
p. 123) that they should take on tertiary education to the point where present costs outweigh 
expected future returns. Although Mincer (1974), Card (1999, 2001) and Heckman et al. 
(2006) have made major subsequent adjustments to Becker’s (1967) calculations of what 
constitutes and how to calculate costs and returns, each has retained the underlying principle 
of equilibrium. 
As a consequence, this framework theorizes that students both try and are successful 
in projecting future earning opportunities for graduates and non-graduates. When challenged 
on this assumption, Becker (1980) responded:
Children have their decisions guided, however, as well as partly financed, by their 
parents, and as long as parents recover some monetary or psychic benefits from an 
increase in their children’s economic well-being, parents have an incentive to help 
children make wise decisions. (p. 105)
Although this reply acknowledges that students might not make enrollment decisions entirely 
independently, it does not concede that students, even with the support of others, might make 
inaccurate forecasts about future returns from education. 
This conviction – that students make sound financial judgments – underlies one 
explanation that human capital theory offers for differing degrees of enrollment according to 
student characteristics: that students vary in their decisions to enroll because their future 
returns also vary. This is characterized in the literature as heterogeneous returns. Becker 
(1980) allowed for a limited range of variations in student circumstances, comparing White 
males to White females and African American males, arguing that lower enrollment among 
the latter two groups in comparison to White males was explained by relatively lower income
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premiums from their college degrees. 
Subsequent research utilizing human capital theory has developed more sophisticated 
means for theorizing and measuring heterogeneous returns to education, such as accounting 
more accurately for the challenge of endogeneity wherein students’ educational choices are 
driven by pre-existing characteristics that may be correlated to future earnings even in the 
absence of additional education (see, for example, Blundell et al., 2000; Card, 1999, 2001; 
Heckman et al., 2006). Nonetheless, as they become increasingly intricate, these studies still 
adhere to the principle that students’ enrollment decisions are based primarily on accurate 
financial forecasts that account for their specific circumstances.
Human capital theory has also identified factors that constrain the opportunities of 
some student groups to enroll in university even when they stand to gain from additional 
education. Given Becker’s (1980) aforementioned claims about the predominance of financial
considerations and the capacity for students to choose the most profitable opportunities 
available to them, it is perhaps unsurprising that he and other early exponents of human 
capital held that “the most important cause of difference in students’ opportunities is the 
availability of funds” (Becker, 1980, p. 107), a factor termed within this literature as credit 
constraints. Since parents are presumed to assist their children in accessing higher education, 
limits in parental income should lead to more restricted opportunities for those children to 
manage the short-term financial burdens of university study (Becker and Tomes, 1986). This 
is exacerbated by the fact that human capital is not entirely analogous to more classical forms
of capital because, barring a scenario in which human beings can be treated as commodities, 
it cannot be bought, sold, or offered as collateral for investments (Becker, 1980; Checchi, 
2006).
Since 1998, England has followed a policy, proposed initially by Friedman (1955), 
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wherein the government offers income-contingent loans for undergraduate students; 
repayments are then taken as a proportion of the borrower’s subsequent earnings and any 
outstanding debt is forgiven after 20 years. This policy is congruous with human capital 
theory’s explications of enrollment disparities because it defers the cost of study until a future
time when poorer students would not face credit constraints (Barr, 2009, 2010; Glennerster, 
1991). Further, enrollment rates have continued to grow in spite of changing fee and loan 
systems (Universities and Colleges Admissions Service, 2013).
Consequently, the research literature to date on educational access in the United 
Kingdom has focused instead on academic preparation, one of the longer-term constraints 
identified by Carneiro and Heckman (2002, 2003). Attainment through the compulsory 
school years is a key indicator of progression to higher education (Chowdry et al., 2013), and 
it serves to explain the great majority of the disparity across socio-economic classes for those 
who do progress through the final years of schooling (Marcenaro-Gutierrez et al., 2007). 
However, this caveat – those who progress to the final years of schooling – is crucial. In order
to enroll in university, a student should complete A-level examinations that are studied for 
and taken at age 18, but compulsory schooling in England ends before youths reach this age. 
In 2011, about 25% of 17 years olds were not in school, and this fraction is considerably 
larger for 17 year-olds from low-income households. As such, increasing the number of youth
who remain in education up to age 18 is an important policy issue for university access.
Policy background 
One policy mechanism aimed at reducing attrition is the conditional cash transfer 
(CCT). Besides the United Kingdom’s EMA policy, CCTs aimed at tackling educational 
attrition have been implemented in Colombia (Attanasio et al., 2010), Mexico (Attanasio et 
al., 2012), New York (Morris et al., 2012), and Australia (Dearden and Heath, 1996). CCTs 
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provide recipients with a direct cash reward for fulfilling a given criteria – for education 
policy, the criteria are typically enrollment and attendance in an education program. These 
rewards tend to offer partial, rather than comprehensive, cover for the financial costs of 
remaining in education. For instance, in 2005 the EMA’s maximum weekly payment, £30, 
was equivalent to wages for ten hours of work at the minimum wage for 16–17 year olds, or 
six hours of work at the minimum wage for 18 year olds. Nonetheless, CCTs embody the key 
principles of human capital theory: the marginal cost of enrolling in education is reduced for 
the individual, but the marginal benefit of additional education is unaffected. Thus, such 
policy tools should provide governments with an effective means to increase enrollment in 
scenarios in which they deem it to be sub-optimally low.
The English government provided the EMA between 2004–2011. The policy’s target 
recipients were those aged 16 to 19 who had finished compulsory education (typically 
completed in England at age 16) who were enrolled in some form of full-time education. 
EMA was means-tested: the allowance was £30 (approximately US$45) per week for students
whose annual household income was less than £20,817; £20 per week for those whose annual
household income was between £20,818 and £25,521; and £10 per week for those whose 
annual household income was between £25,522 and £30,810. These thresholds exclude 
maintenance paid by non-resident parents and any income earned by the student. Until 2008, 
students could also receive two additional payments of £100 each year for completing the 
autumn and summer school terms. Students could receive EMA for up to three years, with 
eligibility being assessed annually, and receipt of EMA did not affect eligibility for any other 
government benefits. Money was paid directly into students’ bank accounts.
The English government ended the EMA in 2011, although enrolled students were 
able to receive it for an additional year. The following year, the government replaced EMA 
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with the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund, which offers up to £1,200 per year to a more restricted 
number of students. To date, the governments of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have 
kept the EMA.
Evaluation methodology
This paper investigates whether eligibility for the EMA influenced enrollment rates 
for eligible students. To do so, it employs the Neyman-Rubin counterfactual framework 
(Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974). Letting Yi represent enrollment for student i, and denoting 
eligibility for EMA as T = 1,
Y i={Y i
1
if T i=1
Y i
0
if T i=0
(1)
 and the causal impact of EMA on enrollment for student i is (Yi
1 – Yi
0). However, since it is 
not possible to directly observe both Yi
0  and Yi
1 , it is necessary to use an evaluation strategy 
that emulates the counterfactual, i.e., the condition that did not occur in real-world conditions.
The Neyman-Rubin counterfactual framework does this by comparing the average outcome 
for treated participants (Yi
1) to the average outcome for untreated participants (Yi
0). Thus, 
from a sufficiently large sample, it is possible to estimate (Yi
1 – Yi
0) by
Y^ i=α^+ β^ T i+εi . (2)
However this estimate ( β̂) of the true treatment effect (β) relies on the ignorable 
treatment assignment assumption (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), which can be expressed as 
(Y 0,Y 1 )⊥T . (3)
In other words, if Cov(Ti, εi) ≠ 0, E(β̂) ≠ β, and so the estimated program impact of EMA ( β̂) 
will be biased. Random allocation of T would circumvent this challenge, since Ti  then occurs 
126
independently of εi. However, given the means-tested nature of EMA, alternatives are 
necessary to assess its impact during its national rollout.
Absent random allocation, this paper uses the quasi-experimental method known as 
regression discontinuity design (RDD). The structure of the EMA lends itself to RDD 
because household income “cut-off” levels defined eligibility for EMA payments. RDD is 
based on the assumption that the running variable (in this case, annual household income) has
a continuous impact on the outcome variable (enrollment in post-compulsory education), but 
that the treatment (receipt of an EMA payment) changes discontinuously as a function of the 
running variable (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; McCall and Bielby, 2012). This structure 
allows the causal impact of the treatment on the outcome to be identified at the cut-off points.
In this paper, we focus on the effect of EMA eligibility on school enrollment. Since 
eligibility, rather than receipt, of EMA serves as the treatment, the EMA program satisfies a 
“sharp” RDD because the cut-off variable defines allocation of the treatment (Imbens and 
Lemieux, 2008).  This is because there are clear boundaries according to the running variable:
as noted, households with income above £30,810 are not eligible for an allowance whereas 
those in households with income between £25,522 and £30,810, £20,818 and  £25,521, or  
£20,817 or less, are eligible for a payment of £10 per week,  £20 per week, or £30 per week, 
respectively.
Intuitively, whether students’ household incomes fall just above or just below a cut-off
point is approximately randomly distributed, but whether household income falls above or 
below the cut-off point has a discrete effect on their eligibility for EMA. When this scenario 
holds, variation in treatment is essentially randomized around the cut-off (Lee and Lemieux, 
2010). It is important to note though that any estimate of treatment effects around the cut-off 
are local (i.e., pertaining only to observations around the cut-off) rather than general 
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treatment effects (DiNardo and Lee, 2011; Shadish et al., 2002).
Let λk represent the local average treatment effect of increasing weekly allowance 
amount from 10 × (k-1) to 10 × k, k=1,2,3. Then
l
k
=
limd®0 E(Y | ck > I > ck - d)- limd®0 E(Y | ck + d > I > ck )
limd®0 Pr(T = 1| ck > I > ck - d)- limd®0 Pr(T = 0 | ck + d > I > ck )
(4)
 
Since we have a sharp design, the elements of the denominator sum to one, leaving
l
k
= limd®0 E(Y | ck > I > ck - d)- limd®0 E(Y | ck + d > I > ck ) (5)
where  c1 = £30,810 , c2 = £25,521, c3 = £20,817 and the last equality holds because nobody 
with income above the cut-off receives a higher allowance.2
RDD estimates can be obtained either using parametric or non-parametric methods 
(see Hahn et al., 2001; Lee and Lemieux, 2010; and McCall and Bielby, 2012). For 
parametric specifications we use linear, quadratic and cubic polynomial specifications of the 
running variable. Furthermore, we only include observations whose household income is 
within a pre-specified bandwidth of the cut-point. We check the robustness of the estimates to
different choices of bandwidth.  As this bandwidth decreases, we expect the bias of the 
estimates to be reduced, but since the number of observations falls concomitantly, the 
variance of the estimates increases. Moreover, at lower bandwidths the estimates are based on
data that is close to only one cut-off point.
More specifically, we estimate the following regression models:
for (6)
for  s = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2, 3, 4 where d1 = £3750, d2 = £2500, d3 = £1750, and d4 = £1750 
and xk is the running variable measured as a deviation from the cut-off value ck.  The 
2 For the first couple years of the program, the cut-off levels were slightly different. These differences are 
incorporated into the empirical work below.
y =a
k
I (xk £ 0)+ bk
sxk
s
s=0
S
å + e xk Î -d j ,d jéë ùû
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parameter αk measures the local average treatment effect on the probability of enrollment of 
an increase in the EMA amount that an individual is eligible to receive from 10 × (k-1) to 10 
× k, k=1,2,3. If near the cut-off points individuals are approximately randomly distributed on 
either sides of the cut-off point, adding additional regressors to the model should not 
substantially change the parameter estimates αk.
3 Nonetheless, we re-estimate the model with 
regressors to provide a robustness check (see Appendix 3.A, Table 3.A2); we find that adding
these regressors does not substantively alter our estimates. We also check whether individual 
households are manipulating their household income, i.e., setting it just below one of the cut-
off points, by investigating the distribution of household income near these cut-off points to 
see if there is any evidence of discontinuities (McCrary, 2008). Non-parametric methods that 
employ local linear regression (Fan and Gijbels, 1996) are used to further check the 
robustness of our empirical results.  For these estimates we use the Epanechnikov kernel and 
compute robust z-statistics according to the methodology recommended by Calonico et al. 
(2014). 
Data
The data for this study comes from the Family Resources Survey (FRS). Sponsored 
by the government’s Department for Work and Pensions, the FRS consists of annual cross-
sectional surveys of about 25,000 households (per year) across the United Kingdom. 
Households are selected from the Royal Mail’s database of addresses that receive fewer than 
500 items per day and are not labelled as organizations. The primary sampling units are post-
code sectors, of which there are 1,848; each sector’s probability of selection is weighted in 
proportion to its size. In addition, sampling units are stratified according to region, average 
income, and average cost of living.  Interviews are conducted with all household residents 
3 The precision of the estimates, however, should increase.
129
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All
Within £2500
below £30
cut-off
Within £2500
above £30 cut-
off
Within £2500
below £20 cut-
off
Within £2500
above £20 cut-
off
Within £2500
below £10 cut-
off
Within £2500
above £10 cut-
off
Male 0.505 0.492 0.479 0.470 0.534 0.533 0.557
Age 
16 0.428 0.416 0.447 0.360 0.457 0.423 0.385
17 0.340 0.395 0.337 0.375 0.290 0.330 0.354
Parent has university 
degree 0.212 0.098 0.130 0.161 0.145 0.192 0.163
Year
2005 0.133 0.165 0.145 0.114 0.139 0.140 0.157
2006 0.165 0.125 0.148 0.189 0.191 0.176 0.160
2007 0.158 0.162 0.145 0.155 0.164 0.154 0.145
2008 0.165 0.159 0.183 0.186 0.157 0.118 0.191
2009 0.156 0.153 0.172 0.136 0.142 0.137 0.111
2010 15.280 0.159 0.130 0.164 0.142 0.184 0.169
Region
North West & 
Merseyside   0.155 0.190 0.154 0.219 0.151 0.151 0.132
Yorkshire & 
Humberside 0.103 0.116 0.089 0.120 0.073 0.115 0.086
East Midlands 0.094 0.107 0.124 0.068 0.110 0.085 0.139
West Midlands 0.110 0.122 0.130 0.102 0.123 0.115 0.154
Eastern 0.112 0.089 0.148 0.117 0.155 0.129 0.074
London 0.123 0.107 0.098 0.105 0.098 0.085 0.114
South East 0.163 0.144 0.139 0.139 0.164 0.165 0.151
South West 0.088 0.064 0.074 0.071 0.088 0.107 0.105
Sample size 9403 327 338 324 317 364 325
p-value of equality test                            0.667                             0.057                              0.112
Source: Family Resource Surveys: 2004-2010
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aged 16 or above, on a face-to-face basis, and then cross-validated against official records. In 
addition, the FRS collects detailed information on the educational enrollment status of all 
household members, their age, and whether they are receiving EMA. Further details on the 
FRS’ survey methodology are available from the Department for Work and Pensions (2012).
We exclude households from Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. We also limit our 
sample to those who are 16-18 years old at the time of the survey. Moreover, we limit our 
data to the survey years 2004/2005 – 2010/2011 since the EMA began nationwide in England 
in 2004 and stopped accepting applications in January 2011, although those who applied 
before that date continued receiving payments for the remainder of the school year. The final 
sample size is 9,403.  Summary statistics are provided in column (1) of Table 3.1. 
The FRS collects a detailed breakdown of income data from all household members, 
as reported to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs for tax purposes. This allows us to 
construct measures matching the exact criteria under which eligibility for EMA is assessed. 
Using household identifiers, we merge on information about parental income (including step-
parents) to these youths and determine family income as the sum of parental (and step-parent)
net income, where parental net income equals their gross income minus income from tax 
credits, disability benefits and other government provided benefits such as jobseekers 
allowances, maternity allowances and incapacity benefits. Income data is reported weekly to 
the closest pound; we convert this into a yearly amount and, because of data heaping and 
possible measurement error, we further group the income data into £250 bins. 
In order to determine whether there is any empirical evidence of household 
manipulation around the EMA cut-off points, Figure 3.1 displays the histogram of household 
income around each of the three cut-off points. As can be seen from the graphs, there is no 
evidence of unusual jumps in the histogram just below the cut-off points. As a further 
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robustness check, in columns (2) – (7) of Table 3.1 we report the results of tests to judge 
whether there is any empirical evidence that the distribution of a set of categorical variables 
differ between those just above and just below the cut-off points.4 As indicated by the p-
values reported at the bottom of the table, we do not reject the null hypothesis of no 
differences at the 5% significance level, although for the £20 cut-off we can reject the null 
hypothesis at the 10% level (p-value = 0.057). 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of income
Source: Family resources Survey 2004–2010.
Results
Of the potential methods for calculating household income, here we present results 
when calculating taxable household income on the basis of both biological and step-parents’ 
income. Appendix 3.A presents alternative estimates, the first of which instead calculates 
taxable income solely on the basis of biological parents’ income (Table 3.A1). In addition, we
4 We define those just above to be no more than £2500 above the cut-off point and those just below to be no 
more than £2500 below the cut-off point.
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check the sensitivity of our eligibility measure by adding model controls for gender, age, 
parental education, region, and the month and year in which the survey was conducted  (Table
3.A2). Neither substantially alters the results of the model estimates. We also estimate all 
models with non-parametric local linear regressions (Table 3.A3). These results provide point
estimates of a similar magnitude, albeit with more conservative levels of statistical 
significance. 
Figure 3.2: Probability of school enrollment by income
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In order to test the robustness of our results, we estimate models with varying interval 
sizes and polynomial orders. The interval sizes are £1,250, £1,750, £2,500, and £3,750 either 
side of each eligibility cut-off. We re-estimate each of these models allowing for the running 
variable to have a linear, quadratic and then cubic effect on the dependent variable, 
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enrollment.5
Table 3.2: RDD estimates of the effect of EMA eligibility on enrollment
 (1) (2) (3)
Interval Linear Quadratic Cubic
£30 cut-off point
±3750 0.004  0.004  -0.008  
 (0.054)  (0.050)  (0.054)  
±2500 0.007  0.009  -0.049  
 (0.054)  (0.059)  (0.059)  
±1750 -0.024  -0.024  0.020  
 (0.050)  (0.067)  (0.065)  
±1250 -0.057  -0.056  0.142 *
 (0.063)  (0.078)  (0.086)  
£20 cut-off point
±3750 -0.029  -0.029  0.105  
 (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.072)  
±2500 0.044  0.046  0.153 *
 (0.072)  (0.071)  (0.080)  
±1750 0.121 * 0.122 * 0.186 **
 (0.073)  (0.072)  (0.095)  
±1250 0.161 * 0.161 * 0.254 **
 (0.084)  (0.082)  (0.104)  
£10 cut-off point
±3750 -0.006  -0.007  0.036  
 (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.053)  
±2500 0.024  0.026  0.094 *
 (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.057)  
±1750 0.054  0.049  0.149 **
 (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.063)  
±1250 0.115 * 0.110 ** 0.114 **
(0.059)  (0.053)  (0.058)
Notes: Dependent variable whether or not an individual is enrolled in full-time
education. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Source: Family Resource Survey 2004-
2010. Estimates presented in bold are those which we believe to be the most 
reliable at each interval level, as per the rationale laid out in footnote 5.
5 Given that we present multiple estimates for each cut-off point, we thought it worth providing some guidance 
as to which estimates we consider to be the most reliable. The preferred model is the linear model if the 
estimated coefficient for the quadratic is not significant and the joint test of the coefficients for the quadratic and
cubic terms are not significant at 10% level. The preferred model is quadratic if the coefficient for the quadratic 
term is significant but the coefficient for the cubic term is not significant at 10% level. The cubic model is 
preferred if both the coefficient for the cubic term is significant and the joint test of quadratic and cubic 
coefficients is significant at 10% level. In Table 3.2, we use bold text to indicate which estimate we consider to 
be the most reliable estimate for each interval level.
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Figure 3.2 provides a visual representation of the pattern of enrollment behavior 
around each of the cut-offs, allowing for the running variable to have cubic effects. Table 3.2 
presents regression-discontinuity estimates for all models estimated on the full sample, 
without controls. Both provide limited evidence of the £30 EMA payments having any impact
on enrollment. Whereas the model estimate with a £1,250 interval and a cubic function is 
significant at the 10 percent level, this is not supported by the other estimates for this cut-off 
since as many are negative as are positive, and for each the standard error exceeds the point 
estimate.
In contrast, the visible discontinuities that are apparent in the figures around the £20 
and £10 cut-offs are borne out by the model estimates: it appears that both the £20 and £10 
EMA payments have positive impact on net enrollment. For the £20 payment, seven of the 12
estimates are significant, and each of these was at one of the two lower interval levels. Also, 
the size of the estimates increases as the interval size decreases. Even the lower bound of the 
95% confidence interval is approximately five percentage points when using a model with a 
£1,250 interval and a cubic function. However, it is worth noting that the other significant 
estimates are more conservative, with lower bounds closer to one percentage point. There is 
also evidence that the £10 payment influenced enrollment behavior. As with estimates for the 
£20 cut-off, estimates are significant for all models with the interval of £1,250. Significant 
point estimates range from nine to 15 percentage points, although the lower bound for these 
confidence intervals are around one percentage point.
We also test for heterogeneous effects of EMA payments according to recipients’ 
region, gender, age, and parental education. For region, we combine youth in the north and 
Midlands into a single sample due to restricted sample sizes,. Model estimates for 
heterogeneous effects by region are presented in Table 3.3. Columns (1) – (3) present model 
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estimates for youth in the south of England, and columns (4) – (6) present model estimates 
for youth in the north and the Midlands. The major notable difference between the regions is 
Table 3.3: RDD estimates for heterogeneous effects by region
South North and Midlands
Interval
(1)
Linear
(2)
Quadratic
(3)
Cubic
(4)
Linear
(5)
Quadratic
(6)
Cubic
£30 cut-off point
±3750 -0.046 -0.048 -0.092 0.045 0.038 0.059
 (0.062) (0.071) (0.079) (0.069) (0.069) (0.064)
±2500 -0.068 -0.067 -0.110 0.065 0.066 -0.004
 (0.073) (0.087) (0.086) (0.067) (0.080) (0.076)
±1750 -0.073 -0.068 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.038
 (0.074) (0.100) (0.078) (0.060) (0.090) (0.075)
±1250 -0.064 -0.054 0.118 -0.044 -0.047 0.170*
 (0.070) (0.115) (0.102) (0.071) (0.107) (0.098)
£20 cut-off point
±3750 0.056 0.060 0.193* -0.105 -0.105 0.041
 (0.089) (0.082) (0.101) (0.088) (0.089) (0.114)
±2500 0.151 0.153 0.184 -0.045 -0.028 0.142
 (0.100) (0.097) (0.121) (0.116) (0.106) (0.128)
±1750 0.193* 0.195* 0.223* 0.073 0.083 0.168
 (0.112) (0.109) (0.134) (0.122) (0.108) (0.149)
±1250 0.183 0.187 0.394*** 0.160 0.165 0.162
 (0.124) (0.116) (0.150) (0.137) (0.116) (0.156)
£10 cut-off point
±3750 -0.030 -0.040 -0.051 0.009 0.010 0.091
 (0.047) (0.038) (0.054) (0.069) (0.068) (0.079)
±2500 -0.031 -0.046 0.006 0.069 0.069 0.111
 (0.054) (0.045) (0.056) (0.074) (0.075) (0.098)
±1750 -0.041 -0.030 -0.009 0.092 0.087 0.227**
 (0.049) (0.054) (0.079) (0.087) (0.079) (0.104)
±1250 -0.008 -0.029 -0.081* 0.165* 0.172** 0.184*
(0.062) (0.048) (0.058) (0.091) (0.080)* (0.111)
Notes: Dependent variable whether or not an individual is enrolled in full-time 
education. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and
1 percent level, respectively. Source: Family Resource Survey 2004-2010.
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that there is consistent evidence that the £10 payment has a positive impact on enrollment 
among youth in the north and the Midlands, since four estimates were positive and significant
at the 10% level, including all three estimates with the narrowest interval. In contrast, there is
not comparable evidence of the £10 payment having a significant impact among youth in the 
south. This difference between the regions was statistically significant at the .01 level.
Columns (1) – (6) of Table 3.4 present separate model estimates for females and 
males, respectively. On the basis of these estimates, it would appear that the impact of EMA 
payments varies according to gender. For females, there is scant evidence that EMA 
payments influence their enrollment behavior at any payment level. In contrast, model 
estimates are consistently significant for males at the £10 and £20 payment levels when using
lower interval values, and of a similar magnitude to those for the whole group. However, 
statistical tests for differences between the groups were not significant.
For age, columns (7) – (12) of Table 3.4 present findings for 17- and 18-year-olds, 
respectively.6 There are more consistent positive results for 17 year-olds than for 18 year-
olds, at both the £20 and £10 levels. As with the models for the full sample and by gender, for
both age groups there is little if any evidence that the increase from the £20 to the £30 
payment has a significant impact on enrollment behavior. Statistical tests for differences 
between the groups were only significant in one instance, namely for the £10 payment when 
allowing for intervals of £1,250 on either side of the cut-off, in which case the payment had a 
higher impact on 18 year-olds.
6 Estimates for 16 year-olds are presented in Table 3.A4 of Appendix 3.A. These provided insignificant model 
estimates, suggesting a difference from 17- and 18-year-olds. However, the absence of birth month makes it 
impossible for us to distinguish between 16 year-olds who are and are not still in compulsory education (tenth 
grade).
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Table 3.4: RDD estimates for heterogeneous effects by gender and age
Females Males Age 17 Age 18
Interval
(1)
Linear
(2)
Quadratic
(3)
Cubic
(4)
Linear
(5)
Quadratic
(6)
Cubic
(7)
Linear
(8)
Quadratic
(9)
Cubic
(10)
Linear
(11)
Quadratic
(12)
Cubic
£30 cut-off point
±3750 0.00*** 0.02*** -0.05** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.02** -0.05** -0.05*** -0.08** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.14**
 (0.06)** (0.08)** (0.09)* (0.07)** (0.08)** (0.08)* (0.08)* (0.08)** (0.08)* (0.11)* (0.14)*** (0.14)*
±2500 0.02*** 0.00*** -0.05** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.05** -0.07** -0.07*** -0.123** 0.12** 0.14*** 0.18**
 (0.07)** (0.09)** (0.09)* (0.07)** (0.09)** (0.09)* (0.08)* (0.10)** (0.09)* (0.14)* (0.16)** (0.14)*
±1750 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.02** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.07** -0.12** -0.12*** -0.01** 0.15** 0.16*** 0.23**
 (0.06)** (0.08)** (0.09)* (0.09)** (0.11)** (0.09)* (0.078)* (0.11)** (0.10)* (0.13)* (0.19)** (0.17)*
±1250 -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.06** -0.07*** -0.07*** 0.22** -0.10** -0.10*** 0.20** 0.14** 0.15*** 0.12**
 (0.07)** (0.10)** (0.12)* (0.10)** (0.12)** (0.11)* (0.11)* (0.13)** (0.13)* (0.12)* (0.22)** (0.19)*
£20 cut-off point
±3750 -0.07*** -0.06*** 0.11** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.09** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.21** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.27***
 (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.11)* (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.09)* (0.12)* (0.11)** (0.11)* (0.10)* (0.10)** (0.10)*
±2500 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.19** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.19** 0.15** 0.15*** 0.28** 0.18** 0.18*** 0.27**
 (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)* (0.09)** (0.09)** (0.08)* (0.11)* (0.11)** (0.12)* (0.10)* (0.10)** (0.12)*
±1750 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.25*** 0.22** 0.22*** 0.35** 0.24** 0.24*** 0.10**
 (0.10)** (0.09)** (0.15)* (0.08)** (0.09)** (0.08)* (0.12)* (0.11)** (0.15)* (0.11)* (0.12)** (0.18)*
±1250 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.23** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.35** 0.17** 0.15*** 0.10**
 (0.12)** (0.11)** (0.17)* (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.09)* (0.13)* (0.12)** (0.16)* (0.13)* (0.12)** (0.18)*
£10 cut-off point
±3750 -0.05*** -0.05*** 0.01** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.05** -0.08** -0.08*** 0.05** -0.08** -0.08*** 0.05**
 (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.08)* (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.07)* (0.06)* (0.06)** (0.06)* (0.06)* (0.06)** (0.06)*
±2500 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.14** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06** 0.02** 0.023** 0.12** 0.07** 0.08*** 0.26***
 (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.09)* (0.07)** (0.06)** (0.07)* (0.06)* (0.06)** (0.06)* (0.16)* (0.17)** (0.06)*
±1750 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.14** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.15*** 0.08** 0.08*** 0.13** 0.11** 0.13*** 0.46**
 (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.12)* (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.05)* (0.07)* (0.07)** (0.08)* (0.19)* (0.19)** (0.22)*
±1250 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.09** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.14** 0.08** 0.08*** 0.23*** 0.32** 0.30*** 0.32**
(0.10)** (0.09)** (0.13)* (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.05)* (0.06)* (0.06)** (0.07)* (0.18)* (0.17)** (0.23)*
Notes: Dependent variable whether or not an individual is enrolled in full-time education. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 
5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Source: Family Resource Survey 2004-2010.
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In addition, we tested for differences according to parental education, the results of 
which are presented in Tables 3.A5 and 3.A6 of Appendix 3.A. Although a greater number of 
model estimates are significant among youths without a degree-educated parent, just one of 
these estimates proved significantly different between the groups: the £10 payment when 
allowing for intervals of £1,250 on either side of the cut-off, in which case the payment had a 
higher impact on youths without a degree-educated parent. However, it is worth noting that 
very few youths in the sample had both a degree-educated parent and a sufficiently low 
household income to be eligible for the EMA, and so we choose not to put too much stock in 
this finding.
Discussion and conclusions
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first large-scale inferential analysis of the 
EMA during its national rollout or, for that matter, of any conditional cash transfer carried out
in the entirety of a high-income country. Our findings are all the more compelling because we
use nationally representative data collected during the program’s full implementation. This 
advances prior literature on the EMA’s pilot phase because it enables a more geographically 
and temporally expansive view of the program’s impact. In addition, our use of a regression-
discontinuity design is likely to provide the most robust casual estimates in the absence of a 
randomized controlled trial. 
Our findings indicate that the EMA had a positive impact on enrollment in education 
among eligible youths, thus corroborating claims by the most robust prior research on the 
policy, by Dearden et al. (2009) and Middleton et al. (2003). While the size of some 
confidence intervals means that we do not attach too much weight to the exact estimates 
provided by the models, the consistency of significant non-zero results provides strong 
grounds to reject the null hypothesis of no impact of the EMA on enrollment. These findings 
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verify a core concept of human capital theory: that youth evaluate short-term financial costs 
when making enrollment decisions and are responsive to reductions in these costs.
Of our tests for heterogeneous treatment effects, perhaps the most interesting is the 
apparent regional difference for the £10 payment: it seems to have a larger impact on 
enrollment among youth in the North and the Midlands than among youth in the South. This 
difference is logical; the cost of living and earnings are typically lower in the North and the 
Midlands, making the relative value of the payment was greater for youth in those regions 
than for youth in the South. This suggests that youth are sensitive to the value of conditional 
cash transfers, and calls into question whether the EMA might have been more effective had 
its value not been held constant for its duration. 
Unfortunately, we are unable to test whether the EMA affected achievement as well as
enrollment. As far as we know, the Family Resources Survey is the only data source with a 
sufficient number of respondents and detailed information on earnings to make an RD 
approach feasible. However, its cross-sectional nature means that it is not possible to track 
youth around the eligibility thresholds to see whether the EMA also influenced their 
achievement and receipt of qualifications. Since our findings confirm that increases in 
enrollment during the pilot extended to the national rollout, it is plausible that this increase 
was reflected in the increases in achievement identified by Chowdry et al. (2007). 
Unfortunately though, the absence of appropriate data means that we do not think it is 
possible to test this empirically.
Nonetheless, future research could extend this paper’s analysis in several ways. More 
qualitative approaches could explore the mechanisms by which the EMA influences 
enrollment behavior. For example, it would be useful to policymakers to know whether 
knowledge of EMA in early years of schooling expanded the program’s impact, or how the 
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application and payment processes might influence take-up. In addition, both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches might further investigate whether the EMA’s impact is greater for 
especially disadvantaged subgroups of the population, such as youths with disabilities. With a
longitudinal approach, future research could extend our understanding of the EMA’s effect on
future outcomes, such as enrollment in higher education or employment. Such analyses of 
outcomes in later years would improve our ability to make meaningful assessments of the 
cost-effectiveness of the EMA.
It is important though to reiterate that the regression-discontinuity design provides 
local area treatment effects. Since we can only focus on youths close to the eligibility 
thresholds, it is not possible to make claims about the EMA’s impact on the most financially 
disadvantaged youths. The incumbent coalition government’s replacement to the EMA – the 
16–19 bursary fund – focuses on youths below the income threshold for the £30 EMA 
payment. Unfortunately, our analysis strategy does not make it possible to estimate the 
EMA’s impact on equivalent youths in order to offer a point of comparison with any future 
research on the replacement bursary policy.
Nonetheless, our findings also add to current debates on education policy and access 
in England. As Britain nears a national election, tuition fee levels have attracted much of the 
attention in education policy. Yet, although reducing the direct costs of university would 
appear to be a pro-access measure, it may represent a greater de facto subsidy to the middle 
classes than more needs-targeted programs such as the EMA. Past research (for example, 
Anders, 2012; Chowdry et al., 2013; Galindo-Rueda, Marcenaro-Gutierrez, & Vignoles, 
2004) provides compelling evidence that disparities do not occur at the point of making 
applications, but years before. Access policies must thus focus on the years preceding 
university.
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 It remains unclear whether the raising of the school-leaving age and the 16–19 
bursary fund may help students progress to higher education. The first of these policies only 
mandates a level of education or training far lower than the type of full-time education 
necessary to progress to higher education. The second transfers a far lower total sum to 
students than the EMA did, and a lack of clarity over its conditions may lessen the extent to 
which it influences students’ post-16 decisions. However, this is speculation; to date, there is 
not yet research on whether either policy has widened access to post-compulsory education. 
In the meantime, our findings suggest that the English government has abolished a policy that
is accurate in targeting, and effective in supporting, poorer students to progress in full-time, 
post-compulsory education.
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Appendix 3.A: Supplementary model estimates
Table 3.A1: RDD Estimates of the effect of EMA eligibility on enrollment, when excluding 
step-parental income from household income.
 Linear Quadratic Cubic
Interval (1) (2) (3)
£30 cutoff point
±3750 0.009  0.009  0.043  
 (0.054)  (0.049)  (0.056)  
±2500 0.044  0.045  0.009  
 (0.056)  (0.059)  (0.061)  
±1750 0.017  0.016  0.115 *
 (0.057)  (0.067)  (0.069)  
±1250 0.016  0.017  0.228 ***
 (0.065)  (0.079)  (0.088)  
£20 cutoff point
±3750 -0.042  -0.042  0.052  
 (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.058)  
±2500 0.008  0.012  0.072  
 (0.055)  (0.051)  (0.060)  
±1750 0.058  0.062  0.085  
 (0.062)  (0.051)  (0.062)  
±1250 0.068  0.068  0.103  
 (0.062)  (0.060)  (0.072)  
£10 cutoff point
±3750 -0.027  -0.031  0.011  
 (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.052)  
±2500 -0.003  -0.006  0.080 *
 (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.047)  
±1750 0.047  0.037  0.124 **
 (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.049)  
±1250 0.083 * 0.080 * 0.146 ***
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.056)  
Source: Family Resource Surveys: 2004-2010
Notes: Dependent variable whether or not an individual is 
enrolled in education. One, two, and three asterisks indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, 
respectively.
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Table 3.A2: RDD Estimates of the effect of EMA eligibility on enrollment, with additional 
regressors included.
 Linear Quadratic Cubic
Interval (1) (2) (3)
£30 cut-off point
±3750 0.002  0.002  -0.004  
 (0.051)  (0.047)  (0.054)  
±2500 0.004  0.006  -0.038  
 (0.053)  (0.056)  (0.050)  
±1750 -0.033  -0.032  0.055  
 (0.054)  (0.064)  (0.056)  
±1250 -0.026  -0.024  0.155 *
 (0.058)  (0.076)  (0.078)  
£20 cut-off point
±3750 -0.001  -0.001  0.136 **
 (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.069)  
±2500 0.091  0.099  0.202 ***
 (0.074)  (0.069)  (0.076)  
±1750 0.172 ** 0.173 ** 0.262 ***
 (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.084)  
±1250 0.249 *** 0.249 *** 0.352 ***
 (0.066)  (0.064)  (0.080)  
£10 cut-off point
±3750 -0.029  -0.030  0.011  
 (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.045)  
±2500 0.008  0.011  0.062  
 (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.057)  
±1750 -0.006  -0.007  0.069  
 (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.071)  
±1250 0.054  0.051  0.083  
 (0.067)  (0.065)  (0.080)  
Source: Family Resource Surveys: 2004-2010
Notes: Dependent variable whether or not an individual is enrolled 
in full-time education. One, two, and three asterisks indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. Estimates include controls for gender, age, parent’s 
education, region of the country, and month and year of survey
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Table 3.A3: RDD Estimates of the effect of EMA eligibility on enrollment for the full sample, 
using local linear regression estimates.
 £30 cutoff point £20 cutoff point £10 cutoff point
Sample (1) (2) (3)
All -0.036  0.202 * 0.114  
 (-0.462)  (1.690)  (1.107)  
Males 0.084  0.205  0.118  
 (0.695)  (1.002)  (0.882)  
Females -0.096  0.179  0.115  
 (-0.651)  (1.257)  (0.147)  
Aged 16 0.005  0.176  0.164  
 (0.223)  (1.415)  (0.699)  
Aged 17 0.016  0.254  -0.014  
 (0.282)  (1.110)  (0.170)  
Aged 18 -0.303  0.321  0.233  
 (-0.898)  (0.789)  (0.692)  
Parent with Uni Degree -0.143  
    -
 0.110  
 (-1.226)   (0.122)  
No Parent with Uni Degree 0.243  0.239 * 0.147  
 (1.319)  (1.858)  (1.169)  
Source: Family Resource Surveys: 2004-2010
Notes: Dependent variable whether or not an individual is enrolled in school. One, 
two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
level, respectively. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Estimates based 
on Epanechnikov kernel.
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Table 3.A4: RDD Estimates of the effect of EMA eligibility on enrollment among 16 year-
olds.
 Linear Quadratic Cubic
Interval (1) (2) (3)
£30 cutoff point
±3750 0.060  0.059  0.007  
 (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.069)  
±2500 0.032  0.031  -0.088  
 (0.066)  (0.061)  (0.091)  
±1750 -0.019  -0.020  -0.099  
 (0.076)  (0.073)  (0.113)  
±1250 -0.099  -0.097  0.017  
 (0.097)  (0.092)  (0.156)  
£20 cutoff point
±3750 -0.016  -0.017  -0.025  
 (0.060)  (0.061)  (0.085)  
±2500 -0.068  -0.066  0.002  
 (0.078)  (0.078)  (0.107)  
±1750 0.004  0.010  0.103  
 (0.086)  (0.087)  (0.103)  
±1250 0.044  0.023  0.177 **
 (0.107)  (0.099)  (0.087)  
£10 cutoff point
±3750 -0.007  -0.017  -0.015  
 (0.047)  (0.043)  (0.057)  
±2500 -0.027  -0.028  -0.037  
 (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.060)  
±1750 -0.038  -0.041  0.015  
 (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.069)  
±1250 -0.008  -0.012  -0.029  
 (0.070)  (0.059)  (0.076)  
Source: Family Resource Surveys: 2004-2010
Notes: Dependent variable whether or not an individual is enrolled 
in school. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 3.A5: RDD Estimates of the effect of EMA eligibility on enrollment among those whose 
parents do not have a degree.
 (1) (2) (3)
Interval Linear Quadratic Cubic
£30 cut-off point
±3750 -0.002  -0.004  -0.028  
 (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.058)  
±2500 -0.013  -0.013  -0.068  
 (0.059)  (0.064)  (0.065)  
±1750 -0.044  -0.044  0.011  
 (0.055)  (0.073)  (0.078)  
±1250 -0.073  -0.071  0.127  
 (0.070)  (0.085)  (0.105)  
£20 cut-off point
±3750 -0.007  -0.007  0.130  
 (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.082)  
±2500 0.074  0.079  0.194 **
 (0.083)  (0.078)  (0.086)  
±1750 0.156 * 0.157 ** 0.214 **
 (0.082)  (0.080)  (0.099)  
±1250 0.197 ** 0.195 ** 0.304 ***
 (0.090)  (0.086)  (0.234)  
£10 cut-off point
±3750 0.009  0.008  0.031  
 (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.059)  
±2500 0.031  0.031  0.071  
 (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.064)  
±1750 0.041  0.039  0.147 **
 (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.061)  
±1250 0.098  0.096 * 0.174 ***
 (0.062)  (0.055)  (0.061)  
Source: Family Resource Surveys: 2004-2010
Notes: Dependent variable whether or not an individual is enrolled 
in full-time education. One, two, and three asterisks indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, 
respectively.
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Table 3.A6: RDD Estimates of the effect of EMA eligibility on enrollment among those whose 
parents have a degree.
 Linear Quadratic Cubic
Interval (1) (2) (3)
£30 cut-off point
±3750 0.039  0.060  0.156 *
 (0.109)  (0.107)  (0.094)  
±2500 0.152  0.155  0.139  
 (0.081)  (0.109)  (0.087)  
±1750 0.153 * 0.145  0.142  
 (0.083)  (0.104)  (0.096)  
±1250 0.120  0.120  0.192 *
 (0.090)  (0.147)  (0.111)  
£20 cut-off point
±3750 -0.198 * -0.193  -0.025  
 (0.113)  (0.117)  (0.151)  
±2500 -0.116  -0.134  -0.161  
 (0.130)  (0.131)  (0.141)  
±1750 -0.096  -0.101  -0.134  
 (0.121)  (0.130)  (0.196)  
±1250 -0.116  -0.085  -0.088  
 (0.143)  (0.171)  (0.234)  
£10 cut-off point
±3750 -0.121  -0.118  -0.031  
 (0.066)  (0.064)  (0.070)  
±2500 -0.060  -0.048  0.044  
 (0.071)  (0.063)  (0.114)  
±1750 0.028  -0.008  -0.023  
 (0.185)  (0.071)  (0.141)  
±1250 0.048  -0.001  -0.395 **
 (0.169)  (0.113)  (0.154)  
Source: Family Resource Surveys: 2004-2010
Notes: Dependent variable whether or not an 
individual is enrolled in full-time education. One, 
two, and three asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, 
respectively.
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Conclusion 
Educational access continues to be a major policy concern in England. Inequalities remain 
entrenched: for all the efforts of practitioners, politicians and researchers, a student’s 
background remains a strong determinant of her progression to higher education. Effective 
policymaking is crucial to redressing this, but effective policymaking is reliant on well-
informed theory, grounded in empirical research. 
My thesis comprises three distinct, but related, studies of influences on student 
behavior that may alter access inequalities. I hope that their collective impact will be to 
broaden the ways in which our research field investigates access. Too often, theoretical 
divisions also mirror methodological divisions. This is a problem because the complementary
affordances of different methodologies are rarely applied to a given theorization or 
hypothesis. In an attempt to ameliorate this shortcoming, I apply inferential methods to assess
theories that researchers in the UK have only studied with qualitative methods to date. I hope 
that this will encourage other researchers to be more flexible in how they pair theory and 
methods. In addition, I make original use of an administrative dataset – primarily focused on 
employment, earnings, and wealth – to evaluate the national impact of an education policy, 
when we had previously been reliant on data from that policy’s pilot phase. I hope this will 
encourage other education researchers to consider how to make more innovative use of the 
rich data in England that do not necessarily focus on education. Such changes in thinking can 
expand the evidentiary base from which policy and research are developed.
In chapter 1, I assess the role of teacher encouragement to enroll in the final, non-
compulsory years of high school on students’ observed enrollment behavior, both in those 
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final years and in undergraduate degree programs. Education researchers in England have 
invoked Bourdieu’s theorization of habitus to claim that social interactions influence 
students’ enrollment behavior by altering the extent to which they think further education is 
feasible and desirable, and that the effect of these interactions depends on students’ social 
class. My findings corroborate both of these claims: it seems that teacher encouragement does
change students’ ensuing enrollment behavior, and that this impact is greatest for students 
from lower socio-economic groups. Furthermore, the fact that encouragement can have a 
positive effect supports researchers who have diverged from Bourdieu’s work by claiming 
that teachers can challenge educational inequalities.
These findings offer robust quantitative evidence for a factor that, to the best of my 
knowledge, prior research has only tested with small-scale, cross-sectional, qualitative 
methods. Thus, the scale and longitudinal nature of the present inferential study may help to 
widen the audience who would countenance the role of teacher encouragement in students’ 
progress to higher education. It may also expand debates on the role of teachers in supporting
more disadvantaged student groups: where there is currently a narrow focus on teachers 
raising exam attainment among pupils, the relational aspects of their work might now receive 
greater attention too.
In chapter 2, I assess the impact of discrete grade labels from national eighth grade 
exams on students’ enrollment in undergraduate degree programs five to seven years later. I 
find that grade labels lead to a bifurcation in achievement and enrollment behavior among 
students who are otherwise indistinguishable from one another. This finding supports 
theorizations from a range of conceptual traditions in psychology, economics, and sociology. 
In addition, effects appear to be greater among students from lower socio-economic groups, 
supporting the theorization that working-class students are particularly susceptible to the 
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summative judgments of their ability that they receive in formal education. 
This finding is especially worrying given that the purported goal of these 
examinations was to judge school quality rather than student progress. Although it could be 
argued that the labelling effect is as much a boon for those receiving the higher grade as it is a
detriment to those receiving the lower grade, past sociological research emphasizes the latter. 
This paper’s quasi-experimental design and longitudinal approach bolsters the research 
literature, and might encourage researchers and policymakers to think more carefully about 
how one conducts and provides feedback on the many instances of formal assessment that 
currently occur in the English education system. The case for reform is all the stronger given 
that these ostensibly low-stakes exams have negative consequences for historically 
underrepresented students.
Chapter 3 is more conventional in the sense that its theoretical and empirical 
approaches are commonly used in conjunction with one another in the research literature. 
Human capital theory suggests that conditional cash transfers will increase enrollment in 
education, as in students’ decision-making they offset the short-term costs that risk 
outweighing the longer-term benefits of education. Robust inferential research already exists 
to suggest that the UK’s primary conditional cash transfer policy, the Education Maintenance 
Allowance (EMA), was able to increase enrollment during its pilot stage. In this chapter, 
Brian McCall and I extend this research considerably by assessing the EMA’s impact during 
its full implementation, i.e., at the national scale and for multiple student cohorts. We are able
to do this by using administrative datasets whose scale and detailed income information 
permit robust regression-discontinuity estimates with nationally representative data. 
While Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have maintained more generous variants 
of the Education Maintenance Allowance, England’s current government has discontinued the
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program, claiming that is was ineffective and expensive. Our findings contradict the first of 
these claims. We find that the EMA increased full-time enrollment in post-compulsory 
education, thus corroborating both human capital theory and prior evaluations of the EMA 
during its pilot stage. However, we do not fully engage with the latter claim largely because 
any cost-benefit analysis should account for the true impact of this apparent boost in 
enrollment. Future research could aid this shortcoming by investigating the impact of the 
EMA on later educational qualifications and employment outcomes. If such work were to 
find a positive impact commensurate with our findings on enrollment, it would lend further 
support to the decision of the other governments of the United Kingdom to continue 
supporting their EMA programs.
As a set, these chapters demonstrate the multi-faceted nature of inequalities in access 
to higher education. By working from varied theoretical traditions, I provide evidence for a 
range of conceptualizations of behavior and influencing factors. My emphasis on socio-
economic class disparities should not mask the fact that there are numerous sources of 
disadvantage that are likely to act in mutually dependent and re-enforcing ways. Yet, even 
when focusing on a single element of inequality, my findings demonstrate that many factors 
play a role in shaping disparities. Research ought to reflect this complexity. The emphasis 
here on quantitative inference should not be mistaken for empirical dogmatism: a breadth of 
methodological approaches is of the utmost importance to effective policy research. The 
entrenched nature of disadvantage means that researchers and policymakers face an uphill 
struggle in helping rectify inequalities. If we are to truly make inroads, policy researchers 
must take a methodologically expansive, diverse, and cooperative approach to their work. 
